

<p>1 Wednesday, 26 April 2017</p> <p>2 (10.30 am)</p> <p>3 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Beer.</p> <p>4 MR BEER: Sir, thank you. Ian Arundale, please.</p> <p>5 MR IAN ARUNDALE (sworn)</p> <p>6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Arundale. It is up to you</p> <p>7 whether you sit or stand.</p> <p>8 <b>A. I will stand, sir.</b></p> <p>9 <b>Questions from MR BEER</b></p> <p>10 MR BEER: Mr Arundale, as you know, my name is Jason Beer</p> <p>11 and I ask questions on behalf of the Inquiry. In front</p> <p>12 of you there there should be a folder containing two</p> <p>13 documents.</p> <p>14 The first of them is your report of 4 November 2016,</p> <p>15 which I think spans between pages 1 and 176, including</p> <p>16 the appendix.</p> <p>17 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>18 Q. Then, secondly, a supplementary report dated</p> <p>19 5 April 2017, which spans between pages 1 and 49, again</p> <p>20 including the appendix which was the supplemental letter</p> <p>21 of instruction.</p> <p>22 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>23 Q. Are the contents of those two reports true to the best</p> <p>24 of your knowledge and belief?</p> <p>25 <b>A. Yes, sir. Just a few minor typographical errors.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 1</p>	<p>1 <b>issues, but primarily in relation to police decision</b></p> <p>2 <b>making, the use of force and firearms incidents.</b></p> <p>3 Q. Has that included giving expert evidence?</p> <p>4 <b>A. Yes, it has, sir.</b></p> <p>5 Q. In courts and tribunals?</p> <p>6 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>7 Q. Can I briefly turn to your academic qualifications.</p> <p>8 I think you have a BA in police studies obtained in</p> <p>9 1991; is that right?</p> <p>10 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>11 Q. An MSc in criminology and criminal justice obtained in</p> <p>12 1994?</p> <p>13 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>14 Q. In 1995 you were awarded the Fulbright Scholarship to</p> <p>15 study police management and operations in the</p> <p>16 United States of America?</p> <p>17 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>18 Q. And you have a postgraduate diploma in applied</p> <p>19 criminology and police studies from the University of</p> <p>20 Cambridge?</p> <p>21 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>22 Q. In terms of your policing background, can I start please</p> <p>23 with non-firearms issues. Did you have operational</p> <p>24 policing experience other than relating to firearms?</p> <p>25 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 3</p>
<p>1 Q. Right, I will overlook those for the moment, if any of</p> <p>2 them are of substance perhaps you can point them out as</p> <p>3 we go along.</p> <p>4 <b>A. I don't believe they are, sir.</b></p> <p>5 Q. Thank you.</p> <p>6 By way of background. Your service within the</p> <p>7 police service, please. Is it right that you joined the</p> <p>8 police service in 1980?</p> <p>9 <b>A. That's correct, sir.</b></p> <p>10 Q. And you served until 2012, so 32 years of police</p> <p>11 service?</p> <p>12 <b>A. Yes, sir, June 2012.</b></p> <p>13 Q. In 2000 you became the assistant chief constable of West</p> <p>14 Mercia Police?</p> <p>15 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>16 Q. In 2005 the deputy chief constable of West Mercia</p> <p>17 Police?</p> <p>18 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>19 Q. Then in 2008 the chief constable of Dyfed-Powys Police?</p> <p>20 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>21 Q. I think you retired as the chief constable of</p> <p>22 Dyfed-Powys Police, as you have said, in June 2012?</p> <p>23 <b>A. I did.</b></p> <p>24 Q. Since June 2012 what have you been doing?</p> <p>25 <b>A. I have been doing consultancy services on a range of</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 2</p>	<p>1 Q. Did any of that include the investigation of serious</p> <p>2 crime?</p> <p>3 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>4 Q. Can you tell us what that involved?</p> <p>5 <b>A. Yes. I was a detective from 1983 to 1990, with a short</b></p> <p>6 <b>spell in uniform as a sergeant of just less than a year.</b></p> <p>7 <b>So I investigated serious crime in the city of Cardiff,</b></p> <p>8 <b>armed robberies, rapes, sexual offences in general,</b></p> <p>9 <b>a whole range of offences as you would expect from</b></p> <p>10 <b>a large city.</b></p> <p>11 Q. Did you ever hold a position where you were required to</p> <p>12 investigate organised crime?</p> <p>13 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>14 Q. Was that at the same time?</p> <p>15 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>16 Q. Did you have experience of what is described as file</p> <p>17 building for the purposes of bringing a case to the CPS</p> <p>18 and then to court?</p> <p>19 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>20 Q. And, in that job, liaison with the Crown Prosecution</p> <p>21 Service?</p> <p>22 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>23 Q. Did you, as part of your job, require to identify</p> <p>24 evidential tipping points, ie not in the context of</p> <p>25 a decision whether a TFC should take some action in</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 4</p>

<p>1 order to protect the public, but to determine whether 2 there was sufficient evidence to arrest and/or charge? 3 <b>A. Yes, sir, both on my own and in conjunction with the 4 Crown Prosecution Service.</b> 5 Q. Was that a regular feature of your job? 6 <b>A. It was, sir.</b> 7 Q. Daily? 8 <b>A. Weekly certainly, if not daily.</b> 9 Q. In terms of your background and experience in firearms. 10 I think overall you spent 22 years as a firearms 11 commander; is that right? 12 <b>A. That's correct, sir.</b> 13 Q. That was from 1990 to 2012? 14 <b>A. Yes.</b> 15 Q. Can we start with your role as a bronze commander. Was 16 that between 1990 and 1995? 17 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b> 18 Q. Was that in South Wales Police? 19 <b>A. It was.</b> 20 Q. Can you give us a pen picture of what that job involved 21 as a bronze commander at South Wales Police in the early 22 1990s? 23 <b>A. Yes, sir. Primarily that would have been spontaneous 24 firearms incidents, rather than planned firearms 25 incidents which is the nature of Operation Shire, at</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 5</p>	<p>1 incidents were? 2 <b>A. Yes, sir. At that point in my career I was part of 3 a cadre that covered the force area and I would work 4 night shifts covering the force to respond to incidents, 5 as well as having a day job. When I was working nights 6 I would be dedicated towards that with a small cadre of 7 other people who were trained to deliver those services. 8 That would be the whole range and remit of firearms 9 incidents you get, ranging from fairly low level air 10 rifle incidents to serious armed robberies, kidnappings, 11 threat to kill and even counter terrorist incidents as 12 well on occasion.</b> 13 Q. You say in your report that that number includes counter 14 terrorism incidents, armed robberies and shootings. Is 15 that right? 16 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b> 17 Q. Did that involve both spontaneous and pre-planned 18 firearms operations? 19 <b>A. Yes, sir. At that point in my career it was both.</b> 20 Q. I think in 2000 you moved from South Wales Police to 21 West Mercia Police; is that right? 22 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b> 23 Q. On promotion to become an assistant chief constable? 24 <b>A. I did.</b> 25 Q. Then did you from that point on perform the function of</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 7</p>
<p>1 <b>that point in my career but it would be responding to 2 all incidents that occurred in my policing area and ones 3 that I would be delegated to attend and deal with.</b> 4 <b>It wouldn't just be firearms incidents, it would be 5 a whole range of issues and incidents but firearms were 6 a core part of that.</b> 7 Q. This was in the South Wales Police area. That included 8 Cardiff, is that right? 9 <b>A. It did, sir. I was primarily at that time based in 10 Cardiff, and subsequently Swansea, which are the two 11 major conurbations.</b> 12 Q. At this time what would you say would be the regularity 13 of firearms deployments? 14 <b>A. Almost daily but not quite, but certainly possibly three 15 times a week I would be involved in an incident of that 16 nature.</b> 17 Q. Between 1995 and 2000, I think you acted as a silver 18 commander, is that right? 19 <b>A. That's correct, sir.</b> 20 Q. Was that still in South Wales Police? 21 <b>A. It was.</b> 22 Q. You say in your report that you commanded well over 100 23 major police deployments as a silver commander. 24 <b>A. Yes, sir, at least that.</b> 25 Q. Can you give us a pen picture of what those types of</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 6</p>	<p>1 a gold commander? 2 <b>A. Yes, a strategic firearms commander, sir, yes.</b> 3 Q. By that time, 2000, was it known as an SFC? 4 <b>A. The documentation at that time still said "gold", but we 5 were starting to transition to changing guidance because 6 incidents could have a gold commander and a strategic 7 firearms commander, to avoid confusion.</b> 8 Q. I think you served there as an SFC from 2000 to 2008? 9 <b>A. That's correct, sir.</b> 10 Q. Could you describe the nature of the West Mercia Police 11 area? 12 <b>A. Yes, sir. It is the largest landlocked force in England 13 and Wales itself, borders the West Midlands conurbation 14 and it has a standard range of firearms incidents and 15 challenges that you would expect across a force area of 16 that nature. It had the armed robberies, shootings, 17 fatal shootings down to the numerous minor incidents 18 which would involve air weapons and the threats of the 19 use of a weapon which didn't exist.</b> 20 Q. Did it, West Mercia area, house the national firearms 21 training centre or a national firearms training centre? 22 <b>A. Yes, sir. It was a national firearms centre; there were 23 other accredited centres at that time.</b> 24 Q. What does that mean, being a national firearms training 25 centre?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 8</p>

1 **A. It was an acknowledged centre of excellence where police**  
 2 **forces up and down the country would send their AFOs and**  
 3 **commanders to be trained to national standards.**  
 4 Q. It provided training to other forces; is that right?  
 5 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 6 Q. I think we have heard that between 2008 and 2012 GMP did  
 7 not have a full training licence --  
 8 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 9 Q. -- as it has been described. What does that mean, not  
 10 having a full training licence?  
 11 **A. I think it was described in the -- during this Inquiry**  
 12 **as "being in special measures", something akin to**  
 13 **an OFSTED type situation. What it generally would mean**  
 14 **is that other forces would not necessarily see them as a**  
 15 **supplier of choice of firearms courses at that time**  
 16 **until their training licence had been resolved. But**  
 17 **they could continue to deliver internal services.**  
 18 Q. The West Mercia firearms training, how was that seen  
 19 nationally?  
 20 **A. It is fair to say it was regarded as a centre of**  
 21 **excellence, a centre of good practice.**  
 22 Q. Between 2000 and 2008 what type of incidents did you  
 23 deploy in?  
 24 **A. Starting at the top, we had a dedicated MASTS capability**  
 25 **similar to the one that has been described and explained**

Page 9

1 **during this Inquiry. In addition to that we had those**  
 2 **officers who were surveillance trained as well, so we**  
 3 **had an enhanced capability which was similar only to**  
 4 **that available in the Metropolitan Police at that time.**  
 5 Q. Just before you go on there, you said an armed  
 6 surveillance capability. So is that different to what  
 7 we have heard GMP did, which was using MASTS as a bolt  
 8 on to a surveillance operation?  
 9 **A. That's correct, sir.**  
 10 **I also had the option and commanded a team of people**  
 11 **that could do both of those issues at the same time.**  
 12 **They were trained surveillance officers and they were**  
 13 **trained MASTS officers, so they could deliver the**  
 14 **enhanced capability and carry out surveillance.**  
 15 Q. I think you said that the Met did that?  
 16 **A. I believe at that time the only other -- other than the**  
 17 **military and other law enforcement agencies**  
 18 **[redacted] -- police force I believe at that time was**  
 19 **West Mercia.**  
 20 Q. And the Met?  
 21 **A. And the Met, sorry, yes.**  
 22 Q. Yes.  
 23 **A. Sorry, your question was what type of firearms threats**  
 24 **did I deal with?**  
 25 Q. Yes.

Page 10

1 **A. Obviously there was the organised crime issue across**  
 2 **force areas, and it was a fairly regular issue for me to**  
 3 **command operations which spanned across a number of**  
 4 **force areas and I can recall up to five force areas**  
 5 **where organised crime groups were committing crime over**  
 6 **a wide area.**  
 7 Q. Can you give us any examples of that, please?  
 8 **A. One example would be an organised crime group that was**  
 9 **based in the Gloucestershire police area, just on the**  
 10 **edge of West Mercia, they were committing country house**  
 11 **burglaries and cashpoint thefts, stealing the actual**  
 12 **cashpoint machines, right across Gloucestershire, Thames**  
 13 **Valle, Avon and Somerset, Wiltshire and the West Mercia**  
 14 **Police area. I commanded that operation, as an example**  
 15 **of one where I would be commanding major crime,**  
 16 **organised crime groups across large areas. That was**  
 17 **over a long period of time before the matter was**  
 18 **resolved.**  
 19 Q. You said they were stealing cashpoints, how were they  
 20 stealing cashpoints?  
 21 **A. They would steal JCB diggers, or similar equipment,**  
 22 **steal a low loader lorry, put the JCB on to the lorry**  
 23 **and then take it to locations such as remote towns,**  
 24 **motorway service stations and actually dig the cashpoint**  
 25 **machines out and take them away with them in**

Page 11

1 **high-powered vehicles.**  
 2 Q. Was that a MASTS operation that you commanded?  
 3 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 4 Q. Did that involve the authorisation for the deployment of  
 5 special munitions?  
 6 **A. It did, sir.**  
 7 Q. What kind of special munitions?  
 8 **A. I considered the use of RIP on that occasion and Hatton**  
 9 **rounds, because the use of the JCB vehicles being driven**  
 10 **at police cars was a very difficult threat to counter**  
 11 **and we considered but didn't deploy and actually use RIP**  
 12 **during that, but I did authorise its issue.**  
 13 Q. In 2000 to 2008, did all forces have a MASTS capability?  
 14 **A. No, sir, it was a fairly rare or comparatively rare**  
 15 **service to have available within police forces but there**  
 16 **are a number of other options other than MASTS which can**  
 17 **deliver a similar outcome.**  
 18 THE CHAIRMAN: Was that at that particular time or you mean  
 19 now?  
 20 **A. There are those capabilities now delivered by counter**  
 21 **terrorist hubs for example. The policing landscape in**  
 22 **relation to firearms is now very, very different to what**  
 23 **it was some years ago, but at that time to have**  
 24 **a dedicated MASTS capability within forces was not the**  
 25 **norm.**

Page 12

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.  
 2 MR BEER: Countrywide, what proportion of forces do you  
 3 think would have a MASTS capability at this time?  
 4 **A. I can't recall the numbers, but it was certainly less**  
 5 **than a quarter, far less than that.**  
 6 Q. What would the reasons for not having a MASTS capability  
 7 be?  
 8 **A. I think (1) it is a hugely expensive force to have,**  
 9 **because of the equipment, the vehicles and the training**  
 10 **that is required, a significant abstraction is required**  
 11 **to get AFOs up to speed to deliver that actual**  
 12 **capability.**  
 13 Q. Did you say "extraction"?  
 14 **A. Abstraction from normal duty, because there would be**  
 15 **an additional training requirement.**  
 16 **The other issue would be the operational**  
 17 **requirement, many forces did not see that they had**  
 18 **a crime problem, an OCG problem that justified the**  
 19 **expense and provision of a MASTS capability and they**  
 20 **would request it and pay for it if it was necessary or**  
 21 **they would use alternative tactical methods to deal with**  
 22 **the threat.**  
 23 Q. I think in 2008, you moved on promotion to be the chief  
 24 constable of Dyfed-Powys?  
 25 **A. Yes, sir.**

Page 13

1 Q. Did you continue any command function as the chief  
 2 constable for firearms operations?  
 3 **A. No, in terms of firearms then it became very limited and**  
 4 **it tailed off. Technically my accreditation probably**  
 5 **was still in being until about 2011/beginning of 2012,**  
 6 **but it significantly tailed off. The major part of my**  
 7 **service where I was an SFC was when I was in West**  
 8 **Mercia, although I did perform the function on**  
 9 **occasions.**  
 10 Q. As a strategic firearms commander, did you supervise any  
 11 strategic firearms commanders in Dyfed-Powys in any way?  
 12 **A. Yes, sir, obviously I supervised all of the strategic**  
 13 **firearms commanders but I still performed a role in**  
 14 **relation to the development of individuals within**  
 15 **Dyfed-Powys and much further afield as well.**  
 16 Q. You took up a role in the ACPO Police Use of Firearms  
 17 working group; is that right?  
 18 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 19 Q. When did you first become appointed to ACPO PUF?  
 20 **A. Officially in January 2002, although I did do some work**  
 21 **for about a year before that as a precursor to being**  
 22 **appointed.**  
 23 Q. I have said that you did some work with it, were you in  
 24 fact the chairman of it?  
 25 **A. I was, sir. I was the national lead.**

Page 14

1 Q. That was between January 2002 and?  
 2 **A. And June 2008.**  
 3 Q. What were your responsibilities as chairman of PUF?  
 4 **A. My main responsibility were to be the national lead and**  
 5 **single point of contact with the Home Office in relation**  
 6 **to all policy guidance and training and to provide the**  
 7 **contents of the manual to update them, and to liaise**  
 8 **with a range of bodies such as the Police Complaints**  
 9 **Authority, which became the Independent Police**  
 10 **Complaints Commission, and to ensure all forces were**  
 11 **briefed in relation to established good practice,**  
 12 **changes and developments in firearms policy and**  
 13 **practice, as well as the development of weapons systems,**  
 14 **particularly less lethal weapon systems.**  
 15 Q. Can you explain to the chairman, please, what the ACPO  
 16 PUF is?  
 17 **A. The ACPO PUF was the ACPO Police Use of Firearms**  
 18 **committee. It was a formal branch of ACPO, which is the**  
 19 **Association of Chief Police Officers. It had formal**  
 20 **terms of reference and formal links with Government via**  
 21 **the Home Office in relation to discharging a range of**  
 22 **responsibilities. Particularly in relation to the**  
 23 **article 2 issues around the use of force and the Home**  
 24 **Office's requirements in terms of forces becoming**  
 25 **centres of excellence, good practice and complying with**

Page 15

1 **the expectations of legislation.**  
 2 Q. You say in your report that you were responsible for  
 3 overseeing the production of all national police  
 4 guidance in relation to the command and deployment of  
 5 armed officers?  
 6 **A. That's correct, sir.**  
 7 Q. You say that you were the ACPO lead for the UK's less  
 8 lethal programme. Can you explain what that means,  
 9 please?  
 10 **A. Yes, sir. Arising out of tragic incidents in Northern**  
 11 **Ireland where there were a number of deaths in relation**  
 12 **to use of what is colloquially known as "baton rounds",**  
 13 **plastic bullets, there was a programme funded originally**  
 14 **by the Northern Ireland office to research all less**  
 15 **lethal weaponry and weapon systems worldwide to**  
 16 **introduce a more effective range of tactics, to minimise**  
 17 **the potential to recourse to use to conventional**  
 18 **firearms and potentially lethal force.**  
 19 **The committee was originally set up under the**  
 20 **umbrella of the Patten Commission and I was appointed as**  
 21 **the national policing lead to sit on that and ensure**  
 22 **that all the good practice, research, scientific and**  
 23 **medical evidence was brought into play to make decisions**  
 24 **for UK policing. That led into the introduction of**  
 25 **Taser, the development of completely new weapon systems,**

Page 16

1 such as the AEP which has been mentioned, which was the  
 2 replacement for the Northern Ireland baton round.  
 3 Q. Explain to the chairman what the AEP is?  
 4 A. The full term is the attenuating energy projectile,  
 5 effectively it was a specially designed round to reduce  
 6 the injury potential that was clearly present with the  
 7 previous technology.  
 8 Q. You say in your statement that you oversaw the  
 9 introduction of Taser. In general terms what did that  
 10 involve?  
 11 A. The introduction of Taser probably was the first major  
 12 significant change to policing in terms of less lethal  
 13 weapons systems that was seen. That led to the  
 14 establishment of the Government accepted framework for  
 15 all subsequent less lethal weapon systems. What it  
 16 meant was a complete review and evaluation of the  
 17 technology from an independent point of view,  
 18 independent of the manufacturers, a separate programme  
 19 of medical assessments for the technology and  
 20 a programme of operational assessments to see if it  
 21 fitted the UK operational requirement and the nature of  
 22 policing demands within the UK.  
 23 It was a very significant and detailed programme and  
 24 an extremely costly programme, which eventually led to  
 25 the Home Secretary approving it for trials and then

Page 17

1 after the trials then introduction, initially on  
 2 a limited basis, into UK policing.  
 3 Q. I am not going to ask for it to be turned up, but in  
 4 a document Mr Davies has provided, module 5 of the joint  
 5 MPCC and College of Policing personal safety manual.  
 6 For your note, sir, it is tab 5 of your bundle of  
 7 Mr Davies's documents at page 36.  
 8 It says that:  
 9 "The HOSDB identified a number of potential systems  
 10 that could be used, seven years of study and research  
 11 were undertaken prior to the national trial starting."  
 12 Is that right?  
 13 A. That's correct, sir.  
 14 Q. "There was then a 12-month trial of Taser with 10 UK  
 15 forces."  
 16 Is that right?  
 17 A. Yes, sir.  
 18 Q. What went on in the seven years of study and research?  
 19 A. Part of the difficulty was that the manufacturers could  
 20 not clearly specify exactly how the technology worked,  
 21 the effect of electricity on the body and all the  
 22 potential for injury, primary and secondary injuries  
 23 that could be caused through the equipment and also the  
 24 equipment had not been properly assessed in terms of the  
 25 reliability of its components.

Page 18

1 The Home Office Scientific Development Branch had to  
 2 commission a whole range of experiments and liaison with  
 3 foreign police forces to ensure there was a definitive  
 4 clear audit trail in relation to that research to  
 5 a world class standard. So that a decision that was  
 6 made by the UK Government would be sound and would be  
 7 subject to subsequent scrutiny and court proceedings  
 8 should there be an adverse incident as a result of the  
 9 use of Taser.  
 10 Q. Thank you.  
 11 You mentioned that you oversaw the introduction or  
 12 possible introduction of other less lethal tactics and  
 13 technologies into UK law enforcement. What were the  
 14 other less lethal technologies?  
 15 A. I have mentioned the attenuating energy projectile, the  
 16 AEP. That was a similar long period because we had to  
 17 develop the weapon system from the outset. There  
 18 clearly was an operational requirement to replace the  
 19 previous technology, but there wasn't anything available  
 20 from manufacturers at that time. In that instance we  
 21 actually had to design a weapon system, put it out to  
 22 tender and then go through the whole process as we did  
 23 with Taser, so it was a much longer process.  
 24 A lot of the other reviews were on existing weapons  
 25 systems which were commercially available. I have

Page 19

1 mentioned in my report one such as the FN 303, which was  
 2 a system for delivering chemical munitions such as CS  
 3 and PAVA. That was evaluated and tested, but it was  
 4 felt to be far too dangerous to use in the UK  
 5 operational environment. There had been at least one  
 6 death associated with its use in North America and there  
 7 was a significant potential for the projectiles to  
 8 penetrate or perforate the body wall.  
 9 The testing, which is quite extensive, would look at  
 10 every aspect of injury potential to ensure that if it is  
 11 approved, the potential dangers can be mitigated against  
 12 the threat that an individual posed.  
 13 That, and other technologies, proved to be too  
 14 dangerous and there are documents before the Inquiry  
 15 which indicate where ACPO has told police forces, "This  
 16 is not to be introduced, it is not suitable for use in  
 17 the UK".  
 18 Q. You also mentioned in those self same documents the  
 19 discriminating irritant projectile, the DIP?  
 20 A. Yes, sir.  
 21 Q. Can you explain what happened in relation to that?  
 22 A. There was a potential operational requirement to deliver  
 23 CS to a subject at distance. There wasn't anything  
 24 commercially available which fit the operational  
 25 requirement or which the scientists or the medical

Page 20

1 advisers were content or happy with.  
 2 Again -- this was funded by the Northern Ireland  
 3 office -- we embarked on the programme of trying to  
 4 develop a round. Effectively it was an impact  
 5 projectile which had a CS payload on the front end of  
 6 it. That was developed from scratch, went through  
 7 extensive testing but eventually and it was after I had  
 8 finished leading the project, the project was terminated  
 9 because we couldn't develop or design something which  
 10 was safe and effective compared to the threat that the  
 11 subjects were posing at that time.  
 12 Q. Thank you.  
 13 A. The service actually tries to develop weapon systems as  
 14 well as just evaluating what is commercially available  
 15 off the shelf.  
 16 Perhaps just one other point. Where a weapon system  
 17 has some failings, of course we can also negotiate with  
 18 people or design new systems to try and mitigate the  
 19 problems associated with existing technologies.  
 20 Q. You say in your report that in 2002 you were asked by  
 21 Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary to coordinate  
 22 the introduction of the very first code of practice on  
 23 the Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons. Is  
 24 that right?  
 25 A. Yes, sir.

Page 21

1 Q. Can you tell us in general terms what that project  
 2 involved?  
 3 A. I was approached by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of  
 4 Constabulary and asked to lead this project from  
 5 a policing point of view. I arranged for a group of  
 6 knowledgeable people in relation to firearms, the use of  
 7 force and less lethal weapons to be pulled together.  
 8 The Home Office supplied a person skilled in the art of  
 9 legislation drafting to sit with the group.  
 10 The terms of reference I had were to come up with  
 11 a document which helped police forces to follow good  
 12 practice and to ensure that the international and  
 13 domestic legislation was being pursued in relation to  
 14 the use of force, particularly United Nations basic  
 15 principles on the use of force, which stressed good  
 16 planning of operations and the use of less lethal  
 17 technologies.  
 18 I pulled those people together and we drafted  
 19 a document, which then went in to Government and there  
 20 were some additions there in relation to its potential  
 21 adoption by Northern Ireland and Scotland which led to  
 22 further amendments, but that document was produced and  
 23 published then in 2003.  
 24 Q. We have seen that it came into force with effect on  
 25 3 December 2003.

Page 22

1 A. Yes, sir.  
 2 Q. If you just turn up paragraph 82 of your first report,  
 3 please. You say:  
 4 "I played a significant part in the drafting of the  
 5 2003 code of practice. One of the specific requirements  
 6 from the Home Secretary was to ensure that any  
 7 weapon/device subject to the code had to be researched,  
 8 evaluated and approved by the Home Secretary in line  
 9 with the established national procedures and good  
 10 practice. This would particularly apply to the research  
 11 and evaluation of less lethal options such as chemical  
 12 munitions, eg ..."  
 13 Then amongst the things you list is the CSDC.  
 14 Can you just explain about one of the specific  
 15 requirements from the then Home Secretary related to the  
 16 development of weapons.  
 17 A. Yes, sir.  
 18 One of the key requirements which was personally  
 19 conveyed to me was that the Home Secretary and the  
 20 Government in general did not want police forces to do  
 21 their own thing. They wanted to ensure that any  
 22 technology or less lethal weapon system that was brought  
 23 into common use in the UK had been fully and properly  
 24 researched.  
 25 This was at a time where access to the American

Page 23

1 markets was open and that police forces could for  
 2 example obtain all sorts of technologies which had not  
 3 been tested, which were coming from a jurisdiction which  
 4 was not subject to the constraints that the UK was and  
 5 the Home Secretary was very, very concerned to ensure  
 6 that there was no ad hoc use of unapproved and untested  
 7 equipment.  
 8 Q. What, just going off to America and purchasing some  
 9 stuff?  
 10 A. Sir, there were literally a number of examples of  
 11 individual police officers going to America on holidays,  
 12 seeing a piece of equipment being used and coming back  
 13 and telling their chief officers that that is what  
 14 should be used within their police forces. We needed  
 15 a system to ensure that that didn't happen and because  
 16 of the Patten Commission work that process was already  
 17 in play and legislation was in place and the Home  
 18 Secretary decided that the first code of practice to be  
 19 brought in would seek to control that particular issue.  
 20 Q. Did the PUF committee include chief officers from across  
 21 the United Kingdom?  
 22 A. Yes, sir, every region across the UK was represented on  
 23 the Police Use of Firearms committee.  
 24 Q. Representatives of the Home Office Scientific  
 25 Development Branch?

Page 24

1 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 2 Q. The NPIA?  
 3 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 4 Q. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary?  
 5 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 6 Q. The PCA and then the IPCC?  
 7 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 8 Q. And the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland?  
 9 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 10 Q. Additionally representatives from the Home Office and  
 11 the staff associations of the police service?  
 12 **A. Yes.**  
 13 Q. You say in your report, I am looking at paragraph 29, as  
 14 the chairman of PUF you ran national conferences,  
 15 oversaw research programmes, published technical safety  
 16 and training updates and developed formal links with  
 17 human rights organisations, foreign police services,  
 18 academia and a range of interested observers.  
 19 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 20 Q. What proportion of your time in this period, 2002 to  
 21 2008, did being the chairman of PUF take up?  
 22 **A. Throughout the period I used to give up at least one day**  
 23 **a week, normally a Sunday, where it would be devoted to**  
 24 **catching up on the national work and dealing with the**  
 25 **paperwork associated with it. Probably in addition to**

Page 25

1 **that it would take one day a week, but on other**  
 2 **occasions I might be away from force for two or three**  
 3 **days dealing with national issues. I did have a full**  
 4 **time secretariat supporting me and I had the ability to**  
 5 **second other people to give me resilience in relation to**  
 6 **dealings with issues.**  
 7 Q. Your immediate predecessor, which force did he or she  
 8 come from?  
 9 **A. That was Peter Neyroud, who was my immediate predecessor**  
 10 **and he was West Mercia as well.**  
 11 Q. Your successor was?  
 12 **A. Simon Chesterman, who is still the national lead and he**  
 13 **is based currently with the Civil Nuclear Constabulary.**  
 14 Q. Where was he based in 2008?  
 15 **A. He was in West Mercia then as well.**  
 16 Q. Right.  
 17 You say that you oversaw a comprehensive review of  
 18 all UK strategic, tactical and operational firearms  
 19 command training. Can you tell us what that involved,  
 20 please?  
 21 **A. Yes, sir. As a result of the code of practice itself,**  
 22 **and a desire to ensure much better continuity and**  
 23 **standards nationally, we agreed that a licensing process**  
 24 **would be implemented by the National Policing**  
 25 **Improvement Agency, as it was then. They would**

Page 26

1 **effectively oversee the quality of training delivered**  
 2 **nationally. We started to deliver a programme of**  
 3 **training for all commanders that was to a national**  
 4 **standard, that had checks and balances associated with**  
 5 **it and effectively that was to ensure that all training**  
 6 **spilled out of the contents of the manual itself, the**  
 7 **Manual of Guidance.**  
 8 **This was part of a long-term programme that I set**  
 9 **up, which included things such as bringing the manual**  
 10 **into the public domain for the first time ever, which**  
 11 **meant taking some of these training issues into**  
 12 **a restricted document which was in the National Police**  
 13 **Firearms Training Curriculum.**  
 14 **We had a fairly hefty process really of reforming**  
 15 **the whole firearms policy and training arena over that**  
 16 **period from 2003 to 2008.**  
 17 Q. You say in paragraph 30 that during your time, between  
 18 2000 and 2008, as the ACPO PUF lead you became an umpire  
 19 for national counter terrorism exercises.  
 20 What did being the umpire for national counter  
 21 terrorism exercises involve?  
 22 **A. That effectively meant that there were at that time**  
 23 **extremely large set piece counter terrorist exercises**  
 24 **known as Uglow and Remount exercises, which were run up**  
 25 **and down --**

Page 27

1 Q. Can you say that again?  
 2 **A. Uglow, which is U-G-L-O-W, and Remount which is the**  
 3 **operation name.**  
 4 THE CHAIRMAN: Remount?  
 5 **A. Remount, for significant deployments of police officers,**  
 6 **special forces, Security Services and associated**  
 7 **emergency services. Where there would be large**  
 8 **on-the-ground exercises and complex command situations**  
 9 **to test and develop commanders across the country.**  
 10 **I supported that programme by helping validate the**  
 11 **contents of the scenarios that would be tested, deployed**  
 12 **during those exercises to support and assess the**  
 13 **commanders. For a period of about seven years I had the**  
 14 **privilege of assessing and being with commanders up and**  
 15 **down the country in relation to all manner of terrorist,**  
 16 **counter terrorist scenarios.**  
 17 MR BEER: Would that be strategic firearms commanders and  
 18 tactical firearms commanders?  
 19 **A. And, but I would also make sure that I saw the**  
 20 **operational firearms commanders. I would deploy with**  
 21 **AFOs when executive action was being taken out and with**  
 22 **special forces, because I was in that privileged**  
 23 **position of being able to access all parts and all**  
 24 **aspects of the operations.**  
 25 **This work then led on to training such as the**

Page 28

1 Northern Ireland specialist command training course,  
 2 which has been discussed in here.  
 3 Q. What knowledge did you have of the PSNI SFO course?  
 4 A. I didn't do the course. I was aware of the contents of  
 5 it, I was consulted in relation to parts of it and the  
 6 exercises which were contained within the national  
 7 counter terrorist exercises are very similar to what is  
 8 delivered, although they do have a criminal element as  
 9 well I understand in that.  
 10 I would say whilst I haven't done it, I am very  
 11 familiar with the content, the assessment and I have  
 12 seen many, many commanders operate in those  
 13 environments. In the training environment but also in  
 14 real live operations as well.  
 15 Q. You say that you were involved into reviews into  
 16 incidents such as the Stockwell shooting of  
 17 Jean Charles de Menezes and the Cumbria shootings by  
 18 Derek Bird in 2010.  
 19 A. Yes, sir. I was a formal member of the Stockwell review  
 20 group itself and together with an IPCC commissioner,  
 21 I was the two-person reference group overseeing the  
 22 investigation and review into the Cumbria shootings.  
 23 Q. In paragraph 34 of your first report you say that you  
 24 were personally responsible for overseeing the  
 25 production, review and amendment of the definitive

Page 29

1 document giving guidance in relation to the management  
 2 of firearms operations, commonly known as "the manual",  
 3 namely the Manual of Guidance on the management, command  
 4 and deployment of armed officers. What did that  
 5 involve?  
 6 A. The manual clearly was in existence when I took over the  
 7 group. All suggested amendments to the manual were  
 8 processed via the ACPO PUF working group itself. That  
 9 would be the clearing house, forces would suggest  
 10 amendments, legislation, comments from judicial reviews  
 11 would all be fed in. I would be the person who would  
 12 finally approve and sign off any amendments to the  
 13 manual itself. Clearly with either the full agreement  
 14 of the Police Use of Firearms working group or  
 15 occasionally an agreement to disagree which might have  
 16 led to a judicial challenge to parts of it, which did  
 17 happen in relation to chapter 7, for example, on certain  
 18 occasions.  
 19 Q. On conferring?  
 20 A. Yes, sir.  
 21 Q. We know that in this case GMP were operating under the  
 22 2011 iteration of the Manual of Guidance. What  
 23 involvement did you have in the development of that?  
 24 A. The manual -- the new manual, was introduced in 2009 --  
 25 Q. Yes.

Page 30

1 A. -- and I was fundamentally involved in the majority of  
 2 the work in relation to that, although Simon Chesterman  
 3 did take over the detail in 2008. The manual which was  
 4 published in 2009 was the one which was subject of the  
 5 work I did to ensure it was published entirely in the  
 6 public domain to facilitate scrutiny particularly and to  
 7 make the service more accountable.  
 8 Q. Before then, I think there was a part A and a part B?  
 9 A. There was a part A and a part B and it became very  
 10 difficult to manage the manual because effectively all  
 11 parts were getting into the public domain through  
 12 various routes.  
 13 The 2011 manual is a slightly amended version of the  
 14 2009 manual.  
 15 Q. I see.  
 16 A. In my mind I tend to think of that manual as the 2009,  
 17 as amended, until the manual became authorised  
 18 professional practice in 2013.  
 19 Q. I think it is right, isn't it, that by population  
 20 covered GMP was a larger force than both West Mercia and  
 21 Dyfed-Powys?  
 22 A. Absolutely, sir.  
 23 Q. GMP was a larger force by number of officers?  
 24 A. Yes, sir.  
 25 Q. But not by geographical area for either force, I think?

Page 31

1 A. No, sir.  
 2 Q. It, GMP, would have had a different STRA, strategic  
 3 threat and risk assessment, from both forces?  
 4 A. Yes, sir. They should be bespoke to the individual  
 5 force and the threats that they face.  
 6 Q. It has been suggested and I ask you, if you were  
 7 commanding the majority of critical incidents, critical  
 8 operational incidents in West Mercia, what does that  
 9 demonstrate about the regularity of such incidents?  
 10 A. In terms of the frequency of that.  
 11 Q. Yes.  
 12 A. Potentially three times a week I would be commanding  
 13 an incident.  
 14 Q. Firearms incidents?  
 15 A. Yes, sir.  
 16 Q. Why were you commanding the majority of them?  
 17 A. I think because of my national role. I know it is  
 18 perhaps a bit difficult for me to say that I am being  
 19 told that I had a reputation for effectively commanding  
 20 incidents, which also led to me being chosen to command  
 21 cross-border incidents and multi force incidents as  
 22 well.  
 23 Of course I was also very privileged to be in  
 24 a position where I got involved in firearms deployments  
 25 and firearms debriefs across the nation and had the

Page 32



1 opportunity to learn from the deployments within forces  
 2 across England and Wales and further afield, including  
 3 internationally.  
 4 I think if there is a point in there, sir: was it  
 5 the same as GMP? No, clearly it was different but I did  
 6 have the privilege of exposure in different ways as  
 7 well.  
 8 Q. On how many occasions do you think you authorised the  
 9 deployment of or requested as a TFC the deployment of  
 10 officers on the MASTS platform?  
 11 A. In West Mercia it was a fairly frequent issue, because  
 12 we had that capability and resource, so the deployment  
 13 of MASTS was -- I can't state numbers for it and I am  
 14 not suggesting it was as frequent as Greater Manchester  
 15 Police but it was a fairly frequent occurrence to deploy  
 16 the MASTS officers or combined MASTS and surveillance  
 17 team.  
 18 Q. What about authorisation for deployment of specialist  
 19 munitions?  
 20 A. Yes, that was a component part of it but what I would  
 21 say is my assessment and my decision making led to that  
 22 happening in a very small number of cases compared to  
 23 some of the evidence that we have heard during this  
 24 Inquiry.  
 25 Q. Have you a sense of whether that is because your

Page 33

1 approach was different or because the nature of the  
 2 operations that you were commanding was different?  
 3 A. I sense because of the different nature of my approach,  
 4 although I do accept that the frequency of the more  
 5 serious incidents may be very different in Greater  
 6 Manchester than it was in West Mercia.  
 7 I, of course, was privileged to have access to  
 8 national good practice and lessons learnt, which may  
 9 have meant that my decision making and my scrutiny could  
 10 have been a little different to the average commander.  
 11 Q. Have you any experience in the actual provision of  
 12 firearms training?  
 13 A. At a strategic level, not at a tactical level.  
 14 Q. Just explain what you mean by that answer, please.  
 15 A. I have often been a speaker at training events and  
 16 I have often been a resource at training events. For  
 17 the College of Policing, for example, I used to give  
 18 an input in relation to the role of a strategic firearms  
 19 commander and a gold commander and command structures on  
 20 the national courses held by the police college.  
 21 Q. You haven't been responsible for providing training on  
 22 the range, for example?  
 23 A. No, not at all?  
 24 Q. Were you ever an AFO yourself?  
 25 A. Not in the United Kingdom, but I have been trained and

Page 34

1 deployed operationally in America.  
 2 Q. Have you any experience of assessing in the impact of  
 3 failure on a course provided nationally on the  
 4 continuing accreditation of an officer within their home  
 5 force?  
 6 A. Yes, one of the responsibilities of a firearms leader in  
 7 a police force is to assess any issue which could impact  
 8 upon the effectiveness or the credibility of not just  
 9 AFOs but of commanders. It is a fairly regular issue to  
 10 have to assess somebody's failure on a course, their  
 11 medical condition, their welfare circumstances or any  
 12 issue which might affect their capability as  
 13 an individual. Or, perhaps just as importantly, the  
 14 appropriateness of the force continuing to allow that  
 15 person to operate if there is something known in their  
 16 background which would be disclosed in subsequent  
 17 proceedings if they were to command a critical incident  
 18 or be an AFO during a critical incident.  
 19 Q. Help me with what you mean by that latter point, the  
 20 appropriateness of a force?  
 21 A. Perhaps to give an example which is not necessarily  
 22 directly linked to this Inquiry. Quite a regular issue  
 23 would be somebody might have a temporary illness,  
 24 perhaps a mental health issue, and they have taken  
 25 medication which temporarily affects their cognitive

Page 35

1 ability.  
 2 That might be a temporary issue which the medical  
 3 advice would be after three months they are absolutely  
 4 fine to continue their previous duties.  
 5 As a force, you have to carefully consider the  
 6 appropriateness of that person returning to work on the  
 7 basis that all of that will be disclosed in the public  
 8 arena. It could be just a failure on a course, it could  
 9 be a negative issue which has been said, it could be  
 10 a breach of discipline. Effectively it could be  
 11 anything at all which actually affects a person, be it  
 12 an AFO or a commander at that point in time, or could  
 13 affect the reputation of the force, the credibility of  
 14 the force or public confidence in the force's  
 15 maintenance of effective commanders or firearms  
 16 officers.  
 17 It is not just a tactical issue, it is a much wider  
 18 strategic thing and that would be something which would  
 19 crop up many times during a year and firearms officers  
 20 appointed under the code to lead firearms matters within  
 21 forces should be taking those decision as and when they  
 22 arise, and they would be brought to you normally by the  
 23 chief firearms instructor and/or the head of operations.  
 24 Q. Were such issues brought to you regularly by your CFI  
 25 and your head of operations when you were the ACC and

Page 36

1 deputy chief constable of West Mercia?

2 **A. Yes, sir. They are the sort of things that would be**

3 **brought to your attention on a fairly frequent basis.**

4 **On many occasions they just needed a senior officer to**

5 **sign it off but on some occasions they meant that that**

6 **person would be suspended temporarily and on some**

7 **occasions it would mean that person would be deemed not**

8 **fit to continue in their role in the future.**

9 Q. Was there any, by 2012, national guidance on the impact

10 of course failures on an officer's operational

11 suitability?

12 **A. The guidance that I am aware of is the licensing process**

13 **would inspect forces to ensure they had a regime and**

14 **process for making those decisions.**

15 **I don't recall whether that was broken down into**

16 **a whole range of component parts, because they could be**

17 **many and varied, but it would be that the failure issue**

18 **would be a matter for the chief firearms instructor to**

19 **advise upon. A minor issue they may be able to make the**

20 **decision on, if it was one which could have wider**

21 **implications, it is one which should be brought to the**

22 **ACPO officer. I do accept that on some occasions there**

23 **might be a person nominated in some forces to carry out**

24 **that function.**

25 Q. The answer was there was available national guidance and

Page 37

1 the guidance was that as part of the licensing regime

2 forces were required to have in place their own systems

3 for deciding on the impact of for example a course

4 failure on continuing suitability?

5 **A. Yes, sir. I can't say that the words "Course failure"**

6 **were part of it, but I know the programme ensured there**

7 **was a process to consider all those sorts of issues. If**

8 **there wasn't then the force would be taken to task by**

9 **the NPIA.**

10 Q. Irrespective of whether there was a requirement under

11 the licensing system, would you expect forces, perhaps

12 as a matter of common sense, to have a process by which

13 such failures are judged?

14 **A. Yes, sir. Because it would be hard to draft the**

15 **definitive list of all the potential issues which could**

16 **impact upon an individual's suitability. There must be**

17 **a process to consider if there is a problem or**

18 **a perceived problem with an individual, that does need**

19 **to be carefully considered.**

20 **As far as I am concerned, I know I was consulted on**

21 **many occasions in relation to particularly medical**

22 **issues, particularly mental health issues and**

23 **particularly issues related to medication. I would have**

24 **forces ringing me up asking my advice on how to deal**

25 **with those particular issues as well.**

Page 38

1 Q. Did you ever think, "I just don't know how to take these

2 decisions because there is a failure of central bodies

3 to develop national guidance on this issue"?

4 **A. No, sir. I think decision making is an everyday part of**

5 **the role of a senior police officer and it is very easy**

6 **to make strategic decisions. It is very easy to**

7 **critique them later on, but my personal position is my**

8 **professional position from my previous background is**

9 **that those things need to be considered and documented.**

10 **At the very least there is an audit trail and that the**

11 **force has considered the potential downside**

12 **implications, as well as the appropriateness of allowing**

13 **a person to continue.**

14 Q. Thank you.

15 I think penultimately in relation to your background

16 and experience, in paragraph 55 of your first report you

17 say:

18 "A key aspect of this Inquiry relates to the

19 collation, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence.

20 The technical management of police intelligence is

21 a specific discipline that I am not qualified to give

22 an opinion on. I can however give an opinion in

23 relation to some specific intelligence and information

24 solely on the basis of its relevance or otherwise to

25 armed policing deployments."

Page 39

1 Could you just explain what you mean by the

2 distinction between not being qualified in the specific

3 discipline of police intelligence but being able to give

4 an opinion on the relevance of intelligence to armed

5 policing deployments?

6 **A. I am very conscious that there is detailed and extensive**

7 **national advice in relation to the National Intelligence**

8 **Model, how it should be applied, how intelligence and**

9 **information should be assessed. That is not an area of**

10 **business that I am particularly familiar with, certainly**

11 **I am not qualified to give an opinion to this Inquiry in**

12 **relation to those issues.**

13 **But much of that intelligence and information is**

14 **synthesised down to a level where I think I could give**

15 **some opinion in relation to its impact upon firearms**

16 **operations. Certainly I wouldn't want to get into the**

17 **detail of compliance with the National Intelligence**

18 **Model or how intelligence should be synthesised and**

19 **graded.**

20 Q. As an example of that, if we look at paragraph 202 of

21 your first report, please.

22 **A. Yes, sir.**

23 Q. You say:

24 "Historic information may be of little benefit to

25 investigators gathering evidence in relation to

Page 40

<p>1 a current offence, but the same information can greatly                  2 assist those involved in the deployment of AFOs,                  3 particularly the SFC and TFC, in order to appropriately                  4 assess threat and risk and capability and intent in                  5 relation to a subject's potential response when                  6 confronted by armed police officers."                  7 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b>                  8 Q. Is that an example of where you are drawing on your                  9 experience as a TFC and an SFC?                  10 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b>                  11 Q. And drawing a distinction between why an investigator,                  12 in this case somebody like DI Cousen, may not be                  13 significantly interested in gathering historical                  14 information but an SFC and TFC may be interested in it?                  15 <b>A. Yes, sir, absolutely. Matters which are a clear focus</b>                  16 <b>for the SIO in terms of evidence and conviction may not</b>                  17 <b>be the sort of information that is vital to tactical</b>                  18 <b>firearms commanders and AFOs.</b>                  19 Q. Similarly, are you speaking there about your own                  20 experience or because of reviews of other operations?                  21 <b>A. I would say both, but particularly I am well aware that</b>                  22 <b>SIOs and intelligence officers quite often need to be</b>                  23 <b>carefully questioned to draw out relevant issues for</b>                  24 <b>a firearms deployment.</b>                  25 <b>Quite often they would be very much focused on the</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 41</p>	<p>1 intelligence briefing document, with an emphasis on                  2 matters of direct relevance to AFOs and commanders to                  3 help them assess situational threat and risk and the                  4 capability and intent of the subjects."                  5 That suggestion there, is that something that you                  6 have experience of in the past?                  7 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b>                  8 Q. Just explain what it looks like, what it consists of?                  9 <b>A. The main thing is it is a document which is extremely</b>                  10 <b>clear in relation to who has compiled it and when, and</b>                  11 <b>what changes have occurred, particularly if they relate</b>                  12 <b>to the threat and risk assessment or the capability and</b>                  13 <b>intent of an individual.</b>                  14 Q. Just stopping there, you said a document that shows who                  15 has compiled it. I think in our case we don't know who                  16 has compiled the various iterations of the PowerPoint                  17 presentation. You are suggesting that the document                  18 which is presented to firearms officers should have its                  19 author clearly stated on it?                  20 <b>A. What has been termed the PowerPoint briefing here, for</b>                  21 <b>example, I don't think it necessarily has to be that</b>                  22 <b>document, but the document which informs it should have</b>                  23 <b>a direct link back for every key piece of intelligence.</b>                  24 <b>If there is a specific statement there to say,</b>                  25 <b>"Subject A is known to be in possession of a firearm or</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 43</p>
<p>1 <b>evidence issues itself, where if mention of a weapon or</b>                  2 <b>a firearm is made, for example, I would expect tactical</b>                  3 <b>advisers and commanders to quiz that in some detail, as</b>                  4 <b>that would be relevant to briefing firearms officers.</b>                  5 Q. As another example of drawing on your experience of                  6 a user of intelligence in the context of the deployment                  7 of armed officers, can we turn up paragraph 250, please.                  8 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b>                  9 Q. This concludes a section concerning errors, mistakes and                  10 omissions in the compilation of the intelligence picture                  11 by Greater Manchester Police in Operation Shire. You                  12 say:                  13 "As stated, it is unfortunate but not unusual for                  14 there to have been administrative and substantive errors                  15 in relation to intelligence gathering and presentation                  16 during Operation Shire."                  17 There again are you speaking about your own                  18 experience or because of reviews of other operations,                  19 that it not being unusual for there to have been                  20 administrative and substantive errors?                  21 <b>A. Again, sir, that is a combination of the two.</b>                  22 Q. You say:                  23 "What may have helped accuracy and consistency for                  24 AFOs, TAs and commanders would have been a single                  25 continuously updated and version-controlled specific</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 42</p>	<p>1 <b>imitation firearm", that needs to be graded and linked</b>                  2 <b>back to the source.</b>                  3 Q. We have moved on slightly. We were talking about the                  4 document itself being effectively version controlled so                  5 that it shows its author and the date of its compilation                  6 and/or any amendments?                  7 <b>A. I don't know whether we are talking about two issues,</b>                  8 <b>because I am thinking about the intelligence source</b>                  9 <b>document and the briefing has been two different</b>                  10 <b>documents at this point in time.</b>                  11 Q. Yes.                  12 <b>A. The intelligence briefing document should be detailed,</b>                  13 <b>sourced and graded.</b>                  14 Q. Yes.                  15 <b>A. I am tolerant of sometimes that being converted into</b>                  16 <b>language which is clearly understandable for AFOs, which</b>                  17 <b>doesn't necessarily contain the references back to the</b>                  18 <b>origin or a grading because some operations are very</b>                  19 <b>detailed and I think AFOs could get overloaded.</b>                  20 <b>I think the headlines, as long as they have complete</b>                  21 <b>integrity in terms of what they say, are acceptable.</b>                  22 Q. You were saying I think that the authorship of the                  23 document should be transparent?                  24 <b>A. Absolutely, yes, sir.</b>                  25 Q. I think you suggested that if it ends up in a PowerPoint</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 44</p>

1 presentation, for example, or some other presentation,  
 2 the document that led to that presentation should itself  
 3 have all of the sources included in it?  
 4 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 5 Q. Is where the intelligence was obtained from and its  
 6 grading?  
 7 **A. Yes, sir. Obviously there are some pieces of**  
 8 **intelligence, quite clearly, which need to be dealt with**  
 9 **in a slightly different matter because of legislation**  
 10 **but in general, yes.**  
 11 Q. How revolutionary is the suggestion you are making? Was  
 12 it normal custom and practice for you to have that in  
 13 your force in West Mercia?  
 14 **A. Yes, sir, it was.**  
 15 Q. Day in and day out?  
 16 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 17 Q. Any idea of other forces or was West Mercia a sort of  
 18 beacon of excellence?  
 19 **A. I have seen variations on a theme. In some forces that**  
 20 **would be, for example it would be a matter of course**  
 21 **that a person qualified to deliver the intelligence**  
 22 **would have that information with them, so if the**  
 23 **question was asked, any question was asked, they could**  
 24 **immediately give an indication of the strength,**  
 25 **relevance and if it was appropriate the source of that**

Page 45

1 **information.**  
 2 **I don't think it is at all unusual to have**  
 3 **an updated, sourced, referenced and auditable**  
 4 **intelligence document. I think that is very much the**  
 5 **norm for most operations -- not all, because many are**  
 6 **spontaneous and there is not the time or ability to pull**  
 7 **them together.**  
 8 Q. We will come back to the detail later but is what you  
 9 have seen in the documents and what you have heard in  
 10 evidence about the way in which this intelligence was  
 11 communicated to the firearms officers usual or unusual?  
 12 **A. I suppose part of my difficulty directly answering that,**  
 13 **I have heard different versions of how that happens**  
 14 **within GMP.**  
 15 Q. Yes.  
 16 **A. There has been good practice and there has been other**  
 17 **instances where I think the situation could have been**  
 18 **significantly improved.**  
 19 Q. The good practice?  
 20 **A. For example, Chief Superintendent Ellison interrogated**  
 21 **the intelligence that was being presented to him,**  
 22 **challenged the sources of it, challenged the grading and**  
 23 **challenged the SIO to ensure that what he was being told**  
 24 **was to his satisfaction and presented a picture which**  
 25 **fitted the criteria for not only the issue of firearms**

Page 46

1 **but for the tactics that he was about to seek to**  
 2 **approve.**  
 3 **For me this is -- normally there would be a document**  
 4 **in that meeting which would challenge those issues.**  
 5 **I have seen that happening in evidence during this**  
 6 **Inquiry, but clearly there are parts of Operation Shire**  
 7 **where such a thorough and appropriate process wasn't**  
 8 **followed.**  
 9 Q. Even in the case of Chief Superintendent Ellison, the  
 10 process that he undertook on 25/26 January didn't result  
 11 in the creation of a document of the type that you  
 12 mentioned?  
 13 **A. No, and the utility of such a document, I would suggest,**  
 14 **is that it prevents a significant amount of repetition**  
 15 **if different commanders and advisers are involved in**  
 16 **an operation and, you know, allows for a level of**  
 17 **credibility in relation to documents and the**  
 18 **presentation of intelligence which should lead to more**  
 19 **appropriate decision making.**  
 20 Q. Thank you.  
 21 Can we turn then to your instructions and your  
 22 approach to them. I think you were first instructed by  
 23 letter dated 7 September 2012 to provide an independent  
 24 report on specific matters relating to the command,  
 25 control and implementation of Operation Shire. Is that

Page 47

1 right?  
 2 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 3 Q. Did the work that you did to prepare the report that you  
 4 did in November 2016 -- sorry, I said  
 5 instructed September 2012, 2016.  
 6 Did the work that you did to prepare your report  
 7 include reviewing a very large volume of material,  
 8 thousands and thousands of pages?  
 9 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 10 Q. Did you receive periodic email updates as more and more  
 11 material was disclosed by GMP?  
 12 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 13 Q. Did you receive a formal supplemental letter of  
 14 instruction dated 1 February 2017 that drew together all  
 15 of the material that had by then been disclosed?  
 16 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 17 Q. Since then, in the course of the oral hearings have you  
 18 been provided with yet more additional disclosure as it  
 19 has in turn been disclosed by GMP?  
 20 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 21 Q. I think you have sat through the majority of the oral  
 22 hearings of the Inquiry concerning the planning and  
 23 conduct of the firearms operation?  
 24 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 25 Q. In parts of your report you use, in particular,

Page 48

1 concerning the alleged intelligence failings, the  
 2 structure of the IPCC's report and/or the particulars of  
 3 indictment shown in the CPS's case summary --  
 4 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 5 Q. -- to format your approach.  
 6 Why did you use that structure?  
 7 **A. I was asked particularly to focus on the reports of**  
 8 **Mr Molloy, Mr Pemberton, Mr Sturman and others and quite**  
 9 **clearly they had been asked to address those, I assume,**  
 10 **during the preparation of the papers for that case.**  
 11 **Therefore, if I didn't use those headings, it would**  
 12 **have been somewhat difficult to address those issues**  
 13 **directly. Also I thought that many of those issues were**  
 14 **particularly pertinent to potentially the issues the**  
 15 **Inquiry itself might consider to be relevant.**  
 16 Q. You say in paragraph 51 of your report as to your  
 17 approach that you are conscious that your comments and  
 18 opinion in relation to this matter should be pragmatic  
 19 and reasonable and that you do not seek to identify  
 20 an impractical standard of perfection that does not  
 21 reflect the reality of tasks expected from those  
 22 involved in armed policing operations:  
 23 "Setting an unobtainable standard could lead to  
 24 an unacceptable level of caution on the part of  
 25 commanders and AFOs, that in turn may have an adverse

Page 49

1 impact on future policing operations."  
 2 Can you explain why you took that approach?  
 3 **A. Yes, sir. I am very conscious that I had access to the**  
 4 **debriefs of incidents, knowledge, awareness and training**  
 5 **that many commanders would not have had because of my**  
 6 **national position. What I have tried to do is be very**  
 7 **careful not to influence my opinions with that**  
 8 **additional knowledge and additional exposure that I have**  
 9 **had.**  
 10 **I have used what in my mind is a standard of what**  
 11 **I would expect from a reasonable person carrying out**  
 12 **that function and delivering that function on behalf of**  
 13 **a force.**  
 14 Q. You have attempted to avoid the standard expert's trap  
 15 of the expert applying the expert's standard rather than  
 16 the expert applying a reasonable standard?  
 17 **A. Hopefully, sir, yes.**  
 18 Q. Additionally, would this be right, one of the reasons  
 19 why the approach that you have guarded against should  
 20 not be taken is set out in paragraphs 66 and 67 of your  
 21 report, drawing on what GMP themselves said, namely:  
 22 "The deployment of an AFO is a necessary tactic in  
 23 the modern policing of society. It is by its very  
 24 nature and due to the unpredictability of suspects'  
 25 behaviour, a tactic which can expose police officers,

Page 50

1 suspects and members of the public to the possibilities  
 2 of danger.  
 3 "Dealing with the most violent offenders and  
 4 dangerous situations is not an exact science where there  
 5 are always clear answers and easily identifiable rights  
 6 and wrongs of policy and practice for observers to  
 7 classify and note. The opinions of some observers with  
 8 20:20 hindsight may not reflect the complexities and  
 9 uncertainties of managing fast-moving police operations  
 10 such as the incident subject of this Inquiry."  
 11 Is that an additional reason?  
 12 **A. Yes, sir. During my professional career I have seen**  
 13 **many, many, numerous, reports in relation to police**  
 14 **action, police decision making which I think have been**  
 15 **unfair because they have set far too high and perhaps**  
 16 **an unrealistic standard on people in incidents, which**  
 17 **are quite often split-second decisions which are very,**  
 18 **very difficult for even highly trained firearms officers**  
 19 **and commanders to make.**  
 20 Q. You say, as I think a second reason, in 68:  
 21 "The slow time forensic review of incidents can  
 22 sometimes foster unrealistic expectations of police  
 23 commanders and AFOs, very often situations are moving so  
 24 quickly that professional judgment is driving decisions  
 25 faster than they can be recorded."

Page 51

1 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 2 Q. If you look at paragraphs 70 and 71 of your report on  
 3 the same page there, you make two points.  
 4 You say you are conscious that your comments and  
 5 opinion should be:  
 6 "... pragmatic and reasonable and again not seek to  
 7 identify an impracticable standard of perfection.  
 8 "It should also be noted that those involved in  
 9 armed policing operations are volunteers and need  
 10 appropriate support and encouragement as well as  
 11 challenge regarding their actions and activities."  
 12 What did you mean there?  
 13 **A. This takes nothing away from the fact that this is**  
 14 **clearly the most tragic incident of the family and loved**  
 15 **ones of Mr Grainger, but also for those involved from**  
 16 **a policing point of view in these operations, it is**  
 17 **a very, very difficult and traumatic time for them as**  
 18 **well.**  
 19 **I am just conscious that every one of those are**  
 20 **volunteers, we wouldn't have this provision for the**  
 21 **police service unless commanders and AFOs put themselves**  
 22 **forward to do this difficult job. So there needs to be**  
 23 **an appropriate balance between challenge and**  
 24 **accountability and supporting them when things do go**  
 25 **wrong as well.**

Page 52

1 Q. You say that:  
 2 "Sir Brian Leveson reinforces this important  
 3 consideration regarding post-incident reviews in E7's  
 4 unsuccessful challenge to the conclusions of the  
 5 Azelle Rodney Inquiry."  
 6 Where he stated:  
 7 "In our judgment there is considerable force in the  
 8 expressed concern that minute dissection of fractions of  
 9 a second with the benefit of hindsight would discourage  
 10 an appropriate response in real-time to threats thereby  
 11 resulting in potentially increased danger to those  
 12 involved in or likely to be affected by these  
 13 exceedingly difficult operations."  
 14 Then:  
 15 "That provision requires a court to determine the  
 16 genuinely held belief of the individual in question as  
 17 to the circumstances when considering whether the degree  
 18 of force used was reasonable, whether or not the belief  
 19 in question was mistaken or if it was mistaken, whether  
 20 it was reasonable. The reasonableness or otherwise of  
 21 a belief is only relevant to the question whether it was  
 22 genuinely held. This inevitably requires  
 23 a consideration of the dynamic situation and militates  
 24 against an analysis by fractions of a second."  
 25 Did you take that into account when providing your

Page 53

1 report?  
 2 **A. Yes, sir, I did.**  
 3 Q. One last point, please, on approach. Paragraph 54,  
 4 which may have some relevance to questions that others  
 5 may seek the permission of the chairman to ask. You say  
 6 you are not qualified to give opinion in relation to any  
 7 medical, physiological or psychological matters, then  
 8 you say, "... relating to the fitness for duty of those  
 9 involved in the deployment of armed officers or armed  
 10 operations".  
 11 Are you qualified to give any opinion in relation to  
 12 any medical, physiological or psychological matters in  
 13 general?  
 14 **A. No, sir. I particularly was referring there to the**  
 15 **request to give an opinion on the hours of duty**  
 16 **performed by the AFOs. Clearly there would be some**  
 17 **questions there that I couldn't answer if it was down to**  
 18 **physiology or medical issues.**  
 19 Q. It goes wider than that?  
 20 **A. Yes, sir. Any issues in relation to less lethal weapons**  
 21 **for example I would be reliant on the experts to pass on**  
 22 **their opinions.**  
 23 MR BEER: Sir, I wonder whether that is an appropriate  
 24 moment.  
 25 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, it is an appropriate moment and I am

Page 54

1 going to take 10 minutes this morning.  
 2 Thank you.  
 3 (11.46 am)  
 4 (A short adjournment)  
 5 (12.08 pm)  
 6 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.  
 7 MR BEER: Sir, thank you.  
 8 In your reports, Mr Arundale, you refer on a number  
 9 of occasions to the national decision making model.  
 10 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 11 Q. Can you please explain what the national decision making  
 12 model is?  
 13 **A. Yes.**  
 14 **For many years in the police service it became**  
 15 **apparent that when officers like AFOs or commanders were**  
 16 **subsequently asked to articulate why they had made**  
 17 **certain decisions or taken certain courses of action, it**  
 18 **wasn't based on any standard template or standard**  
 19 **training. Some of the most contentious decisions within**  
 20 **policing were taken within the firearms arena. So**  
 21 **a conflict management model was developed which helped**  
 22 **decision making but also helped to subsequently**  
 23 **articulate that decision making and became the basis and**  
 24 **structure for training.**  
 25 **That model evolved into the national decision making**

Page 55

1 **model, because the service as a whole felt it had**  
 2 **utility, significant feedback was received from many**  
 3 **jurisdictions internationally -- indeed it has been**  
 4 **adopted, in slightly amended fashion, in many of**  
 5 **those -- and is now the basis for all decision making**  
 6 **within the police service itself.**  
 7 Q. When was the conflict management model introduced?  
 8 **A. It emerged through and probably first came in the late**  
 9 **1990s, but started to become in the manual itself**  
 10 **I think probably from about 1999 to 2000 onwards it was**  
 11 **articulated in a similar fashion to you can see it now.**  
 12 Q. By 2012, had the use of the conflict management model  
 13 become firmly embedded in the decision-making process  
 14 for firearms incidents?  
 15 **A. No, I would say before then. It was firmly embedded way**  
 16 **before then and certainly the 2005 manual onwards had it**  
 17 **firmly embedded as a core component and the 2009 model**  
 18 **formally reiterated that again.**  
 19 Q. You describe it as being a scalable model that can be  
 20 applied before, during and after an incident, requiring  
 21 the deployment of AFOs.  
 22 What do you mean by that, please?  
 23 **A. It can apply to the incident that has the shortest**  
 24 **duration, it can be applied to long-term incidents.**  
 25 **Effectively it can be applied to any policing issues to**

Page 56

1 assist the decision making of an individual to take them  
 2 through a range of relevant criteria, not just the  
 3 incident itself. It could be applied to large scale  
 4 natural huge disasters, as well as to policing  
 5 challenges that could apply to a constable on a daily  
 6 basis.  
 7 Q. Ought it to have been applied to make and record command  
 8 decisions?  
 9 A. Yes, sir. I have seen many, many incidents where  
 10 commanders quite obviously use that as a matter of  
 11 course, sketch it within their notes and use it as  
 12 a framework for briefings, asking questions and  
 13 recording their decisions.  
 14 Q. Ought it to be used as the framework for briefing  
 15 officers?  
 16 A. Yes, but there are models which use the principles of  
 17 the conflict management model and put some additions on  
 18 to that as well. I wouldn't say that all briefings have  
 19 to reflect the component parts, but the basic principles  
 20 with many additions because there are some briefing  
 21 models which look slightly different but I would argue  
 22 fulfil a similar purpose and add additional benefits.  
 23 Q. Was it, by 2012, the model used to train AFOs to make  
 24 decisions in relation to whether to discharge their  
 25 firearms or not?

Page 57

1 A. Yes, sir.  
 2 Q. In paragraph 107 of your report, you say:  
 3 "A very important aspect of the national decision  
 4 making model is the requirement to continually reassess  
 5 policing situations using the model."  
 6 You refer to paragraph 6.3 of the Manual of  
 7 Guidance, which says:  
 8 "The national decision making model is driven by  
 9 information and intelligence. It is a continuous cycle  
 10 constantly reviewed in the light of new information and  
 11 assessment that will ultimately affect the response to  
 12 the incident."  
 13 Why is it so important?  
 14 A. Clearly a decision made perhaps at the start of  
 15 an incident may not have relevance in the light of new  
 16 information and new intelligence as an incident  
 17 progresses. This is a reminder that the process of  
 18 decision making and assessment needs to be continuous  
 19 throughout an incident to ensure that decisions are  
 20 relevant, up to date and proportionate in relation to  
 21 the threat that has been posed.  
 22 Q. Can we turn up, please, in the policy and procedure  
 23 bundle paragraphs 6.10, which is in red on page 346.  
 24 A. Sorry, sir, paragraph 6.10?  
 25 Q. 6.10, yes.

Page 58

1 A. Yes, sir.  
 2 Q. It says:  
 3 "In firearms-related situations information and  
 4 intelligence combined with the experience of those  
 5 responsible for directing the police response will  
 6 assist in determining the most appropriate response to  
 7 a given situation."  
 8 In the subclause of that sentence, the words  
 9 "combined with the experience of those responsible" is  
 10 included. I think this is a point that you make in your  
 11 report where you differ from those that advised the  
 12 IPCC. This indicated to you, did it, the permissibility  
 13 of officers relying on their own past experience?  
 14 A. Yes, sir, absolutely.  
 15 Many incidents have extremely limited intelligence  
 16 and information itself. The experience of the service  
 17 is that the use of previous experience, knowledge of  
 18 an individual, can significantly help in the resolution  
 19 of incidents.  
 20 Q. Can we move to paragraph 6.17. When dealing with the  
 21 threat assessment it says, the manual:  
 22 "A threat assessment refers to the analysis of  
 23 potential or actual harm to people, the probability of  
 24 it occurring and the consequences or impacts should it  
 25 occur. It is based on fact, information and

Page 59

1 intelligence and will vary over time. A threat  
 2 assessment is used to develop a prioritised working  
 3 strategy and ultimately forms the basis on which the  
 4 proportionality of the police response will be judged."  
 5 It may be suggested by GMP that, I am quoting here,  
 6 "There was a lack of guidance available in relation to  
 7 threat assessments and the communication of the same  
 8 during AFO briefings".  
 9 Can we look firstly, please, at paragraph 6.18,  
 10 right through to 6.25. Are these paragraphs, 6.18 to  
 11 6.25, guidance in the manual in relation to the conduct  
 12 of threat assessments?  
 13 A. Yes, sir.  
 14 Sir, this would then form the basis for subsequent  
 15 training for commanders, tactical advisers and others.  
 16 Q. I think it is right that we haven't heard it suggested  
 17 by any witnesses so far that any errors, mistakes or  
 18 omissions in the threat assessment carried out in  
 19 Operation Shire on 2 and 3 March were due to a lack of  
 20 guidance about how to conduct threat assessments. Have  
 21 you heard that before in any wider context?  
 22 A. No, sir. There was significant discussion, I recall,  
 23 when this version or the 2009 version of the manual was  
 24 being prepared. There had been attempts to specify the  
 25 format of threat assessments and to give definition to

Page 60

1 **the terms, for example, "High", "Medium", "Low" or**  
 2 **"Unknown". What our experience was, that started to tie**  
 3 **commanders particularly up in knots where they would**  
 4 **spend long periods trying to assess whether the words**  
 5 **fitted the definition.**  
 6 **What we wanted to do was to make sure that**  
 7 **commanders made an assessment to prioritise the threats**  
 8 **that they were currently facing. It was a deliberate**  
 9 **decision to provide this guidance but not to provide**  
 10 **detail trying to define the words, what it should look**  
 11 **like on paper, because in general no two incidents are**  
 12 **the same and we wanted people to prioritise the threats**  
 13 **across the spectrum of the resources and assets they had**  
 14 **in front of them and their ability to deal with it.**  
 15 Q. Thirdly, if that was the difficulty in this case, ie it  
 16 was perceived within Greater Manchester Police that  
 17 there was a lack of guidance on how to carry out threat  
 18 assessments and how to communicate them to AFOs in  
 19 briefings, what would you expect GMP to have done about  
 20 it?  
 21 **A. GMP could have, for example, brought that to the**  
 22 **attention of ACPO. If it was deemed appropriate**  
 23 **additional training in relation to the contents of the**  
 24 **curriculum could have been provided, the manual could be**  
 25 **amended or bespoke local needs could be addressed. GMP**

Page 61

1 **also had the opportunity to deal with those issues**  
 2 **themselves. This is not a training manual, this is, you**  
 3 **know, high level guidance which sets the broad**  
 4 **principles upon which guidance should form from.**  
 5 Q. I have emphasised already that we haven't heard any  
 6 evidence that suggested that any of the mistakes that we  
 7 have seen were due to a perceived lack of guidance, but  
 8 did anyone to your knowledge make such an approach to  
 9 ACPO?  
 10 **A. None that I can recall during my time.**  
 11 Q. In 2012, was it common for there to be what we have  
 12 heard called a risk assessment meeting involving at  
 13 a minimum the SIO, the TFC and a TAC adviser, if time  
 14 allowed?  
 15 **A. Certainly for planned incidents, yes.**  
 16 Q. Yes.  
 17 Was there any documentary guidance that required  
 18 a meeting to occur, ie the physical presence of two or  
 19 perhaps three people?  
 20 **A. Not that I recall, but I think it would be acknowledged**  
 21 **that that would be good practice unless it was**  
 22 **impractical for geographic or other reasons.**  
 23 Q. Indeed we have heard from a high number of GMP officers  
 24 that their understanding was that it was indeed good  
 25 practice.

Page 62

1 It may be further suggested that there was a lack of  
 2 guidance about the use of warning markers within the  
 3 briefing of AFOs. I just want to explore that, please.  
 4 By March 2012, for how long had the police service  
 5 been using warning markers?  
 6 **A. I think certainly throughout my service I can recall**  
 7 **warning markers linked to the PNC.**  
 8 Q. Would you regard it as necessary for national guidance  
 9 to be issued regarding how firearms planners and  
 10 commanders should treat warning markers in the briefing  
 11 of their own officers?  
 12 **A. No, sir. I think that is just a basic policing tool**  
 13 **that all officers from the most junior ranks up would**  
 14 **understand the nature of and the need to interrogate**  
 15 **occasionally if it was relevant to critical decision**  
 16 **making.**  
 17 Q. Again, I don't think we have heard the suggestion by any  
 18 of the GMP witnesses so far that the errors, mistakes  
 19 and omissions in the use of warning markers was due to  
 20 a perceived lack of guidance. Have you heard that  
 21 suggestion being made before in any wider context?  
 22 **A. No, sir. We have heard evidence that warning markers**  
 23 **can cover a wide variation of issues, I think that is**  
 24 **the common understanding within the police service to**  
 25 **the best of my knowledge.**

Page 63

1 Q. It may be suggested that there was a lack of guidance  
 2 about rating intelligence for the purposes of AFO  
 3 briefings. Looking at paragraphs 6.17 to 6.25, which  
 4 sets out the process by which a threat assessment is  
 5 arrived at. Do you consider this to be adequate or  
 6 inadequate guidance on the approach that should be taken  
 7 to rating intelligence for the purposes of briefings to  
 8 AFOs?  
 9 **A. Clearly I have been aware of this guidance for many**  
 10 **years and it has never raised any concerns and neither**  
 11 **do I recall any being raised with me. Of course there**  
 12 **would be other guidance in relation to the use of**  
 13 **intelligence through the National Intelligence Model,**  
 14 **which might assist with this.**  
 15 Q. If you --  
 16 **A. How intelligence is used in all policing operations,**  
 17 **because this is -- because it is a firearm incident, it**  
 18 **should not mean it should be dealt with in any other way**  
 19 **to all policing operations.**  
 20 Q. Indeed if you look back to paragraph 6.9 on page 345,  
 21 the definition of information and intelligence is drawn  
 22 from the National Intelligence Model.  
 23 **A. Hmm.**  
 24 Q. Was it your understanding that the National Intelligence  
 25 Model wasn't excluded in its application to firearms

Page 64



<p>1 operations?</p> <p>2 <b>A. No, absolutely not, sir, it is integral. I also read</b></p> <p>3 <b>these things to say, "If it says 'information', it</b></p> <p>4 <b>wouldn't have a grading. If it says 'intelligence' then</b></p> <p>5 <b>it is likely in many documents the grading would be</b></p> <p>6 <b>included".</b></p> <p>7 Q. Thirdly, to what extent do you consider it to be common</p> <p>8 sense and not requiring a national guidance document to</p> <p>9 make it happen that firearms officers should have</p> <p>10 communicated to them the assessment of the reliability</p> <p>11 of intelligence upon which they are going to be asked to</p> <p>12 make life and death decisions?</p> <p>13 <b>A. Sir, I would fully agree it is a matter of common sense.</b></p> <p>14 <b>I would say though that I would be tolerant of not</b></p> <p>15 <b>necessarily overburdening AFOs with lists of 5x5x5</b></p> <p>16 <b>criteria, as long as the wording that is used accurately</b></p> <p>17 <b>conveys the strength and nature of the intelligence</b></p> <p>18 <b>itself.</b></p> <p>19 Q. I think you have been present for some of the evidence</p> <p>20 where some firearms officers have said that it depends</p> <p>21 on the personality of the TFC that is briefing you in</p> <p>22 GMP as to what approach should be taken, in broad terms</p> <p>23 some have used the 5x5 system, some use words as</p> <p>24 a surrogate for the National Intelligence Model 5x5</p> <p>25 system and some don't use anything at all.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 65</p>	<p>1 you vary your answers according to, if there is</p> <p>2 a difference, SFC, TFC and TAC adviser.</p> <p>3 <b>A. I have seen a variation nationally in relation to the</b></p> <p>4 <b>way those documents are completed. Some officers are</b></p> <p>5 <b>very comfortable with the use of a daybook system for</b></p> <p>6 <b>example. Some of those individuals will tend to put far</b></p> <p>7 <b>more detail in the daybook than they will in the log.</b></p> <p>8 <b>What I would expect in terms of the submission and</b></p> <p>9 <b>completion of those documents is for that daybook to be</b></p> <p>10 <b>copied and for that to be attached to the booklet with</b></p> <p>11 <b>a clear note to indicate what part of the incident that</b></p> <p>12 <b>covers, so that the document and the log is absolutely</b></p> <p>13 <b>clear in terms of when it was completed, by whom and</b></p> <p>14 <b>what it says.</b></p> <p>15 <b>In terms of the intelligence question that led into</b></p> <p>16 <b>this, I would expect to see more discussion of the 5x5x5</b></p> <p>17 <b>model at the strategic level, and I am more tolerant of</b></p> <p>18 <b>the use of words when it comes to the AFO not to</b></p> <p>19 <b>overburden them with some of that detail, as long as the</b></p> <p>20 <b>message is very, very clear.</b></p> <p>21 Q. Putting it more frankly, in all of the logs for 2 and</p> <p>22 3 March these columns are just not filled in. Is that</p> <p>23 usual or unusual or do people just think, "This</p> <p>24 a document, I haven't got to complete it"?</p> <p>25 <b>A. It is unusual, because normally that information is</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 67</p>
<p>1 <b>A. I would be tolerant as long as the words that are used</b></p> <p>2 <b>are absolutely accurate and reflect the grading.</b></p> <p>3 <b>I think probably an ideal situation would be the minimal</b></p> <p>4 <b>use of the 5x5x5 system for AFOs, but quite clearly some</b></p> <p>5 <b>of the gradings tell a really clear picture and on</b></p> <p>6 <b>occasions that could be used to good effect to put the</b></p> <p>7 <b>intelligence into perspective.</b></p> <p>8 Q. We have seen that the logs which the firearms commanders</p> <p>9 in this operation were supposed to use for the TFC, the</p> <p>10 SFC and the TAC adviser contained a column facilitating</p> <p>11 the recording of the National Intelligence Model 5x5</p> <p>12 system.</p> <p>13 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>14 Q. Is it the case that the design of the logs was subject</p> <p>15 to amendment over time?</p> <p>16 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>17 Q. Was the design of the logs aimed at prompting officers</p> <p>18 into certain action, ie to ask certain questions and</p> <p>19 also to record the answers to them?</p> <p>20 <b>A. It was, sir, yes.</b></p> <p>21 Q. I think we have seen that other than</p> <p>22 Superintendent Ellison, the logs provided to the GMP</p> <p>23 officers were not used by any other officer. To what</p> <p>24 extent was that in your experience common? Not to</p> <p>25 complete the log designed for the purpose? Perhaps if</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 66</p>	<p>1 <b>recorded elsewhere. I have seen many logs where there</b></p> <p>2 <b>are large blanks, but there is normally a mass of paper</b></p> <p>3 <b>with it --</b></p> <p>4 Q. Yes.</p> <p>5 <b>A. -- sometimes loose leaf, but generally photocopies of</b></p> <p>6 <b>daybooks. I am tolerant of that because it has been</b></p> <p>7 <b>done but it has been done in a slightly different</b></p> <p>8 <b>fashion. I think that is down to the custom and</b></p> <p>9 <b>practice of individuals over many years, as long as that</b></p> <p>10 <b>then contains the relevant information and decision</b></p> <p>11 <b>making and is capable of audit.</b></p> <p>12 Q. The Manual of Guidance imposes requirements frequently</p> <p>13 in relation to all firearms commanders to keep records</p> <p>14 of their decisions?</p> <p>15 <b>A. Yes.</b></p> <p>16 Q. The purposes of that, would I be right, include the</p> <p>17 following.</p> <p>18 Firstly, if there is to be a handover within</p> <p>19 an operation, it facilitates the transfer of</p> <p>20 information?</p> <p>21 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>22 Q. Secondly, it leads them through the process of decision</p> <p>23 making in a formatted and logical sequence of events?</p> <p>24 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>25 Q. Which is why the books are designed in the way that they</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 68</p>

1 are; is that right?

2 **A. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.**

3 **The books were very much designed by capturing good**

4 **practice from up and down the country. So good practice**

5 **would indicate to use the book in its entirety and I say**

6 **on that balance I am somewhat tolerant if that has been**

7 **done in a slightly different fashion.**

8 Q. Thirdly, they, the books, allow for post-incident

9 scrutiny?

10 **A. Yes, sir.**

11 Q. Would you agree that one of the values of

12 contemporaneous recording of decisions in the logs is

13 that it may reveal the extent to which the matters

14 recorded show operational failings and a disregard of

15 the conflict management model or national decision

16 making model?

17 **A. Certainly that would be one issue, sir. What it also**

18 **can do as well is properly completed it can show that**

19 **the decision making might have been extremely reasonable**

20 **based on limited information, so it works both ways.**

21 Q. Lastly, the logs would allow for local and national

22 analysis of data?

23 **A. Yes, sir.**

24 Q. In paragraph 340 of your first report, if we can turn

25 that up, please, to 344 --

Page 69

1 **A. Yes, sir.**

2 Q. -- you give your opinion on one of the allegations made

3 in the prosecution of Sir Peter Fahy, which was in

4 general the recording of decisions, reasons behind

5 decisions and the selections of particular tactical

6 options was poor.

7 You say in 340:

8 "To place this issue in context, it is generally the

9 case that in any post-incident review of police firearms

10 deployments that the documentation could have been more

11 comprehensive and more effectively presented. Those

12 that have not commanded or been involved in armed

13 deployments may not appreciate just how fast moving and

14 hectic some armed deployments can be. Additionally, for

15 some officers such as the SFC this will not be their

16 only operational responsibility."

17 That probably speaks for itself, but you go on to

18 say at 341:

19 "However, in this case there are issues that go well

20 beyond the normal criticism that can often be applied

21 post-incident in relation to written logs. There are

22 fundamental questions relating to the scope of matters

23 identified and considered by the TAs and the TFC in

24 their logs on 3 March. During Op Shire it appears that

25 there were periods of down time where decisions and

Page 70

1 considerations could have been far more comprehensively

2 documented."

3 Does that remain your view having listened to the

4 oral evidence?

5 **A. It does, sir, yes.**

6 Q. You say that, "There are issues that go well beyond the

7 normal criticism" and that, "There are fundamental

8 questions relating to the scope of matters identified

9 and considered".

10 By that do you mean that there are a significant

11 number of issues relating to recording of decisions or

12 are you suggesting there that the lack of recording

13 demonstrates more fundamental questions relating to the

14 substance of matters decided?

15 **A. Sir, I think it is more substantial fundamental issues**

16 **in relation to the decision making and command of the**

17 **incident, rather than administrative errors.**

18 Q. You continue at 342:

19 "There was a post-incident internal review in

20 relation to the records and actions of Steve Allen and

21 Y19 on 3 March, carried out by the CFI, which was

22 documented in a report dated 14 March. The CFI states

23 ..."

24 We are just dealing with the TAC adviser's logs

25 here:

Page 71

1 "... that there was no record of the threat

2 assessment of the TFC, there was no mention of what

3 tactic had been authorised or by who, there was no

4 mention of the tactic being rehearsed before deployment

5 as usually happens or any rationale as to why this

6 hasn't happened.

7 "I am aware of some OFCs using a national firearms

8 instructor to observe officers during this run through

9 to ensure compliance with the standard operating

10 procedure, unfortunately no mention of this is made in

11 the log. Mention is made that Cheshire has four ARVs on

12 standby at a nearby location, but this is not then

13 recorded in the contingency section nor is there any

14 reference to any advice given regarding those ARVs or

15 any subsequent policy decisions. Overall the recording

16 appears to be lacking substance. There is no mention of

17 any tipping points for the use of special munitions or

18 whether these have been authorised. I would expect the

19 TAC adviser to be asking the TFC what thresholds they

20 would be looking for, in particular around the

21 deployment of special munitions."

22 You say:

23 "I fully agree with the observations from the CFI

24 above. However, I will argue that many of them also

25 indicate operational failings as well as recording

Page 72

1 errors."  
 2 Is that what you have just told us?  
 3 **A. Yes, sir. My clear point is, sir, I agree with the**  
 4 **words that are written down. I don't agree that they**  
 5 **are just administrative errors, I think that many of**  
 6 **those reflect actual errors during the police operation**  
 7 **itself and therefore they are more substantive.**  
 8 Q. Do you understand how the CFI came to the conclusion  
 9 that these were mere recording errors?  
 10 **A. No, sir. Not for the first time in relation to some of**  
 11 **the documents I agree with the content of the report,**  
 12 **but there appears to be a conclusion at the end which is**  
 13 **not supported by the evidence which precedes it.**  
 14 Q. Why did you conclude that these were not errors in mere  
 15 recording but indicated substantive operational  
 16 failings?  
 17 **A. For example there is mention here of tactic being**  
 18 **rehearsed, it says no mention, well the tactic was not**  
 19 **rehearsed.**  
 20 **It says that mention is made that Cheshire had four**  
 21 **ARVs on standby at a near location, but that is not**  
 22 **recorded as a contingency. Well it wasn't and the**  
 23 **Cheshire ARVs as far as I am aware were not considered**  
 24 **in any way, shape or form.**  
 25 **Many of these issues to me appear to be reflections**

Page 73

1 **of the facts of the situation, not a recording error.**  
 2 Q. You say:  
 3 "The CFI says, 'There is nothing in this document  
 4 which gives me cause for concern over the quality of  
 5 advice given, but I do have the opinion that there is  
 6 a clear weakness in the way it has been recorded and  
 7 indeed a lack of knowledge and experience in the type of  
 8 information that should be recorded'. "  
 9 You say:  
 10 "At this point my opinion again differs from other  
 11 commentators in relation to both the selection of  
 12 tactics, contingencies and related decision making.  
 13 I agree with the observations of the CFI, but not his  
 14 conclusion."  
 15 Is that for the reasons you have just given?  
 16 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 17 Q. I just want to run through some errors or failures of  
 18 record keeping that might be found to exist within GMP  
 19 in the context of this operation.  
 20 Just dealing with record keeping at the moment, and  
 21 not the additional question of whether it is revelatory  
 22 of a substantive failing. Did you find, at the least,  
 23 errors of record keeping by the strategic firearms  
 24 commander?  
 25 **A. Yes, sir.**

Page 74

1 Q. By the tactical firearms commander?  
 2 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 3 Q. By both TAC advisers?  
 4 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 5 Q. Did you find any contemporaneous record at all of the  
 6 OFC's decision making?  
 7 **A. No, sir.**  
 8 Q. To what extent was it normal for, bearing in mind the  
 9 role that he or she may be performing, the OFC to make  
 10 a record of their decision making?  
 11 **A. In the latter stages of Operation Shire, clearly it was**  
 12 **dynamic and there wouldn't be a written record made of**  
 13 **those issues. I would expect there to be some record of**  
 14 **the decision making, particularly any amendments to the**  
 15 **tactical plan and decisions throughout the day of the**  
 16 **3rd particularly. OFC's records tend to be far less**  
 17 **comprehensive and shorter in length than the other**  
 18 **records, but there is normally a record.**  
 19 Q. We know there is not a log designed for the purpose --  
 20 **A. No.**  
 21 Q. -- how did OFCs record, in your experience, their  
 22 decisions or actions, contemporaneously?  
 23 **A. Probably in the main I have seen an awful lot recorded**  
 24 **on the actual computerised incident logs of various**  
 25 **forces.**

Page 75

1 Q. Yes.  
 2 **A. Also the briefing document itself is quite often used to**  
 3 **start a narrative note from operational firearms**  
 4 **commanders, with the daybook --**  
 5 Q. Yes.  
 6 **A. -- I've seen various versions.**  
 7 **I have also seen a few logs which have been compiled**  
 8 **by forces themselves for OFCs.**  
 9 Q. So a self-designed booklet?  
 10 **A. A self-designed log, but as I say they are not normally**  
 11 **particularly comprehensive issues but the OFCs, quite**  
 12 **often to protect themselves and ensure accuracy will**  
 13 **keep a note and a record of relevant issues.**  
 14 **Particularly when they have changed the instruction that**  
 15 **they have given to AFOs or amended it.**  
 16 Q. If we look at the Manual of Guidance, if that is still  
 17 open, please, at page 333 to start with.  
 18 At paragraph 5.23:  
 19 "The OFC [then if you go over the page to the top of  
 20 334] should ensure decisions taken are recorded where  
 21 possible to provide a clear audit trail."  
 22 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 23 Q. It was a responsibility of the OFC outlined in the  
 24 Manual of Guidance; is that right?  
 25 **A. That's right, sir, but I wouldn't expect to see the**

Page 76

1 **documentation I would from the other commanders.**  
 2 Q. Here there was, it seems, no recording of the  
 3 communication channel upon which the OFC was  
 4 communicating. To what extent was that normal or usual?  
 5 **A. There was a significant variation nationally, some**  
 6 **systems recorded, some didn't at that stage.**  
 7 Q. There was again no recording of the channel on which the  
 8 firearms officers were communicating. Was that normal  
 9 or usual?  
 10 **A. Again, the similar position, there was variations**  
 11 **nationally.**  
 12 Q. Here the AFOs, save for the three people who were  
 13 identified as principals, decided not to record their  
 14 initial accounts in their notebooks or in a first  
 15 account. To what extent is that in post-incident  
 16 procedures normal or not?  
 17 **A. It is hard to state a normality for post-incident**  
 18 **procedures.**  
 19 Q. Is that because of the relative infrequency of them?  
 20 **A. I think it is a combination that they are infrequent,**  
 21 **the nature of incidents can vary considerably, the**  
 22 **approach of the PIM and the IPCC can vary considerably**  
 23 **and there are competing requirements. For example, in**  
 24 **this incident there is an ongoing criminal investigation**  
 25 **in relation to the robbery allegations, so there**

Page 77

1 **a requirement to record, retain and reveal information**  
 2 **and evidence from the officers in relation to that.**  
 3 **There could be a desire within the force to ask officers**  
 4 **to make an initial account in relation to the incident**  
 5 **in general.**  
 6 **Some of the officers might be deemed to be**  
 7 **significant witnesses, there is additional guidance and**  
 8 **legislation that could determine how they are dealt with**  
 9 **there and then there is the firearms manual chapter 7**  
 10 **issues in relation to accounts.**  
 11 **I think it is fair to say there has been a real**  
 12 **mixed bag in relation to the response to post-incident**  
 13 **procedures because of the infrequency and the different**  
 14 **nature of the leadership and decision making that has**  
 15 **been applied immediately post-incident.**  
 16 Q. The absence of initial accounts in this case from all  
 17 but three would not be unusual?  
 18 **A. Potentially. And I think it is because of the --**  
 19 **because of a range of factors, but normally there is the**  
 20 **gathering of evidence and information, even if it is not**  
 21 **obtaining accounts in the fashion that it was for the**  
 22 **three officers who did it in this case. You might see**  
 23 **a mix, for example there might be officers making**  
 24 **pocketbook entries, some officers who are on the**  
 25 **periphery, some being treated as principals, some**

Page 78

1 **providing initial accounts. So you would get a mixed**  
 2 **bag of evidence and initial accounts.**  
 3 Q. Can we turn to the issue of the conduct of individual as  
 4 opposed to collective threat assessments. If you go to  
 5 page 347 -- which we have just read in a different  
 6 context -- and look at paragraph 6.17.  
 7 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 8 Q. I think you would accept that if information in a threat  
 9 assessment may be relied on by AFOs to make decisions  
 10 whether or not to discharge their weapon, there is  
 11 a very high priority on recording the information that  
 12 is given to them and communicating it in as accurate  
 13 a way as possible.  
 14 **A. Yes, sir. Although I would say that the threat**  
 15 **assessment itself shouldn't be the basis for that**  
 16 **decision alone.**  
 17 Q. Just explain why, please?  
 18 **A. Because clearly most of the decisions made by an AFO**  
 19 **will be based on the circumstances they are presented**  
 20 **with at that time on the ground during an operation, but**  
 21 **they would be informed by the intelligence information**  
 22 **and the threat assessment.**  
 23 Q. Would you agree that it being a possibility that AFOs  
 24 may make a decision that is in part based on the  
 25 information that they are provided at a briefing, there

Page 79

1 is an obligation on those planning the operation to take  
 2 careful and thorough steps to ensure that the  
 3 information they provide is accurate?  
 4 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 5 Q. We have seen in GMP's policy -- I am not going to turn  
 6 it up in the interests of time -- standard operating  
 7 procedure number 3 at F/686, that:  
 8 "Officers conducting briefings need to be mindful  
 9 that the content of the briefing may directly affect the  
 10 response of armed officers to any perceived threat."  
 11 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 12 Q. I think that is a point that is made in the manual too;  
 13 is that right?  
 14 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 15 Q. At page 355, at 6.71:  
 16 "Officers conducting briefings should be mindful  
 17 that the content of the briefing may directly affect the  
 18 response of armed officers to any subsequent perceived  
 19 threat from a subject. Officers providing briefings  
 20 should stress the aim of any operation, including  
 21 specifically the individual responsibility of the  
 22 officers and the legal powers relevant to the  
 23 deployment."  
 24 Both in the SOP of GMP at the relevant time and in  
 25 the Manual of Guidance there was a warning, would you

Page 80

1 agree, to officers conducting briefings reminding them  
 2 of the common sense position that what they were telling  
 3 the officers might directly affect the subsequent  
 4 actions of the AFOs?  
 5 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 6 Q. By 2012 had the importance of accurate information being  
 7 provided in briefings been stated and restated a number  
 8 of times as a result of reviews of fatalities involving  
 9 the police service?  
 10 **A. Yes, sir. It is also a matter of common understanding**  
 11 **I would say within the police service as a matter of**  
 12 **fact.**  
 13 Q. Just going a bit beyond that, had the common sense  
 14 position been reinforced in the context of deaths of  
 15 members of the public previously, I am thinking of the  
 16 Jean Charles de Menezes shooting and the coroner's  
 17 report as a result of that?  
 18 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 19 Q. When he gave evidence, DI Cousen said that in the  
 20 context of the threat assessment on which command  
 21 decisions were based, the main concern would be with the  
 22 person that presents the highest risk, yes?  
 23 **A. That -- I would probably present it in a different way.**  
 24 Q. Okay. First of all, that is what he said?  
 25 **A. Yes.**

Page 81

1 Q. Why would you present it in a different way?  
 2 **A. Because the threat assessment encourages you to look at**  
 3 **the threat that an individual presents. Then you have**  
 4 **a collective of the number of individuals or subjects**  
 5 **you have within an incident itself, and therefore the**  
 6 **threat that the incident poses.**  
 7 **One of the reasons for breaking this down is you may**  
 8 **have a tactical option or you might be presented with**  
 9 **a set of circumstances where subjects split and you have**  
 10 **the opportunity perhaps to intercept or arrest**  
 11 **individuals on their own.**  
 12 Q. I see.  
 13 **A. That helps AFOs then understand whether, you know, the**  
 14 **threat assessment for that individual should affect**  
 15 **their response.**  
 16 Q. Another way of putting it might be as follows. That in  
 17 deciding whether or not the deployment of armed officers  
 18 is justified, the collective threat may be the most  
 19 important one.  
 20 **A. Yes, sir. In terms of gaining an authorisation, but**  
 21 **there are other considerations. There is an element in**  
 22 **what Mr Cousen said that, when you were assessing this**  
 23 **as a whole, quite clearly you have to take into account**  
 24 **the threat that the highest level individual within that**  
 25 **group presents.**

Page 82

1 Q. The position is different, is that right, where the  
 2 threat assessments are provided to AFOs, because amongst  
 3 other reasons the manual requires a specific individual  
 4 threat assessment in relation to all of the individual  
 5 parties to be formulated?  
 6 **A. Yes, and past experience has shown the intelligence**  
 7 **indicating that the three individuals may turn up could**  
 8 **be wrong. You could have a different individual, as**  
 9 **indeed was the case in this incident. That is why each**  
 10 **individual needs to have a threat assessment as well as**  
 11 **a collective assessment on the operation as a whole.**  
 12 Q. We see that in paragraph 6.22, do we:  
 13 "Once the threat has been defined, it will enable  
 14 a specific individual threat assessment in relation to  
 15 all identified parties to be formulated."  
 16 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 17 Q. Is that right?  
 18 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 19 Q. I think we know that that is in fact what happened here,  
 20 that individualised threat assessments were carried out.  
 21 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 22 Q. Why would it be necessary to provide AFOs with specific  
 23 individual threat assessments in relation to all  
 24 individual subjects?  
 25 **A. At the start of an operation you never know exactly how**

Page 83

1 **it is going to turn out. There could be a whole range**  
 2 **of situations where the AFOs are asked to confront all**  
 3 **three, one of the individuals, whether it turns into**  
 4 **a situation where they go into a building. All of this**  
 5 **is extremely relevant. The history and the threat that**  
 6 **they pose can inform tactics and decision making.**  
 7 **Therefore based on your previous point, it needs to be**  
 8 **as accurate and as relevant as possible.**  
 9 Q. Can I turn then to a different topic, please, the  
 10 operational and occupational competency of some of the  
 11 principal officers, I am using that word in  
 12 a non-technical sense, in Operation Shire.  
 13 Can we start, please, with ACC Terry Sweeney as he  
 14 then was. Can you look, please, in paragraphs 151 and  
 15 152 of your report.  
 16 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 17 Q. In these paragraphs you deal with Mr Sweeney, then  
 18 operating under the cypher N18. In paragraph 151 you  
 19 set out, in summary form, his background and experience  
 20 in firearms matters.  
 21 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 22 Q. You said, the last sentence of paragraph 151, that:  
 23 "He was a very experienced firearms commander with  
 24 a broad firearms based CV that well qualifies him to  
 25 command incidents such as Operation Shire as an SFC."

Page 84

1 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 2 Q. You therefore agreed with another commentator's  
 3 conclusions that ACC Sweeney was both operationally and  
 4 occupationally competent to perform duties as an SFC on  
 5 3 March.  
 6 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 7 Q. Having heard the evidence, does that remain your view?  
 8 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 9 Q. Can we turn then to Superintendent Granby, and I am  
 10 going to take this slowly.  
 11 In between paragraphs 154 and 165 of your first  
 12 report, and then paragraphs 81 and 84 of your second  
 13 report, you address the position of  
 14 Superintendent Granby, yes?  
 15 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 16 Q. You I think have highlighted in particular  
 17 Superintendent Granby's "not yet competent" assessment  
 18 on the joint services specialist commander development  
 19 programme conducted by the PSNI in 2011 as a very  
 20 relevant feature of his background and history?  
 21 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 22 Q. In general terms, why is that?  
 23 **A. Well in general terms -- on the one side it is the**  
 24 **question of what the contents of the feedback means for**  
 25 **him as an individual, as a tactical firearms commander.**

Page 85

1 **On the other side it is the consequences of the**  
 2 **subsequent disclosure of the contents of that for the**  
 3 **reputation of the force and public confidence, if it is**  
 4 **not properly addressed and considered by the force.**  
 5 Q. Have you seen any evidence that this was properly  
 6 addressed and considered by the force?  
 7 **A. No, sir.**  
 8 Q. What would you suggest constituted proper consideration  
 9 by the force?  
 10 **A. Perhaps an ideal situation would have been the chief**  
 11 **officer with responsibility for firearms to receive the**  
 12 **full details of the officer's performance on the course**  
 13 **itself, at a meeting with the chief firearms instructor,**  
 14 **and possibly the head of operations, depending on the**  
 15 **functional nature of those individuals in the force. To**  
 16 **consider all the issues, not just of the officer's**  
 17 **immediate future but the strategic consequences of this**  
 18 **sort of information being disclosed and what that meant**  
 19 **to the force.**  
 20 I would expect that to be documented, for  
 21 consideration to be given about the officer being  
 22 temporarily taken off duties while the matter was being  
 23 dealt with and for a reasoned decision to be made.  
 24 I am not saying what the decision should be, but  
 25 I suggest at the very least there should have been

Page 86

1 **a formal documented proper consideration of it.**  
 2 Q. You in both reports have refrained from saying what the  
 3 outcome of the decision might have been; is that right?  
 4 **A. That's correct, sir, yes.**  
 5 Q. And have limited yourself to suggesting that there ought  
 6 to have been formal audited decision making by the  
 7 people that you have just mentioned --  
 8 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 9 Q. -- which didn't occur.  
 10 Why are you not able to say what the outcome would  
 11 have been, or should have been?  
 12 **A. This goes back to my role in relation to giving**  
 13 **an opinion and advice that it is opinion and there may**  
 14 **be different decisions made in relation to the future of**  
 15 **this individual, but what I am very happy to say is at**  
 16 **the very least there should have been serious and formal**  
 17 **consideration given to it. I do accept that other**  
 18 **people might come to a different conclusion than I would**  
 19 **in relation to these circumstances, but I think the**  
 20 **subsequent disclosure of this could be extremely**  
 21 **embarrassing to a force and there are of course other**  
 22 **issues associated with this such as the failure to**  
 23 **openly disclose this by Superintendent Granby in one of**  
 24 **his witness statements.**  
 25 I am trying to be extremely careful in relation to

Page 87

1 **not applying my level of exposure and knowledge of**  
 2 **decision making on firearms issues here and to hold back**  
 3 **to that earlier principle of making sure that what I say**  
 4 **is something that I am happy is a reasonable level of**  
 5 **approach by a force rather than a standard of**  
 6 **perfection.**  
 7 Q. Would the general matters that might be taken into  
 8 account in such a decision be the nature of the course  
 9 that was being undertaken?  
 10 **A. Yes, sir, there would be a range of issues.**  
 11 **First of all, is there a welfare issue which has**  
 12 **impacted on the individual's performance on the course?**  
 13 **Is the course so demanding that you would expect**  
 14 **a different level of performance from that individual on**  
 15 **the course, to the extent where they cannot apply the**  
 16 **conflict management model and lapse into long periods of**  
 17 **indecision? Is that a factor on the course?**  
 18 **I have an opinion on that because I have seen**  
 19 **officers work in this environment over many, many years.**  
 20 **Those are things which should have been considered.**  
 21 **Did the officer need some retraining?**  
 22 **Did they need some reassessment or coaching?**  
 23 **And, you know, is the force happy for this sort of**  
 24 **feedback to remain on file without anything being done**  
 25 **in relation to it?**

Page 88

1 Q. Would it be right then to split down a decision into  
 2 some general factors, namely the officers conducting the  
 3 decisions' general knowledge of the pass and failure  
 4 rate, how demanding the course was, what comparison it  
 5 bore to the activities that Superintendent Granby was  
 6 being asked to carry out on a day-to-day basis,  
 7 including MASTS deployments, a comparison of the levels  
 8 of skill tested?  
 9 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 10 Q. Then, specifically, in relation to personal matters,  
 11 that concerned him?  
 12 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 13 Q. Looking at the personal matters that concerned him, you  
 14 highlight some of them in paragraph 159:  
 15 "It was said that he committed himself 100 per cent  
 16 to the programme, in the early stages he deployed  
 17 competency in the command of basic pre-planned and  
 18 spontaneous firearms incidents but that he experienced  
 19 difficulty in the management and coordination of  
 20 multidisciplinary intelligence, firearms and  
 21 investigative specialist assets.  
 22 "He was not able to display competency in all of the  
 23 required skill criteria associated with specialist  
 24 firearms command. His use of the conflict management  
 25 model throughout this exercise was inconsistent and at

Page 89

1 times elements were completely overlooked. This led to  
 2 difficulties when it came to establishing the levels of  
 3 threat, application of the working strategy in  
 4 implementing the appropriate operational action. This  
 5 situation was highlighted during the exercise, where  
 6 failure to exercise appropriately the elements of the  
 7 conflict management model led to long periods of  
 8 indecision.  
 9 "From the outset of the exercise had some difficulty  
 10 in demonstrating effective use of the conflict  
 11 management model."  
 12 I think you mentioned a moment ago that the factors  
 13 that you highlighted were his use of the conflict  
 14 management model was inconsistent and at times  
 15 completely overlooked and that this led to long periods  
 16 of indecision. Why did you highlight those?  
 17 **A. The conflict management model is the absolute core of**  
 18 **decision making in relation to firearms incidents and**  
 19 **firearms deployments for AFOs through to every single**  
 20 **commander. The conflict management model is something**  
 21 **we expect every police officer to know, use and utilise**  
 22 **within the workplace.**  
 23 **That is an extremely unusual set of facts that long**  
 24 **periods of indecision and great difficulties with the**  
 25 **conflict management model.**

Page 90

1 Q. What do you mean it is "an extremely unusual set of  
 2 facts"?  
 3 **A. Sorry opinions, it is an unusual set of things put**  
 4 **together for an assessment, because quite often what you**  
 5 **will do is you will get feedback to say that the**  
 6 **decision making was not commensurate with the**  
 7 **intelligence or the nature of the incident.**  
 8 **I can't recall long periods of indecision and the**  
 9 **conflict management model failures being reported in**  
 10 **that way on the training events that I have been aware**  
 11 **of in similar situations.**  
 12 Q. What, ever?  
 13 **A. I can't recall any. It seems to me to be significant**  
 14 **enough to make a serious decision about that**  
 15 **individual's short-term future.**  
 16 Q. The guidance or the feedback that was given by the  
 17 course providers on the sheets was that Mr Granby needed  
 18 more experience with multidisciplinary specialist  
 19 investigative assets and to understand the capability  
 20 and operational strength that those assets could bring  
 21 to an operation.  
 22 Would you have regarded that feedback as all that  
 23 needed to be done, ie to get more experience with  
 24 multidisciplinary investigative assets?  
 25 **A. No, because of the nature of the feedback is fundamental**

Page 91

1 **to the use of the conflict management model and**  
 2 **indecision. I think any force receiving that would have**  
 3 **considered the feedback but applied their own judgment**  
 4 **to make sure they were happy with the recommendations**  
 5 **and content.**  
 6 Q. It may be suggested that there was no guidance  
 7 nationally available at the time to GMP on the effect  
 8 that failure on this course, or a not yet competent  
 9 assessment on this course, should have on TFC's normal  
 10 operability. Is that right, that there was no national  
 11 document telling GMP what it should have done?  
 12 **A. No, there is the guidance on the front of the training**  
 13 **course documentation that says it doesn't necessarily**  
 14 **affect the TFC's criteria.**  
 15 Q. Yes.  
 16 **A. I think there is a later letter from Simon Chesterman**  
 17 **some time afterwards, but for me this would be part of**  
 18 **the common sense review mechanism that is insisted upon**  
 19 **by the National Police Improvement Agency, that any**  
 20 **issue that arises that may impact upon the individual's**  
 21 **effectiveness or their continued credibility as**  
 22 **a commander or AFO needs to be reviewed when it comes**  
 23 **into force.**  
 24 Q. You say at paragraph 161 that:  
 25 "The above development issues [which are those that

Page 92

<p>1 you have listed in paragraph 160] that were identified                  2 during this training course were also apparent, to                  3 varying degrees, when reviewing Superintendent Granby's                  4 performance during the events of 2 and 3 March."                  5 You appear to be drawing a link there between what                  6 the Northern Ireland course providers had said about                  7 Superintendent Granby and what you saw or read about                  8 what he did in Operation Shire. Can you expand on that                  9 please?                  10 <b>A. Yes, first of all Operation Shire was an event,</b>                  11 <b>an incident, a policing operation which involved</b>                  12 <b>advanced policing tactics. It involved the use of</b>                  13 <b>diverse intelligence sources and it involved the use of</b>                  14 <b>a range of policing assets. So there are</b>                  15 <b>comparabilities with the nature of the policing</b>                  16 <b>operations that take place during that course itself.</b>                  17 <b>The conflict management model, my suggestion is that</b>                  18 <b>was not used throughout the incident by</b>                  19 <b>Superintendent Granby, because if it was we would have</b>                  20 <b>seen some process of continuous review and decision</b>                  21 <b>making and assessment.</b>                  22 <b>I have made clear that I think the range of tactical</b>                  23 <b>options that were considered were insufficient and I go</b>                  24 <b>into some detail later on in the reports in relation to</b>                  25 <b>those, particularly at Culcheth itself.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 93</p>	<p>1 <b>indecision.</b>                  2 MR BEER: Thank you.                  3 Sir, might that be an appropriate moment?                  4 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.                  5 2.10.                  6 (1.06 pm)                  7 (The Luncheon Adjournment)                  8 (2.17 pm)                  9 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Beer.                  10 MR BEER: Thank you, sir.                  11 Mr Arundale, I was turning to the operational and                  12 occupational competence of X7, the operational firearms                  13 commander, on 3 March.                  14 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b>                  15 Q. Which you address in paragraphs 167 to 171 of your first                  16 report. I wonder whether we could turn those up,                  17 please.                  18 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b>                  19 Q. I think in general terms these paragraphs were written                  20 when you did not know about X7's lack of success on the                  21 MPS CTSFO course.                  22 <b>A. Yes, sir, that's correct.</b>                  23 Q. We will come to the impact that that knowledge had on                  24 your conclusions in a moment when we look at your second                  25 report, but you say in paragraph 168 that:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 95</p>
<p>1 <b>And that the communication between the TFC and the</b>                  2 <b>OFC could have been improved. The assessment of</b>                  3 <b>intelligence, which is something that we have already</b>                  4 <b>touched upon.</b>                  5 <b>I think there are parallels. That was also drawn</b>                  6 <b>with Mr Molloy as well, saw the same parallels in</b>                  7 <b>relation to Superintendent Granby's actions and</b>                  8 <b>decisions on 3 March 2012.</b>                  9 Q. You say at the end of paragraph 162 that:                  10 "The PSNI course is challenging and more serious                  11 criminal or terrorist scenarios are explored than                  12 Operation Shire presented, but I would not expect                  13 a failure as significant as Superintendent Granby's from                  14 a commander as apparently highly regarded as he was by                  15 his force."                  16 When you say "a failure as significant as                  17 Superintendent Granby's", is that a reference to the                  18 points that you have just made about the use of the                  19 conflict management model?                  20 <b>A. Mainly to the conflict management model, because that is</b>                  21 <b>so fundamental, effectively it is like mirror, signal,</b>                  22 <b>manoeuvre is to driving. The conflict management model</b>                  23 <b>is the absolute heart and core of decision making and it</b>                  24 <b>is very unusual to see that applied to the extent in</b>                  25 <b>terms of feedback where there are long periods of</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 94</p>	<p>1 "Messrs Pemberton and Sturman made reference to the                  2 status of X7 having passed the OFC course in 2009, but                  3 that based on the GMP records of his subsequent training                  4 that despite being an experienced OFC he does not appear                  5 to have attended his mandatory NPIA national command                  6 refresher training day in 2011, and this means he was                  7 technically not competent at the time of this incident."                  8 I think you agreed with that approach; is that                  9 right?                  10 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b>                  11 Q. I think we have heard evidence from X7 that he did                  12 attend some of the day but left before it finished, but                  13 there is no written record of that or indeed of what                  14 part of the training he did receive and which part of it                  15 he did not.                  16 Do you regard that as satisfactory compliance with                  17 the requirement to attend the mandatory NPIA national                  18 command refresher training?                  19 <b>A. No, sir.</b>                  20 Q. Why not?                  21 <b>A. It is mandatory, it is a course of training that must be</b>                  22 <b>attended by all relevant officers. It provides national</b>                  23 <b>updates in relation to any changes in guidance or</b>                  24 <b>training or any good practice that has been picked up</b>                  25 <b>from incidents during the previous year.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 96</p>



1 **A fundamental core of the integrity of the training**  
 2 **role is to maintain appropriate records and where there**  
 3 **is difficulty in an officer attending whole or part of**  
 4 **a course, that remedial action is taken or a new course**  
 5 **is undertaken by that individual.**  
 6 Q. In paragraph 171 you say:  
 7 "X7's failure to attend all or some of the training  
 8 may not have had any negative impact on Operation Shire,  
 9 but on the other hand the training may have contained or  
 10 reinforced important considerations that could have led  
 11 him to have acted differently or to have considered  
 12 alternative action."  
 13 Are you effectively saying there that you don't know  
 14 one way or the other?  
 15 **A. Yes.**  
 16 Q. You say however that on balance, given his extensive  
 17 experience, you do not consider this omission is  
 18 a critical factor for the Inquiry. Why was that?  
 19 **A. Because I am not aware of any fundamental changes to**  
 20 **training or guidance during that time. It would have**  
 21 **primarily been a reinforcement of all the previous**  
 22 **guidance and training that X7 would have received, so**  
 23 **there shouldn't be anything fundamental contained in**  
 24 **that training at that time.**  
 25 Q. Your knowledge that you have now of his attendance --

Page 97

1 has your position changed in the light of the knowledge  
 2 you now have?  
 3 **A. In relation to the Metropolitan Police course and the**  
 4 **earlier course?**  
 5 Q. Yes.  
 6 **A. Yes, I think there is an additional layer of**  
 7 **consideration there. As I explained earlier, I think**  
 8 **there was probably enough flags raised there where there**  
 9 **should have been some action taken in relation to**  
 10 **considering X7's position and whether any additional**  
 11 **training was being delivered.**  
 12 **I think we knew after this that he had left to**  
 13 **attend a 12.00 meeting. I was not clear what time the**  
 14 **course started, but it did look like there was not**  
 15 **a significant amount of contact time on that particular**  
 16 **occasion for X7.**  
 17 Q. Taken alone, failure to attend the full day's NPIA  
 18 refresher training, on its own, do you remain of the  
 19 view that it wasn't a critical factor?  
 20 **A. Well, I certainly see no evidence or I can't see**  
 21 **a causal link between the two.**  
 22 Q. In reaching that view, would you attach importance to  
 23 the fact that X7 may have had refresher training during  
 24 his MASTS refresher courses which I think we know took  
 25 place in May and December 2010?

Page 98

1 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 2 Q. That he had attended armed interception refresher  
 3 training in February 2011 and MASTS refresher training  
 4 in March 2011 and November 2011?  
 5 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 6 Q. We have heard that he was accredited from 1 April 2011  
 7 to 31 March 2012. You have heard I think all of the  
 8 evidence that is relevant to the suggestion that because  
 9 he was accredited from 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2012,  
 10 his failure to attend the training could not matter.  
 11 What do you say as to that?  
 12 **A. I think it does matter. The accreditation is**  
 13 **a retrospective sign off in relation to the officer's**  
 14 **operational and training experience in the year prior to**  
 15 **that. Any issues which arise in that year, be it**  
 16 **a failure on a course, a failure to attend the whole or**  
 17 **part of a course or some form of operational failure**  
 18 **should be considered at the time it arises. If it is**  
 19 **significant, it should be considered by the relevant**  
 20 **authority in the force in relation to the officer's**  
 21 **current position.**  
 22 Q. Would that normally be the CFI or his deputy?  
 23 **A. Yes, there would be layers and the CFI would be the**  
 24 **first level in relation to that.**  
 25 Q. Have you seen any evidence that this was considered?

Page 99

1 **A. Not in relation to this, no.**  
 2 Q. Can we turn then, please, to paragraphs 78 to 80 of your  
 3 second report, please.  
 4 THE CHAIRMAN: Those paragraphs numbers again, please?  
 5 Sorry, Mr Beer.  
 6 MR BEER: 78 to 80, please.  
 7 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 8 Q. You are addressing here -- I am still not going fully  
 9 yet to the Met course -- what X7 has said about two  
 10 issues, namely leaving the NPIA training early and  
 11 failing the Met course. In paragraph 79 you say:  
 12 "There is now the additional information outlined  
 13 earlier in this report that X7 had failed two SFO  
 14 courses prior to 3 March. I have not seen any details  
 15 of the first SFO course, but the course report could  
 16 contain relevant information."  
 17 I think you now have seen the course report for the  
 18 first --  
 19 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 20 Q. -- course:  
 21 "These facts, together with my earlier comments,  
 22 lead me to amend my original conclusion at paragraph 171  
 23 of my original report. I do not consider that on  
 24 3 March X7 was technically occupationally competent for  
 25 the role that he was expected to carry out and there

Page 100

1 were unresolved issues that may indicate that X7 should  
 2 not have been allowed to perform operational duties on  
 3 3 March."  
 4 What has led you to amend your original conclusion?  
 5 **A. It is the additional information really. There is the**  
 6 **failure on two courses and the course reports present**  
 7 **information which needs to be considered. It shouldn't**  
 8 **be something which is just left on file with no review**  
 9 **and acknowledgement. It should be information which is**  
 10 **brought to the attention of the chief firearms**  
 11 **instructor to make a considered opinion as to whether it**  
 12 **impacts or not on X7's continued competence.**  
 13 Q. When you say it should be brought to the attention of  
 14 the CFI, in what way?  
 15 **A. It should be information which is automatically provided**  
 16 **to a CFI. The CFI should have known that the individual**  
 17 **was on a course and there should be a mechanism in place**  
 18 **for the CFI to have that information.**  
 19 **Also the failure of X7 to attend the full mandatory**  
 20 **training should have been something that was referred to**  
 21 **the CFI. There should have been a process in place to**  
 22 **ensure that the CFI was aware of that.**  
 23 Q. Turning then to the attendance at the MPS courses, if we  
 24 go back, please, to paragraphs 65 to 77, which address  
 25 I think compendiously the issues of X7 and Z15.

Page 101

1 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 2 Q. In paragraph 66, you are referring to Chief Inspector  
 3 Trevor Clark of the MPS and his statement that:  
 4 "X7 was removed from the course after two weeks due  
 5 to the officer's performance adversely affecting other  
 6 students."  
 7 You note Mr Clark's timings may be out.  
 8 You carry on to say:  
 9 "It is however the case that X7 and Z15 were sent  
 10 back to force early and that responsible individuals  
 11 within GMP knew that X7 and Z15 had failed this course,  
 12 and at least the basic nature of their fail was known in  
 13 advance of the events of 3 March 2012."  
 14 Was there any formal process for forces that were  
 15 providing training to officers of other forces to feed  
 16 back the outcome of that training to the home force?  
 17 **A. I am not aware of any formal document which just focuses**  
 18 **on that particular issue, but my understanding was it**  
 19 **was fairly common practice, if it was a non-contentious**  
 20 **report it would go back in slow time. If there was**  
 21 **anything that the force had to consider or was**  
 22 **contentious, there would be an immediate referral. That**  
 23 **referral would be to the chief firearms instructor.**  
 24 Q. We have heard some evidence, certainly from the then  
 25 chief firearms instructor, that it should have been him

Page 102

1 that was arranging the attendance of GMP's officers on  
 2 these courses and that he was not so involved.  
 3 Firstly, is that from a national point of view the  
 4 right position, the correct position, that the CFI was  
 5 responsible for arranging attendance on courses?  
 6 **A. Yes, sir, it is absolutely integral to the system for**  
 7 **managing and monitoring the training of all officers**  
 8 **involved in the deployment of armed officers.**  
 9 Q. Why was that?  
 10 **A. The CFI is trained and qualified to make an assessment**  
 11 **of course reports and the individuals who attend them,**  
 12 **both prior to their attendance and afterwards. If the**  
 13 **records are not maintained in a single location with**  
 14 **a key decision maker, then individuals can slip the net**  
 15 **if they haven't passed training, if there have been**  
 16 **issues which are not referred back directly to the chief**  
 17 **firearms instructor due consideration cannot be given in**  
 18 **fast time.**  
 19 Q. You address in paragraphs 68 to 70 some of the email  
 20 traffic that we have seen that preceded the events of  
 21 3 March and then postdated the events of 3 March.  
 22 Overall it tends to suggest that although the course  
 23 reports were returned on perhaps 28 February, they were  
 24 not considered by the CFI until perhaps a fortnight  
 25 later.

Page 103

1 **A. Hmm.**  
 2 Q. In general terms, given what you know of the contents of  
 3 the course reports now, would you regard that as  
 4 an acceptable period of time?  
 5 **A. No, I would have expected people being sent back from**  
 6 **a course to be sent back in a situation where there**  
 7 **could be a fast time review of those issues because it**  
 8 **is not a Metropolitan Police decision. In this case it**  
 9 **was a GMP decision in relation to whether this was**  
 10 **relevant information that had a direct impact on their**  
 11 **immediate deployment or not. It should have gone back**  
 12 **straight away.**  
 13 Q. We have seen from the MPS's emails that there was  
 14 an intention to give Z15 his own course reports and  
 15 those of X7, who had failed about a fortnight earlier.  
 16 Was that usual practice?  
 17 **A. I have seen evidence that that has happened on a number**  
 18 **of occasions. As quite often to ensure that the**  
 19 **individual officer has seen all the information to try**  
 20 **and reinforce the feedback that they have been given,**  
 21 **but that should be accompanied by an independent and**  
 22 **direct method of sending that information back to force,**  
 23 **because you are too reliant on the individual officer**  
 24 **and of course some officers, I would say many officers,**  
 25 **might have a slightly different view of their**

Page 104

1 **performance than the instructors who have assessed them.**  
 2 Q. We have seen that there was an email in relation to Z15  
 3 from the MPS to Inspector Nutter saying that we had to  
 4 ask Z15 to leave the course for safety reasons. There  
 5 wasn't an equivalent communication in relation to X7.  
 6 Knowing what you do of the contents of X7's course  
 7 reports, would you have expected some similar  
 8 communication in relation to him?  
 9 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 10 Q. In any event, when X7's course reports did land, if they  
 11 did on 28 February 2012, what process would you expect  
 12 to have been undertaken by GMP then?  
 13 **A. The chief firearms instructor to do a fast time review**  
 14 **to determine the relevance and impact of the contents of**  
 15 **that feedback. And to consider a more formal review, so**  
 16 **that it is properly and fully documented. So if that**  
 17 **officer was involved in a critical incident, there would**  
 18 **be a clear audit trail dealing with the issues that had**  
 19 **been raised in the Metropolitan Police area.**  
 20 Q. We know that that didn't happen and you say in the  
 21 middle of paragraph 71:  
 22 "There may be a significant irregularity in relation  
 23 to the arrangements for officers to attend the MPS SFO  
 24 training and the subsequent submission of records."  
 25 What do you mean by "significant irregularity"?

Page 105

1 **A. As I have hinted upon, the integrity of the whole**  
 2 **process is that the firearms training element should be**  
 3 **completely separate from the firearms operation, both in**  
 4 **terms of decision making and record keeping. There have**  
 5 **been many instances in the early days of firearms**  
 6 **incidents in the UK where these problems have turned**  
 7 **into critical incidents because the training is not**  
 8 **current, there is no clear record of who has had**  
 9 **training and when.**  
 10 **All of that changed from about 1995 onwards, and by**  
 11 **this time I would have expected chief firearms**  
 12 **instructors to have clear responsibility and methods of**  
 13 **communication with them to ensure that didn't happen.**  
 14 Q. You say at the end of paragraph 71:  
 15 "I have never known any form of AFO training to take  
 16 place or be arranged without the CFI of the officer's  
 17 force being directly involved."  
 18 Are we to understand that as it literally says,  
 19 never?  
 20 **A. Yes, sir. I have been aware of a few command courses**  
 21 **which have been allocated which have not gone through**  
 22 **a chief firearms instruction, when that is**  
 23 **understandable or where the person allocating the course**  
 24 **didn't realise the significance of it, but not for AFO**  
 25 **training.**

Page 106

1 Q. The "never" there means literally never?  
 2 **A. No, I am not aware of any.**  
 3 Q. You I think have looked at the records of X7's failures  
 4 on the SFO courses and in particular the attendance on  
 5 the course that was due to take place between 16 January  
 6 and 16 March 2012.  
 7 **A. Hmm.**  
 8 Q. This was his second failure, yes?  
 9 **A. Yes.**  
 10 Q. Amongst other things was a conclusion that:  
 11 "... he had become overloaded when under pressure  
 12 and his performance during the four weeks was not at  
 13 a consistently competent level. He showed a lack of  
 14 understanding, a lack of confidence and tactical  
 15 awareness of his role.  
 16 "On one day the instructoral staff did not witness  
 17 him trying to organise the team or contribute to any  
 18 ideas and that he had not reached the standard required  
 19 to pass the CQC model of the course."  
 20 What in your assessment was the nature of his  
 21 failure?  
 22 **A. I accept that this is an extremely challenging**  
 23 **environment and this particular part of the exercise was**  
 24 **very, very challenging. It is hard --**  
 25 Q. Namely because this is the CQC element?

Page 107

1 **A. It is, and by its very nature it is not something which**  
 2 **everybody is going to pass. It is not the training that**  
 3 **the bulk of AFOs are going to go through and you will**  
 4 **get significant feedback in relation to it and it is**  
 5 **a very, very dangerous environment.**  
 6 Q. Stopping there, you said that not everyone is going to  
 7 pass. Are you aware of what the failure rates were at  
 8 about this time?  
 9 **A. I have heard failure rates quoted during this Inquiry.**  
 10 Q. Other than that?  
 11 **A. I was not aware before that what the failure rate was,**  
 12 **other than that there was a failure rate and it was**  
 13 **higher than normal courses. I think that is something**  
 14 **I am aware of and accepted, I didn't know the figures in**  
 15 **relation to it.**  
 16 **This really says to me a few issues, a lack of**  
 17 **consistency but particularly in relation to the role of**  
 18 **a team leader, and the ability to organise staff under**  
 19 **the officer's command and control. That is the sort of**  
 20 **message that I am getting from that.**  
 21 **I think I would put a caveat that the chief firearms**  
 22 **instructor would be able to give a far more incisive**  
 23 **overview of what this meant in relation to the officer**  
 24 **and the training. Because they would be familiar with**  
 25 **the lesson plans, the training objectives and I am not**

Page 108

1 **that familiar with those issues.**  
 2 Q. You don't say that in the light of his failure of the  
 3 course he should immediately have been taken off  
 4 firearms duties completely?  
 5 **A. No, sir. No sir.**  
 6 Q. But I think what you do say is that there should have  
 7 been active and auditable consideration given to that  
 8 issue?  
 9 **A. Yes, sir, I think some of those statements would appear**  
 10 **to anybody reviewing an incident that officer may be**  
 11 **involved in as being potentially very relevant and**  
 12 **important statements that needed to be reviewed and**  
 13 **carefully considered and a policy decision made in**  
 14 **relation to their impact or otherwise on the officer's**  
 15 **future.**  
 16 Q. Again, it may be suggested by GMP that there was  
 17 an absence of written policy at a national level as to  
 18 the effects on an officer's future of their failure on  
 19 an outside course, especially if it was a specialist  
 20 course.  
 21 Firstly, was there any national policy on that  
 22 issue?  
 23 **A. The policy I have mentioned earlier in relation to the**  
 24 **licensing authority determining that there should be**  
 25 **a review mechanism for any relevant issues in terms of**

Page 109

1 **the officer's performance or potential to perform.**  
 2 Q. The policy was that the decision making vested in the  
 3 home force, and they had to themselves develop criteria  
 4 or --  
 5 **A. Have a system in place for making appropriate and**  
 6 **relevant decisions. The accepted process would clearly**  
 7 **involve informed contributors such as the chief firearms**  
 8 **instructor to that outcome.**  
 9 Q. Have you seen any evidence that that was done in the  
 10 case of X7?  
 11 **A. No, I haven't.**  
 12 Q. Can we turn, please, to Y19. The second tactical  
 13 adviser on 3 March from about 3.15 onwards. You address  
 14 this in your first report, between paragraphs 178 and  
 15 184.  
 16 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 17 Q. You noted that Mr Pemberton had said in paragraph 178  
 18 that in looking at the status of Y19:  
 19 "It is apparent that at the time of this incident he  
 20 had never been trained as a basic or standard MASTS  
 21 officer, as required by the national curriculum. By  
 22 virtue of this he cannot therefore be described as  
 23 occupationally competent under the revised curriculum  
 24 content, ie he had never attended a MASTS course as  
 25 an AFO."

Page 110

1 Do you agree with that approach?  
 2 **A. I do, yes.**  
 3 Q. In the light of the evidence that you have heard, does  
 4 that remain your view?  
 5 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 6 Q. The curriculum had been changed in I think either May or  
 7 June 2011. What was the process for notification of  
 8 changes to the national curriculum at that time?  
 9 **A. There was a direct electronic process to forces, to**  
 10 **chief firearms instructors and others notifying them of**  
 11 **any changes to the curriculum. There would also be**  
 12 **a series of national briefing sessions throughout the**  
 13 **year, chief firearms instructors' conferences, there**  
 14 **were a number of methods for communicating any**  
 15 **substantive changes to the curriculum. This was**  
 16 **an important change.**  
 17 Q. Was the nature and extent of Y19's previous exposure to  
 18 MASTS by watching as an observer MASTS training take  
 19 place a good enough substitute to comply with the  
 20 national curriculum requirements?  
 21 **A. No, sir. The requirement for a tactical adviser to give**  
 22 **advice is that they must be competent and fully**  
 23 **understand the nature of the tactic, all the associated**  
 24 **risks and benefits and particularly in relation to MASTS**  
 25 **that would include things such as the benefits and**

Page 111

1 **limitations of any special munitions associated with it.**  
 2 **The only way in my view, and certainly in ACPO's**  
 3 **view at the time, for that to be delivered was for the**  
 4 **tactical adviser to have competence in that area.**  
 5 Q. Why was it necessary under the national curriculum for  
 6 the TA to be a practitioner in the tactic that was being  
 7 undertaken and upon which they were advising?  
 8 **A. The key part of the tactical adviser's role is to not**  
 9 **only advise on the potential range of tactics, but to**  
 10 **advise on the benefits and limitations of those tactics.**  
 11 **In effect they were a check and balance within the whole**  
 12 **command and decision-making process, but if a commander,**  
 13 **for example, was pushing or deciding upon a tactic which**  
 14 **had some risks associated with it, the tactical adviser**  
 15 **should be able to advise on those and the implications**  
 16 **of any tactic that commanders wished to deploy.**  
 17 Q. It may be suggested that in this case, in reality what  
 18 the TAC adviser was likely to add to decision making,  
 19 where the type and tactic and contingency were both  
 20 obvious was very limited. Do you agree with that  
 21 suggestion or not?  
 22 **A. No, I think particularly in this deployment, any**  
 23 **deployment involving advanced tactics or MASTS needs**  
 24 **particularly good quality tactical advice to ensure that**  
 25 **all potential contingencies, all relevant options and**

Page 112

1 **tactics are considered and available if appropriate.**  
 2 Q. You say I think that that is for the following reasons,  
 3 and I am looking at the five paragraphs numbered A to E  
 4 in paragraph 180.  
 5 **A. Yes.**  
 6 Q. Firstly, that:  
 7 "MASTS intervention and interception is a tactic  
 8 that has both significant benefits and limitations and  
 9 commanders need clear and informed advice from the most  
 10 qualified tactical advisers about all benefits,  
 11 limitations and risks associated with MASTS."  
 12 You say that MASTS has both significant benefits and  
 13 limitations. Just summarise what those are for us,  
 14 please?  
 15 **A. The significant benefits are that in a deployment where**  
 16 **you are seeking to gain maximum evidence in relation to**  
 17 **a criminal group or a suspected criminal group, you can**  
 18 **facilitate that enterprise and let it run far longer**  
 19 **than you would in normal circumstances to gather**  
 20 **evidence.**  
 21 **To do that, you need the specialist resources. The**  
 22 **significant limitations of that are there are a range of**  
 23 **risks associated with the enhanced MASTS tactics,**  
 24 **because of the very nature of their dynamic intervention**  
 25 **and interception issues against vehicles and**

Page 113

1 **individuals, sometimes in the latter stages of**  
 2 **a criminal enterprise.**  
 3 **It has some dangers associated with it, but it has**  
 4 **significant benefits in capturing some of the more**  
 5 **difficult offenders who are surveillance conscious and**  
 6 **engaged in organised crime.**  
 7 Q. You say, secondly, that:  
 8 "A tactical adviser who is not trained and  
 9 experienced in MASTS will be of limited use to an SFC or  
 10 TFC and may not foresee and therefore be unable to  
 11 proactively advise upon potential risks and pitfalls  
 12 associated with specialist tactics and equipment that  
 13 they are not sufficiently familiar with or competent in  
 14 relation to."  
 15 Can you help us exactly what you mean there?  
 16 **A. In one way I think it is a statement of the obvious,**  
 17 **that if you are not trained, experienced, knowledgeable**  
 18 **and able to articulate all the dimensions of these**  
 19 **deployments you are not in a position to be able to**  
 20 **advise commanders in relation to what you can and cannot**  
 21 **do and what the risks are associated with it.**  
 22 **The Tactical adviser's role is integral and**  
 23 **important to any firearms deployment and you want them**  
 24 **to make sure that the decision makers, they are not the**  
 25 **decision makers, have all information to hand to make**

Page 114

1 **reasoned proportionate decisions to resolve the**  
 2 **incident, hopefully in a safe fashion.**  
 3 **To do that they must be knowledgeable and skilled in**  
 4 **all the tactics, all the equipment and bring to bear**  
 5 **that information when they are providing advice.**  
 6 Q. You will have seen that the review initially conducted  
 7 of Y19 and Steve Allen's logs concluded that the  
 8 failures in them were of an administrative or recording  
 9 nature and did not betray errors of substance; is that  
 10 a view with which you agree?  
 11 **A. No, I don't. I believe that many of those issues**  
 12 **listed, as I indicated earlier in relation to the**  
 13 **internal reviews, are substantive issues. I agree with**  
 14 **the issues raised being important, but I don't agree**  
 15 **that they are inconsequential, I think they are**  
 16 **important issues.**  
 17 Q. You say, thirdly, that:  
 18 "The deployment and use of specialist munitions is  
 19 an important factor in Operation Shire, competent  
 20 specialist advice is essential constantly to assess the  
 21 risks and benefits associated with the use of this  
 22 equipment."  
 23 Here you are focusing on what in fact happened in  
 24 Operation Shire?  
 25 **A. Yes, sir.**

Page 115

1 Q. Namely, it was a MASTS platform that was utilised and  
 2 authority to use specialist munitions was granted.  
 3 Why in the context of Y19's competency is the fact  
 4 that specialist munitions were authorised an important  
 5 factor?  
 6 **A. MASTS itself is high end in terms of its decision making**  
 7 **and the requirement to have an understanding for it.**  
 8 Q. What do you mean by "high end"?  
 9 **A. It is high end in relation to the fact that it delivers**  
 10 **additional tactical capability, which carries risks as**  
 11 **well as benefits towards it. The TAC adviser needs to**  
 12 **be extremely skilled in relation to MASTS as**  
 13 **an operational platform, but on top of that the**  
 14 **deployment of special munitions carries bespoke, indeed**  
 15 **unique, risks associated with them. If they are to be**  
 16 **deployed, that needs to be balanced against the**  
 17 **operational risks.**  
 18 **In my view the only way to do that clearly and for**  
 19 **the commanders to have a full understanding is to tell**  
 20 **what can go wrong as well as the benefits of using that**  
 21 **equipment. So the decision is made knowing the downside**  
 22 **as well as the positive benefits from it.**  
 23 **I would suggest if you don't know that equipment,**  
 24 **its capabilities and limitations, you are not in**  
 25 **a position to give informed advice.**

Page 116

<p>1 Q. Fourthly, you say:</p> <p>2 "An important consideration in Operation Shire is</p> <p>3 the requirement constantly to assess tactical options</p> <p>4 and to identify potential lower risk options.</p> <p>5 An officer with low tactical and technical competence is</p> <p>6 less likely to be able to deliver this requirement. As</p> <p>7 I will subsequently argue in relation to</p> <p>8 Operation Shire, alternative potential tactical options</p> <p>9 should have been considered. The Tactical adviser is</p> <p>10 responsible for advising on potential tactical options</p> <p>11 and must be competent to do so."</p> <p>12 Can you tell us what this point adds to those which</p> <p>13 you have made earlier in A to C?</p> <p>14 <b>A. I think on the one point that I am making the point that</b></p> <p>15 <b>this is not just a one off position in terms of giving</b></p> <p>16 <b>advice. This is something you would expect a tactical</b></p> <p>17 <b>adviser to constantly assess and reassess as a situation</b></p> <p>18 <b>goes on. If they see a change in circumstance or</b></p> <p>19 <b>a change in intelligence which means that the tactical</b></p> <p>20 <b>plan needs to be amended or altered, then they should</b></p> <p>21 <b>and must do so. Clearly they are going to have to be</b></p> <p>22 <b>competent to do that.</b></p> <p>23 <b>As this operation involves MASTS and specialist</b></p> <p>24 <b>munitions, they should be considering those issues right</b></p> <p>25 <b>throughout and particularly importantly I think is</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 117</p>	<p>1 interviewed by the Sir Peter Fahy defence team, and</p> <p>2 indeed to the chairman of this Inquiry, that this was</p> <p>3 the first occasion, 3 March, on which he had been a TAC</p> <p>4 adviser on a MASTS operation.</p> <p>5 Would you have expected somebody in that position to</p> <p>6 be selected for this operation?</p> <p>7 <b>A. No, sir.</b></p> <p>8 Q. You formed the view in paragraph 184:</p> <p>9 "That Y19 was not technically competent in relation</p> <p>10 to MASTS is on balance relevant to the management of</p> <p>11 Operation Shire on 3 March."</p> <p>12 Are you saying by that that this is not a technical</p> <p>13 breach, it is a breach that has consequences for what</p> <p>14 happened?</p> <p>15 <b>A. Yes, sir. Potential consequences.</b></p> <p>16 Q. Can we turn to Q9, the principal officer. You addressed</p> <p>17 this in paragraphs 185 and 186 of your first report.</p> <p>18 You conclude that, by reference to the material you have</p> <p>19 seen, he was occupationally and operationally competent</p> <p>20 as a MASTS AFO on 3 March.</p> <p>21 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>22 Q. Do you remain of that view now?</p> <p>23 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>24 Q. Can we turn, please, to X9, a primary officer that you</p> <p>25 address his position in paragraphs 187 to 189 of your</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 119</p>
<p>1 <b>looking at reasonable contingencies, those what ifs that</b></p> <p>2 <b>might occur during a firearms deployment of this type.</b></p> <p>3 Q. Lastly, you say that:</p> <p>4 "A Tactical adviser who is not operationally</p> <p>5 competent in key aspects of a high risk operation cannot</p> <p>6 discharge their duties as listed in paragraph 5.24."</p> <p>7 Did you regard the decision to utilise the MASTS</p> <p>8 platform with specialist munitions resulting in</p> <p>9 an intervention a high risk operation?</p> <p>10 <b>A. Yes, sir, but high risk and potentially high benefit as</b></p> <p>11 <b>well.</b></p> <p>12 Q. Why was it a high risk?</p> <p>13 <b>A. Because of the dangers associated with MASTS in terms of</b></p> <p>14 <b>public safety.</b></p> <p>15 <b>The fact that this is quite often a high speed</b></p> <p>16 <b>interception or intervention using vehicles, quite often</b></p> <p>17 <b>it is against high end criminals with a propensity to</b></p> <p>18 <b>violence. Clearly taking AFOs to that type of incident</b></p> <p>19 <b>increases the risk of firearms being discharged.</b></p> <p>20 Q. And high benefit, for what reason?</p> <p>21 <b>A. High benefit is back to the potential criminal justice</b></p> <p>22 <b>outcome of capturing evidence and individuals in</b></p> <p>23 <b>an advanced stage of planning so that they can be taken</b></p> <p>24 <b>off the streets in order to make society safer.</b></p> <p>25 Q. We know as a result of answers that he gave when he was</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 118</p>	<p>1 first report.</p> <p>2 You say in 187 that you agree with Mr Molloy, that</p> <p>3 from these records the officer was occupationally and</p> <p>4 operationally competent in the MASTS role and his use of</p> <p>5 the weapons that you describe. But Mr Molloy indicates</p> <p>6 it was not possible to establish from the records</p> <p>7 available when X9 was last refreshed in his use of the</p> <p>8 CSDC, the training package material for the MASTS event</p> <p>9 in November 2011 which X9 attended did include the use</p> <p>10 of inert CSDCs, but there is no formal record of X9</p> <p>11 having done so, and a recommendation is made by</p> <p>12 Mr Molloy.</p> <p>13 You conclude in 189:</p> <p>14 "From the records it is not clear if X9 was</p> <p>15 operationally and occupationally competent in relation</p> <p>16 to the nationally unapproved CSDC device."</p> <p>17 Do you remain of that view?</p> <p>18 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>19 Q. Is there anything you have heard in the course of the</p> <p>20 Inquiry to suggest one way or another whether it is</p> <p>21 clear whether X9 was operationally and occupationally</p> <p>22 competent?</p> <p>23 <b>A. In relation to CSDC?</b></p> <p>24 Q. Yes.</p> <p>25 <b>A. No, I am still unclear as to whether that was classified</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 120</p>

1 **as a weapon system, which the CFI would have maintained**  
 2 **records on. I am not clear, sir.**  
 3 Q. Can we move then, please, to Z15, responsible for  
 4 discharging check the breaching rounds.  
 5 You address his position again in the first report  
 6 without knowledge of his failure on the MPS course, and  
 7 you conclude that he was occupationally and  
 8 operationally competent as a MASTS AFO in the use of  
 9 breaching rounds on 3 March.  
 10 You come to a different conclusion, please, in your  
 11 second report, at paragraphs 74 to 77. We have looked  
 12 at those earlier in the context of X7.  
 13 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 14 Q. You say that:  
 15 "The failure, in particular [this is in 75], of Z15  
 16 are relevant matters that upon notification required  
 17 immediate assessment by GMP. This particularly relates  
 18 to the continued status of Z15 as an AFO delivering  
 19 advanced tactical options, the safety breaches evidenced  
 20 on the part of Z15 are so fundamental and inherently  
 21 dangerous that I cannot envisage any force taking action  
 22 other than immediate suspension from all AFO duties  
 23 whilst the situation was fully assessed."  
 24 We have seen that that view is concurred with by the  
 25 then chief firearms instructor of GMP, Mr Williams.

Page 121

1 **A. Yes.**  
 2 Q. Why was that so? Why are the safety breaches evidenced  
 3 on the part of Z15 fundamental and inherently dangerous?  
 4 **A. I think that the chief firearms instructor, Mr Williams,**  
 5 **his assessment of it is a reasonable assessment and he**  
 6 **uses the term "Potentially life threatening."**  
 7 **Irrespective of the core component parts of the**  
 8 **firearms training itself, the safety aspect for me is**  
 9 **something that strategically indicates there is a matter**  
 10 **for serious immediate consideration in the short term.**  
 11 **There might be medium- to long-term decisions which are**  
 12 **different, but I think on receipt of that information it**  
 13 **is absolutely vital for a force to make a considered**  
 14 **decision about the officer's future.**  
 15 Q. We have heard from Inspector Williams that if he had  
 16 been aware of the contents of Z15's course report on or  
 17 about 28 February, when the course report it seems  
 18 arrived back in GMP, he would have suspended his  
 19 firearms licence immediately and Z15 would not have  
 20 participated in Operation Shire on 3 March. Do you  
 21 agree with that approach?  
 22 **A. I agree with that, sir, totally, yes.**  
 23 Q. Is that because of the nature of the failure?  
 24 **A. I think it is because of not just the nature of the**  
 25 **failure, but the fact that that contained some**

Page 122

1 **fundamental and repeated major safety issues.**  
 2 **Mr Williams is in a much better position than me to**  
 3 **assess the relevance of that from a firearms**  
 4 **instructor's point of view, but it is quite clearly, as**  
 5 **he says, potentially life threatening. That is**  
 6 **a significant issue which required immediate addressing.**  
 7 Q. Other witnesses have taken the view that the important  
 8 thing to be drawn from the Met's communications was the  
 9 fact that they had offered Z15 a second course later in  
 10 the year, which implied that the Met didn't think that  
 11 these were serious issues or certainly serious enough to  
 12 warrant withdrawal on a temporary basis of Z15's  
 13 licence.  
 14 What do you say as to that?  
 15 **A. I fully accept that's an unusual offer in the**  
 16 **circumstances, but it doesn't negate the fact that it is**  
 17 **Greater Manchester Police's responsibility to make**  
 18 **an appropriate decision and assess the feedback that**  
 19 **they have had.**  
 20 **If that has been presented in a manner where the**  
 21 **officer has engaged in life-threatening behaviour,**  
 22 **I can't see anybody considering other than short-term**  
 23 **immediate suspension and a properly considered decision.**  
 24 Q. Have you seen any evidence that that was done before  
 25 3 March?

Page 123

1 **A. No, sir.**  
 2 Q. Thank you.  
 3 Can we turn then to a different issue, namely the  
 4 process of authorisation by Greater Manchester Police  
 5 for the introduction of CSDC in 2007.  
 6 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 7 Q. Is it right that the requirements of the code of  
 8 practice on the Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal  
 9 Weapons are central to the conclusions that you formed  
 10 about the process that GMP undertook or did not  
 11 undertake to introduce CSDC in June or July 2007?  
 12 **A. Yes, sir. The code of practice and of course the**  
 13 **contents of the manual which fall out from that.**  
 14 Q. If we can look at paragraphs 73 and 74 of your first  
 15 report, please.  
 16 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 17 Q. You say that the key national guidance and doctrine  
 18 relevant to the management of armed policing deployments  
 19 are the code, the manual and guidance on command and  
 20 control.  
 21 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 22 Q. In 74 you were fundamentally involved in the first two,  
 23 and jointly responsible and accountable to ACPO for the  
 24 third, yes?  
 25 **A. I was consulted in relation to the third, sir, it is the**

Page 124

1 **second one that I was jointly --**  
 2 Q. I am so sorry.  
 3 **A. -- responsible to ACPO for.**  
 4 Q. Yes, I misread the sentences.  
 5 In paragraph 82 of your report here you say:  
 6 "I played a significant part in the drafting of the  
 7 2003 code and one of the specific requirements from the  
 8 Home Secretary was to ensure that any weapon or device  
 9 subject to the code had to be researched, evaluated and  
 10 approved by the Home Secretary in line with established  
 11 national procedures and good guidance."  
 12 Is it right that part of the very focus of the 2003  
 13 code was on the introduction of new weapons?  
 14 **A. Yes, sir. One of the drivers for this is that one**  
 15 **particular force had indicated they wished to bring**  
 16 **Taser in before it had been evaluated on their personal**  
 17 **opinion, and that was a driver for the Government to**  
 18 **ensure that the code of practice set a national standard**  
 19 **for the evaluation and approval of all less lethal**  
 20 **options and weapons systems.**  
 21 Q. Which force was that?  
 22 **A. It was North Wales.**  
 23 Q. Does what you have said in paragraph 82 there, that one  
 24 of the specific requirements from the Home Secretary  
 25 themselves was to ensure that weapons devices had to be

Page 125

1 researched, evaluated and approved by the Home  
 2 Secretary, explain the detailed provisions in paragraphs  
 3 4.3.1 to 4.3.5 of the code of practice?  
 4 **A. Yes, sir, that is a direct result of the direction we**  
 5 **had from the Home Secretary.**  
 6 Q. Were you responsible for contributing towards the  
 7 drafting of those?  
 8 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 9 Q. Are you aware of whether there was any guidance on the  
 10 interpretation of the code and in particular on the  
 11 definition of a "weapons system" in the opening words of  
 12 paragraph 4.3.1?  
 13 Perhaps you had better turn it up to look at it.  
 14 I wonder whether Mr Arundale could be provided with  
 15 the policy and procedure bundle.  
 16 **A. I have that, sir.**  
 17 THE CHAIRMAN: He may have it actually.  
 18 MR BEER: Thank you very much.  
 19 **A. Yes.**  
 20 Q. The code is at 266.  
 21 **A. Sir, I have it at 530 -- yes.**  
 22 Q. Yes, I am so sorry.  
 23 THE CHAIRMAN: That is the Manual of Guidance.  
 24 MR BEER: Yes, 529.  
 25 Is this the code that we are talking about?

Page 126

1 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 2 Q. Is this the version that was published, including the  
 3 colour of the text and the shading in the boxes?  
 4 **A. Yes, sir. That appears to be the one, yes.**  
 5 Q. Yes. Then if you can go forward, please, to  
 6 paragraph 4.3, which is at page 540 internal pagination.  
 7 **A. Yes.**  
 8 Q. The question is in relation to the sentence, "It is  
 9 important that the continuing development of weapons  
 10 systems should be centrally coordinated", whether there  
 11 was any national guidance on the interpretation of the  
 12 phrase "weapons system" in the opening words of  
 13 paragraph 4.3.1?  
 14 **A. I think, sir, there is an expansion of that in the**  
 15 **manual itself, where it gives some more detail in**  
 16 **relation to what that is. I think the term "weapons**  
 17 **system" is something that is well known within firearms**  
 18 **circles itself, because all evaluation relates to**  
 19 **policy, procedure and training, because clearly you can**  
 20 **only evaluate a weapons system when you are very clear**  
 21 **about the operational conditions and situations in which**  
 22 **it is going to be used.**  
 23 Q. Can I look at it a different way round perhaps and see  
 24 whether the question that I have asked is a pertinent  
 25 one by looking at first paragraph 1.3.3.

Page 127

1 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 2 Q. Which says that:  
 3 "The code applies to any firearms and less lethal  
 4 weapons available for issue within police forces on the  
 5 authority of a senior officer in the circumstances  
 6 described at section 1.4 below."  
 7 1.4 below is where authority has been granted, yes?  
 8 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 9 Q. For armed support of police operations.  
 10 The application of the code is governed by 1.3.3 and  
 11 applies to any firearms and any less lethal weapons?  
 12 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 13 Q. I think in fact we have heard evidence from all of the  
 14 three GMP witnesses who have given evidence on the  
 15 subject that the code was in fact applicable to the task  
 16 that they were undertaking, albeit they have given  
 17 a variety of reasons why they did not have that  
 18 understanding at the time.  
 19 If we look at paragraph 2.1.3 of the manual, which  
 20 is at page 292 I think, so separately from the code  
 21 itself --  
 22 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 23 Q. -- paragraph 2.1.3 of the manual --  
 24 THE CHAIRMAN: 2.13.  
 25 MR BEER: Yes, sorry, 2.13 of the manual provides that:

Page 128



<p>1 "Only less lethal weapons that have been approved by 2 the Home Secretary may be used by UK police services." 3 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b> 4 Q. Irrespective of the point that the code on its face 5 applies to any less lethal weapon, that the Manual of 6 Guidance requires that only less lethal weapons that 7 have been approved by the Home Secretary may be used by 8 UK police services? 9 <b>A. Yes. Sir, you asked me the question about the 10 development of what the system meant. The next 11 paragraph 2.14 and over the page gives you an indication 12 that the systems approach is much wider than just the 13 weapon itself.</b> 14 Q. Yes, I was about to take that as my third point. 15 <b>A. Sorry.</b> 16 Q. Paragraph 2.1.4 explains essentially what a system 17 includes, and what it doesn't necessarily mean is 18 a piece of equipment composed of parts that therefore 19 makes up a system. The system includes the object, the 20 maintenance and storing instructions and guidance on its 21 use? 22 <b>A. Yes.</b> 23 Q. And may extend indeed to training? 24 <b>A. I think the ACPO guidance on use, the methodology for 25 using the weapon and in what circumstances it would be</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 129</p>	<p>1 Q. It stretches right from paragraph 7 to paragraph 64. 2 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b> 3 Q. I just want to take a few paragraphs from it, in fact 4 more than a few from it. 5 In paragraph 8 you say that: 6 "The acquisition and oversight of less lethal 7 weapons is subject to considerable government scrutiny 8 and oversight for a number of reasons." 9 Where you say "it is subject", do you mean in 2007 10 was subject? 11 <b>A. Yes, and still is, sir.</b> 12 Q. You say: 13 "Indeed many observers often remark that the 14 development and introduction of less lethal weapons can 15 be more complex and controversial than decision making 16 for the acquisition of conventional police firearms." 17 Then you explain why that is so. 18 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b> 19 Q. Would that be part of the conversations that you were 20 just referring to? 21 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b> 22 Q. You explain the upsides and downsides in paragraphs 9, 23 10 and 11 to the introduction of less lethal tactics and 24 weapons. 25 You say in paragraph 13 that the code of practice</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 131</p>
<p>1 <b>used are required otherwise the medical assessments 2 cannot take place.</b> 3 Q. How revolutionary would such a sentence be in your view, 4 being immersed in these issues at the time in 5 paragraph 2.13, "Only less lethal weapons that have been 6 approved by the Secretary of State may be used by UK 7 police services", to the average TFU head ops inspector 8 or ACC with lead responsibility for firearms in 2007? 9 <b>A. My understanding is that it would be common knowledge 10 amongst all people of that standing within 11 an organisation.</b> 12 <b>The exposure, the conferences, the briefings that 13 they received, particularly at that time post-2003, 14 would have all concerned the development of things like 15 Taser, which followed that procedure, systems approach. 16 From my discussions with officers up and down the 17 country it appeared to me that it was very, very well 18 known and understood.</b> 19 Q. Can we turn then to your second report, at paragraph 7, 20 where you chronicle the material that GMP disclosed 21 after the production of your first report concerning 22 CSDC. 23 <b>A. Sorry, sir, which paragraph?</b> 24 Q. Paragraph 7. 25 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 130</p>	<p>1 was specifically implemented to prevent the type 2 of approach that GMP took in this case. 3 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b> 4 Q. Does that remain your view? 5 <b>A. It does, sir.</b> 6 Q. You mention three organisations -- it's two, one with 7 a change of name, in paragraph 14. DSTL, housed in part 8 at Porton Down, and SACMILL, previously known as DOMILL. 9 Again, for the officers in the professions that 10 I have just described, the head of ops, CFI and an ACPO 11 lead on firearms, in 2005, 2006 and 2007, to what extent 12 were these organisations common features of discussions 13 involving people in those professions? 14 <b>A. DOMILL's statements in relation to, for example, 15 Taser -- there were a number of those -- would have been 16 circulated nationally. DOMILL is referenced in the 17 Manual of Guidance, so I would have thought that any 18 knowledgeable practitioner in those departments would be 19 aware that there were Government-sponsored bodies who 20 did this work.</b> 21 <b>I am aware from presentations that I have done, 22 particularly the Home Office Scientific Development 23 Branch, they are always stressed because of the nature 24 and the scrutiny that all this equipment must go 25 through.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 132</p>

1 Q. You say in paragraph 16, in a way that seems to  
 2 translate the code of practice at paragraphs 4.31 to  
 3 4.35 into a real or practical statement of series events  
 4 that a more detailed overview of how the Government's  
 5 systems approach can look in practice as follows. You  
 6 set that out over A to P, and we have been through that  
 7 with a couple of witnesses already.  
 8 Are you suggesting here that each of those steps is  
 9 always required, or is this just an illustrative example  
 10 of what it might look like?  
 11 **A. No, sir, all of these steps have been taken in relation**  
 12 **to less lethal tactics and technologies, all of them**  
 13 **have, but not necessarily for every new piece of**  
 14 **equipment that comes along.**  
 15 **You would draw up a matrix of these issues which are**  
 16 **relevant to the system and try and contract with the**  
 17 **Home Office to get agreement at the outset, because**  
 18 **clearly if you were going to go down this road, all of**  
 19 **these issues have to be funded and they can be quite**  
 20 **expensive.**  
 21 Q. Are there debates about funding then?  
 22 **A. Absolutely, but all of these are very real**  
 23 **considerations that have actually been done.**  
 24 Q. Some of them, is this right, would never be overlooked  
 25 for the introduction of a less lethal option, such as

Page 133

1 testing of the weapon, including its functionality, its  
 2 reliability and its medical implications?  
 3 **A. Yes, sir. And, as a basic principle, the manufacturers'**  
 4 **claims would never be taken as read.**  
 5 Q. Why not?  
 6 **A. Because past experience has shown that it is unwise to**  
 7 **rely on manufacturers' claims and specifications,**  
 8 **because if a system goes through the process and is**  
 9 **approved, quite clearly that is a matter for the UK**  
 10 **Government in the end to justify why they have approved**  
 11 **that particular piece of kit and equipment.**  
 12 Q. UK Government to justify to whom?  
 13 **A. To Inquiries such as this, because if this was**  
 14 **a relevant issue here and it was Home Office approved**  
 15 **equipment then you could expect somebody from the Home**  
 16 **Office to come along to say why they had approved that**  
 17 **particular piece of kit and equipment. They would say**  
 18 **we cannot take what the manufacturers say as being the**  
 19 **truth, because their testing standards, their claims,**  
 20 **particularly if it took place in another country, are**  
 21 **not commensurate with the standards we expect.**  
 22 Q. What was the example you were thinking of in the past?  
 23 **A. I can think of in the early days of Taser for example**  
 24 **claims were made that if Taser was used on a pregnant**  
 25 **woman there wouldn't be any danger to the unborn child**

Page 134

1 **because the body would act as a Faraday cage, that is**  
 2 **just one that pops into my head.**  
 3 **In this instance the amount of CS that is contained**  
 4 **in a cartridge, the micron size, you cannot take the**  
 5 **manufacturer's claims. You have to have independent**  
 6 **testing and then verification of the consistent**  
 7 **manufacture to ensure that that doesn't change over**  
 8 **time. If you don't have that, you don't have**  
 9 **a continuous assessment of the medical implications of**  
 10 **that particular technology. Any of these issues and**  
 11 **claims which are made are subject to independent**  
 12 **testing.**  
 13 Q. The code of practice required the Home Secretary's  
 14 consultation on the identity of the testers?  
 15 **A. Yes.**  
 16 Q. Just explain what that would consist of?  
 17 **A. For example, it would normally include -- the Home**  
 18 **Office Scientific Development Branch, as it was, would**  
 19 **give an indication of what their thoughts were in**  
 20 **relation to which organisations or individuals were**  
 21 **capable of doing it, and the reliability of the tests**  
 22 **that could be done for those issues.**  
 23 **If it was beyond their expertise, we had other**  
 24 **facilities such as DSTL, the Defence Science Technology**  
 25 **Laboratory, who would have further international links**

Page 135

1 **in relation to particularly chemical issues and chemical**  
 2 **munitions. That would ensure that the advice and**  
 3 **guidance that was coming back was world class.**  
 4 Q. You say in paragraph N, subparagraph N, that:  
 5 "A peer review may be required, previously this has  
 6 been delivered by academic scientific and law  
 7 enforcement subject matter experts in the USA. In the  
 8 case of Taser this included nominated politicians from  
 9 Northern Ireland."  
 10 Was that a frequent occurrence?  
 11 **A. Yes, it was a frequent occurrence. In relation to for**  
 12 **example the AEP, the attenuating energy projectile,**  
 13 **there was a requirement for that to be peer reviewed,**  
 14 **that was done in North America via Penn State**  
 15 **University. It was done in the case of Taser and these**  
 16 **are requirement that the Home Office occasionally**  
 17 **specify are necessary.**  
 18 Q. There may be elements of this illustrative example that  
 19 are not required, I am thinking perhaps a media or  
 20 communications strategy or a formal process to be  
 21 determined and through life management and oversight  
 22 strategy.  
 23 **A. No, I think both of those for the deployment of chemical**  
 24 **munitions I would say that a media and communications**  
 25 **strategy would probably be required.**

Page 136

1 Q. Why for chemical munitions?  
 2 **A. It is a very contentious area, the use of chemical**  
 3 **munitions by law enforcement and the military.**  
 4 Q. Chemical munitions here had already been authorised by  
 5 CS, hadn't it?  
 6 **A. CS had been authorised in a particular format. This is**  
 7 **a different format with a different delivery system**  
 8 **and --**  
 9 Q. Why does that make a difference?  
 10 **A. Because it is a completely different weapons system.**  
 11 Q. But why does it make a difference?  
 12 **A. Because from a Home Office point of view, that equipment**  
 13 **would be capable of being deployed instantly across**  
 14 **England and Wales, by adoption across Scotland and**  
 15 **Northern Ireland and the political interest in relation**  
 16 **to deployment of these less lethal weapons systems is**  
 17 **acute. From all my experience in it, they would want to**  
 18 **scrutinise this and have their media positions ready,**  
 19 **because there would be challenges from a range of**  
 20 **organisations in relation to the requirement and utility**  
 21 **and testing regime for whatever the equipment was. That**  
 22 **work would have to be done before it was introduced.**  
 23 **Sorry, the second one, the through life management**  
 24 **strategy --**  
 25 Q. Yes.

Page 137

1 **A. -- I don't think there is much point in deploying**  
 2 **weapons systems unless you have the facilities to**  
 3 **collect and manage data in relation to their use and to**  
 4 **continually monitor the quality of their product and its**  
 5 **continued requirement to be amongst the arsenal that is**  
 6 **held by law enforcement. There does need to be**  
 7 **a process of management, measurement and review for all**  
 8 **systems.**  
 9 Q. Amongst the things that you mention as part of the  
 10 weapons system are the drawing up of training  
 11 documentation, including policy and lesson plans that  
 12 are bespoke to the equipment concerned.  
 13 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 14 Q. Would that be done on a national basis?  
 15 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 16 Q. Why is that? Why does there have to be national  
 17 training documentation relating to the piece of  
 18 equipment concerned?  
 19 **A. The only way you can assess the utility and the dangers**  
 20 **of a piece of equipment is to know in exactly what**  
 21 **situations it is going to be used. For example, if you**  
 22 **do have a CS canister that is not going to be thrown**  
 23 **into vehicles, under any circumstances, then you only**  
 24 **have to assess its impact in perhaps houses and other**  
 25 **locations.**

Page 138

1 **You need to know exactly where it is going to be**  
 2 **used, under what circumstances, before you can assess**  
 3 **the impacts on individuals that might be subject to that**  
 4 **device.**  
 5 Q. I see, so the training documentation is relevant to the  
 6 nature of the testing that you carry out?  
 7 **A. Quite often the testing will come back from scientists**  
 8 **in the medical community and they might come back and**  
 9 **say, "We consider this piece of equipment has particular**  
 10 **implications for people with asthma, for persons of**  
 11 **small stature, children, the elderly ..."**  
 12 **They will come back with a whole host of issues and**  
 13 **then we will have to go back and review the training**  
 14 **materials for it and say perhaps that this equipment**  
 15 **should never be used against people who are known to**  
 16 **have breathing problems or breathing issues, unless the**  
 17 **threat they pose is so significant that the dangers and**  
 18 **the limitations balance out the threat that the**  
 19 **individual poses. This process can go on for some time**  
 20 **before approval is given.**  
 21 Q. Thank you, Mr Arundale.  
 22 Sir, is that an appropriate moment to break?  
 23 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, five minutes this time.  
 24 MR BEER: Thank you, sir.  
 25 (3.20 pm)

Page 139

1 (A short adjournment)  
 2 (3.30 pm)  
 3 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Beer.  
 4 MR BEER: Mr Arundale, can we turn to paragraph 27 in your  
 5 second report. Where you begin to consider the  
 6 documents that GMP have provided concerning the  
 7 acquisition of CSDC. You indicate that an officer known  
 8 as G1 indicates that during an informal conversation  
 9 with a weapons supplier in 2004 he was speculatively  
 10 given CSDC canisters to take back to GMP. He didn't  
 11 have a formal remit for this unplanned and unapproved  
 12 local acquisition of CSDC, which appears to be the  
 13 origin of GMP's interest in the device.  
 14 Is that an example of the approach that you were  
 15 saying earlier the code of practice was seeking to  
 16 prevent?  
 17 **A. Yes, sir, that sort of issue occasionally occurred but**  
 18 **very quickly became known to ACPO or CAST, or the force**  
 19 **itself would stop that happening as soon as they became**  
 20 **aware of it.**  
 21 **Yes, sir, that is the sort of thing that the code**  
 22 **was seeking to prevent happening.**  
 23 MR BEER: Moving the chronology on, you say that Mr Harte in  
 24 his witness statement says that he originally commenced  
 25 research into the CSDC but handed the project over when

Page 140

<p>1 he changed roles in 2005 and says that he was fully 2 aware that in order to use and deploy the CS grenade 3 operationally they would need to be approved by PSDB. 4 You say that whilst the approval process is more 5 complex than this quote infers, it is an important point 6 as it indicates knowledge that GMP could not approve the 7 deployment and use of CSDC without at least PSDB or Home 8 Office consent. 9 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b> 10 Q. You are pointing I think to that email as being 11 contemporaneous evidence from within GMP of knowledge of 12 the need to obtain approval or consent from PSDB. 13 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b> 14 Q. Over the page at paragraph 30, I think between 15 paragraphs 30 and 33 you consider the position of Chief 16 Inspector Davies. 17 Then between paragraphs 34 and 60 you consider the 18 position of then Assistant Chief Constable Thompson. 19 I just want to ask you a few questions arising from 20 what you say about each of them. 21 You note that when Chief Inspector Davies was 22 replying just last year to -- sorry, in 2009, to a query 23 that had arisen in the course of the investigation into 24 the death of PC Terry, Chief Inspector Davies replied: 25 "Remember that forces do not necessarily need HOSDB</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 141</p>	<p>1 evidence, the accuracy of which the chairman will have 2 to judge. At paragraph 32 you note that Mr Davies says 3 at paragraph 20 of his witness statement: 4 "My belief is that Inspector Holmes would have 5 documented there [that is HOSDB's advice] as part of the 6 audit file." 7 You suggest that it was incumbent on Mr Davies to 8 oversee this action which would if it had been completed 9 no doubt have reiterated the existing HOSDB advice not 10 to proceed without ACPO or Home Office involvement, 11 advice and approval as per the 2003 code of practice. 12 Why do you say that it was incumbent on the chief 13 inspector to do that rather than leave it to the 14 inspector? 15 <b>A. I think this was an action that was being completed by</b> 16 <b>GMP, Chief Inspector Davies was the officer in charge,</b> 17 <b>as I understand it, of Mr Holmes at that point in time.</b> 18 <b>It was something which should have been checked,</b> 19 <b>I think all senior police officers should be checking to</b> 20 <b>ensure that any process being undertaken under their</b> 21 <b>name is lawful in accordance with national guidance and</b> 22 <b>good practice.</b> 23 Q. You suggest that this is such an important decision that 24 assumptions or beliefs are not appropriate levels of 25 leadership. Can you just explain why?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 143</p>
<p>1 approval to introduce weaponry/equipment providing there 2 is a audit trail/rationale et cetera." 3 You say that: 4 "This is a wholly incorrect statement in relation to 5 the approval of any less lethal weapons system, which is 6 dismissive of Mr Preston's very legitimate question and 7 the opinion expressed by an influential senior officer 8 may directly influence GMP's general approach to the 9 introduction of CSDC." 10 You say it is a "wholly incorrect statement", can 11 you explain why? 12 <b>A. Of course, this is in the context of a direct query in</b> 13 <b>relation to a less lethal weapons system itself. The</b> 14 <b>code of practice was in being at that time and the</b> 15 <b>established procedure for seeking an operational</b> 16 <b>requirement, technical and medical evaluation, Home</b> 17 <b>Office approval, the involvement of ACPO. All of those</b> 18 <b>are key considerations in relation to how that should be</b> 19 <b>taken forward. It was wholly incorrect that a force</b> 20 <b>could do it on their own with an audit trail.</b> 21 Q. In paragraph 31 you deal with what Chief Inspector 22 Davies said in his witness statement about making it 23 clear at the meeting that HOSDB had not approved the 24 device, nor tested it. 25 I am going to pass over that because that is oral</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 142</p>	<p>1 <b>A. Because the deployment and use of less lethal weapons</b> 2 <b>and technologies will on occasions, albeit infrequent,</b> 3 <b>be associated with the death of a subject. That must be</b> 4 <b>acknowledged from the outset, be it a primary or</b> 5 <b>secondary cause of the deployment of that equipment, it</b> 6 <b>is a weapons system and untoward occurrences can happen.</b> 7 <b>That is well known in firearms circles.</b> 8 Q. Moving to the position of then ACC Thompson at 9 paragraph 34, you note by reason of the contents of the 10 written briefing of 11 June 2007, deployed at the 11 meeting on 12 June 2007, in paragraph 37, that 12 Mr Thompson may have been misled in relation to key 13 issues directly relevant to his decision making 14 regarding GMP's approval of CSDC. 15 Would you accept that this is subject to the 16 chairman's findings of fact -- 17 <b>A. Obviously, sir, yes.</b> 18 Q. -- on which of those three witnesses gave accurate and 19 reliable evidence to him? 20 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b> 21 Q. In particular, if you look at paragraph 42 of your 22 report. 23 THE CHAIRMAN: Paragraph? 24 MR BEER: 42. 25 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 144</p>

1 MR BEER: You note that in a passage in his witness  
 2 statement, in paragraph 50, Mr Thompson states that when  
 3 he approved CSDC, he did:  
 4 "... not know if the CSDC had been used by any other  
 5 law enforcement agencies."  
 6 Yes?  
 7 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 8 Q. Of course when he came and gave evidence to us he said  
 9 that his belief was that CSDC was being used not only by  
 10 other law enforcement agencies but by his own force --  
 11 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 12 Q. -- in buildings?  
 13 **A. Yes, sir, obviously this was drafted before that**  
 14 **evidence.**  
 15 Q. Before you heard his explanation?  
 16 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 17 Q. Yes.  
 18 You say, however, on the basis of what his written  
 19 evidence indicated, at paragraph 39, that:  
 20 "Mr Thompson's statement understates the scope and  
 21 extent of the influence of ACPO in relation to firearms  
 22 and less lethal matters between 2003 and 2007."  
 23 What do you mean by that, please?  
 24 **A. In his witness statement, which I don't have to hand,**  
 25 **I think he infers that ACPO really were not really**

Page 145

1 **engaged or doing much work in relation to these issues.**  
 2 **The ACPO Police Use of Firearms minutes have been**  
 3 **circulated to this Inquiry and a cursory glance through**  
 4 **that will give an indication of the depth and volume of**  
 5 **work which was being taken out through that time. It**  
 6 **has been suggested that from 2000 on, particularly to**  
 7 **about 2010, there was a radical change in the nature of**  
 8 **police policy in the United Kingdom.**  
 9 Q. If you move forward to paragraph 53 of your own report,  
 10 again relating to what Mr Thompson suggested in his  
 11 witness statement, namely that at 12 June, I do not  
 12 believe there was a clear national armed policing  
 13 process that he could have followed regarding the GMP  
 14 interest in the dispersal canister. Yes?  
 15 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 16 Q. What, if any, response do you have to the suggestion  
 17 that in June 2007 there was no clear national armed  
 18 policing process that could have been followed regarding  
 19 GMP's interest in CSDC?  
 20 **A. It is my understanding that certainly from 2003 onwards**  
 21 **there was significant communications presentations at**  
 22 **all the relevant conferences and an extremely high level**  
 23 **of knowledge amongst practitioners that this was**  
 24 **a carefully controlled process, with the Home Office at**  
 25 **the helm.**

Page 146

1 Q. I suppose that starts, does it, with the code itself?  
 2 **A. Yes, sir, the 2003 code.**  
 3 Q. Which sets out the national process that needed to be  
 4 followed?  
 5 **A. Yes, sir. Of course it is a code linked to statute. It**  
 6 **is not just an advisory document; it carries some**  
 7 **weight.**  
 8 Q. Yes, the duty on police forces is to have regard to it?  
 9 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 10 Q. To what extent did the culture at the time in your view  
 11 reflect the position adopted here, namely there was no  
 12 clear process that could have been followed in relation  
 13 to GMP's interest in CSDC?  
 14 **A. I don't think that reflects the national position at all**  
 15 **of forces certainly across England and Wales. I think**  
 16 **there seemed to be a high level of knowledge and**  
 17 **awareness in relation to that and occasionally when**  
 18 **mistakes were made or errors, there would be a quick**  
 19 **contact with the ACPO secretariat to ask for advice in**  
 20 **relation to any new and emerging equipment the forces**  
 21 **might be interested in.**  
 22 Q. You say in this paragraph that you would also point to  
 23 the exhibited ACPO and GMP minutes of meetings that  
 24 indicate that ACPO and Home Office updates and decisions  
 25 in relation to two other less lethal weapons that were

Page 147

1 in fact capable of discharging CS, namely FN 303 and the  
 2 discriminating irritant projectile, those minutes  
 3 include discussions and decisions about those very  
 4 objects?  
 5 **A. Yes, sir, that supports my point that this was**  
 6 **a well-known process, and the fact that it was something**  
 7 **that forces could not determine on their own was well**  
 8 **known.**  
 9 Q. You say in 54 that:  
 10 "The above paragraph indicates that ACPO regularly  
 11 informed forces about the suitability or otherwise of  
 12 less lethal weapons and that GMP should have been aware  
 13 of these circulars and disseminated the directive or  
 14 information internally."  
 15 And that, ironically enough, the very same meeting,  
 16 12 October 2007, refers to a national Taser trial with,  
 17 amongst others, ACC Thompson and Chief Inspector Davies  
 18 as being present at the meeting.  
 19 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 20 Q. What point, if any, were you making there?  
 21 **A. That is a point that the Taser trial was something which**  
 22 **all forces were well aware of, there was great interest**  
 23 **in it, there was significant communication and**  
 24 **correspondence, everybody in the firearms arena would**  
 25 **have been reading and keeping up to date with the**

Page 148

1 **process of approval, the trials and the other**  
 2 **evaluations going on.**  
 3 **That would lead me to believe that people in this**  
 4 **position should have been aware that central approval**  
 5 **was required.**  
 6 Q. You say that they should have been aware, should have  
 7 been aware or were aware?  
 8 **A. Well, they should have been aware, I can't say that they**  
 9 **were aware, should have been aware, sir.**  
 10 Q. You have heard the reasons given -- a variety I think of  
 11 them have been given -- for the failure of GMP to  
 12 undertake the process set out in the code of practice in  
 13 any respect. What as a practitioner, irrespective of  
 14 which of those reasons is correct, level of concern, if  
 15 any, does that create? The failure to obtain  
 16 authorisation or follow the code in any way?  
 17 **A. From whose perspective, sir? From the Home Office or**  
 18 **from ACPO?**  
 19 Q. From ACPO?  
 20 **A. It is extremely concerning, because clearly the code has**  
 21 **not influenced the activities of the force, as it was**  
 22 **expected to do. That many people -- I say "many**  
 23 **people", some individuals within the firearms arena**  
 24 **appear to be well aware of the process that needed to be**  
 25 **followed. Yet that path was not taken to its logical**

Page 149

1 **conclusion in terms of listening to the advice from the**  
 2 **Home Office Scientific Development Branch or indeed**  
 3 **a basic cursory contact with ACPO which would have put**  
 4 **them straight in relation to the requirements.**  
 5 **I can't quite understand how it has happened.**  
 6 Q. In the scheme of the events of the development of less  
 7 lethal weapons, how significant a step would this have  
 8 been to introduce the CSDC?  
 9 **A. A very significant step, very significant. I can't**  
 10 **overestimate the Home Office interest in these issues.**  
 11 **There is a wider Government interest because anything**  
 12 **that is approved for use in England and Wales can be**  
 13 **used in Northern Ireland and there is a significant**  
 14 **interest in any developments there. This would have**  
 15 **been of interest to the Home Secretary and the policing**  
 16 **minister in particular.**  
 17 Q. You say at paragraph 50, we are talking here after  
 18 a year and a half or so, when discussing the NPIA's  
 19 review of GMP's training and to an extent operations in  
 20 the firearms arena, that ACC Thompson sent his then  
 21 chief constable, Sir Peter, an email in relation to the  
 22 introduction of CSDC which said that the decision is  
 23 auditable. You say that:  
 24 "A chief constable reading the statement could  
 25 reasonably assume that all relevant legal, political,

Page 150

1 governance, financial, health and safety, medical,  
 2 technical, operational, community and ACPO Home Office  
 3 related matters have been identified, documented and  
 4 addressed to an acceptable standard."  
 5 Here you are saying that you don't apportion blame  
 6 to Sir Peter for relying on that statement?  
 7 **A. No, sir.**  
 8 Q. You haven't seen any evidence that the fact that the  
 9 decision was auditable was the case; is that right?  
 10 **A. No, I haven't, sir.**  
 11 Q. You say at paragraph 59, that:  
 12 "Apart from any expectations or requirements placed  
 13 on a police force or chief officer under the code of  
 14 practice, or the manual, or accepted good practice, it  
 15 would be a matter of basic professional courtesy and due  
 16 diligence to inform a national ACPO lead and/or the Home  
 17 Office of a decision such as this."  
 18 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 19 Q. When you say "to inform a national ACPO lead", you mean  
 20 actually inform you?  
 21 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 22 Q. Why do you think it would have been a matter of basic  
 23 professional courtesy to have told you about the  
 24 introduction of this device?  
 25 **A. Because it is a significant development in the use of**

Page 151

1 **less lethal weapons in the UK, bringing a device into**  
 2 **use by any police force. The requirement is that ACPO**  
 3 **and the Home Office must be fundamentally involved, and**  
 4 **that wasn't the case. I just cannot envisage that being**  
 5 **done without the basic courtesy, never mind the due**  
 6 **diligence, which should precede it.**  
 7 Q. You go on to consider, in paragraphs 61 to 64, the  
 8 weaponry database maintained by HOSDB.  
 9 **A. Yes, sir.**  
 10 Q. I want to ask you some questions, the effect of which is  
 11 to understand your evidence on whether there was any  
 12 attempt by GMP to conceal or disguise its use of CSDC  
 13 from the Home Office, ACPO or the NPIA.  
 14 Firstly, just tell the chairman, please, what the  
 15 NPIA is?  
 16 **A. The National Policing Improvement Agency was a body**  
 17 **which has now morphed into the College of Policing.**  
 18 **Effectively it used to be the centre of excellence for**  
 19 **training, for running a range of exercises and for**  
 20 **expert advice and opinion in issues ranging from**  
 21 **firearms to major crime enquiries. It was a national**  
 22 **centre of excellence for policing.**  
 23 Q. Did it have a role in licensed firearms training?  
 24 **A. Specifically in relation to firearms it licensed every**  
 25 **force that was providing any form of training on**

Page 152

1 a rolling programme.  
 2 Q. When did it come into existence?  
 3 A. I can't recall the year when the NPJA came into  
 4 existence, because it transformed from Centrex at the  
 5 beginning of 2000 through to the NPJA. I think it took  
 6 about four iterations over the next decade, but I can't  
 7 recall the years. Effectively the functions were the  
 8 same, but the organisation changed its name.  
 9 Q. Did it have any role in the maintenance of the weaponry  
 10 database?  
 11 A. Not to my knowledge, it was HOSDB.  
 12 Q. In terms of HOSDB, what role did it have in the  
 13 maintenance of the weaponry database?  
 14 A. I think it received the returns, I recall discussions at  
 15 an international conference that there was a need for  
 16 similar organisations to list the weaponry that was in  
 17 use by police forces internationally. So if a law  
 18 enforcement organisation was going to start research,  
 19 they could quickly find out where to go to see where  
 20 research had been done before. I think that was the  
 21 original purpose of the database itself. I don't recall  
 22 it was maintained by anybody else other than HOSDB.  
 23 Q. You say that:  
 24 "The fact that GMP submitted [this is in  
 25 paragraph 61] at least one return indicating possession

Page 153

1 of CSDC does not constitute a full and frank disclosure  
 2 of GMP's acquisition and operational use of CSDC to ACPO  
 3 and the Home Office some time after the original  
 4 decision had been made."  
 5 Why do you say that?  
 6 A. The database was, I believe, a fairly infrequently used  
 7 database itself. I certainly never accessed it.  
 8 I don't know whether the information even went on there,  
 9 or whether it was just the main weapons that were held  
 10 that were nationally approved in relation to it. The  
 11 only way to properly consult and declare what GMP had  
 12 done, in my view, would be through the Home Office,  
 13 HOSDB and ACPO route. This is not even a back door, but  
 14 I think what it does indicate is that some individuals  
 15 within GMP were not concealing the fact that the CSDC  
 16 was being used and they included it in the returns.  
 17 Q. You say that the database was never used for any  
 18 governance or oversight purposes and was infrequently  
 19 used. What do you mean it was not used for governance  
 20 or oversight purposes?  
 21 A. No, I think it was for information purposes and I recall  
 22 the original criteria was to demonstrate to  
 23 international police forces what weaponry was held in  
 24 the UK.  
 25 Q. You say additionally the way that CSDC was listed on the

Page 154

1 GMP return could lead some observers reasonably to  
 2 conclude or to consider that it was a public order  
 3 technology, being no indication that it was a less  
 4 lethal munition.  
 5 A. Yes, sir, when I read the documentation, there was  
 6 a number of types of simulated ammunition and public  
 7 order devices listed on there by GMP as well. I can't  
 8 state for certain, but they may not have made it on to  
 9 the database itself.  
 10 Q. In conclusion on this -- by this method, this was not  
 11 a full and frank disclosure and was not even a back door  
 12 method of notification?  
 13 A. No, sir.  
 14 Q. In 2012 we have documentation to show that GMP contacted  
 15 I think it was then known as CAST, in relation to  
 16 a leaking a CSDC canister and you say that:  
 17 "This indicates that some individuals within GMP  
 18 latterly made no attempt to conceal CSDC acquisition, as  
 19 these communications were obviously open and  
 20 transparent."  
 21 A. Yes, sir.  
 22 Q. By that, do you mean that GMP as a whole was being open  
 23 and transparent as to its decision to use CSDC?  
 24 A. No, I can't say that from the information that I have  
 25 seen. That was really just in relation to the fact that

Page 155

1 nominated individuals disclosed to CAST and to HOSDB.  
 2 Q. I think finally on this, the evidence the Inquiry has  
 3 received suggests that Messrs Alder and Latto from the  
 4 NPJA participated in a review of, amongst other things,  
 5 the MASTS SOP within GMP in 2009?  
 6 A. Yes, sir.  
 7 Q. And that SOP revealed to them the use of CSDC?  
 8 A. Yes, sir.  
 9 Q. Again, did you draw any conclusions from that?  
 10 A. I think certainly the conclusions I drew are similar to  
 11 Mr Latto's in relation to questioning the operational  
 12 requirement for deploying CS into a vehicle and how that  
 13 was linked to the MASTS SOP within GMP. Particularly  
 14 issues such as holding doors closed and a number of  
 15 other issues in there, so I agreed with his  
 16 observations.  
 17 One thing, I am not sure whether it was CSDC or RIP  
 18 at that time, that was 2008, I think, version.  
 19 Q. I think it was in the SOP.  
 20 A. So it would have been CSDC.  
 21 Q. Yes.  
 22 My question was more focused on whether this was  
 23 open and transparent disclosure to the NPJA by GMP of  
 24 its decision to introduce this chemical munition into  
 25 its armoury?

Page 156

1 **A. I suppose it was discovered, I suppose there was**  
2 **a question of whether the NPIA should have done**  
3 **something at that point.**  
4 Q. Are you aware whether they did anything about that?  
5 **A. I am not aware at all of any referral from the NPIA, so**  
6 **to the best of my knowledge they didn't report it to**  
7 **ACPO or the Home Office.**  
8 Q. Should they have done?  
9 **A. Yes.**  
10 Q. To the best of your knowledge did ACPO itself, ie the  
11 working group secretariat or you, or your successor,  
12 discover GMP's unilateral introduction of this chemical  
13 munition?  
14 **A. No, I can state from my time I had no knowledge of it**  
15 **whatsoever and I know Mr Chesterman has given a witness**  
16 **statement to say that he was not aware either.**  
17 Q. If CSDC had been submitted for approval in accordance  
18 with the process set out in paragraphs 16 and 17 of your  
19 witness statements, can you help the chairman with what  
20 the likely issues that would have been considered in  
21 relation to it were? Specifically relating to the  
22 manner in which CSDC was to be delivered into a vehicle?  
23 **A. I think the first thing would have been to understand**  
24 **why there was a requirement to introduce CS into**  
25 **a vehicle in the first instance? What were we seeking**

Page 157

1 **to achieve as a service by doing that? That is the**  
2 **operational requirement, why would you want to do that**  
3 **in the first place? To have a clear understanding of**  
4 **why you wanted to do it.**  
5 Q. The RIP round already did that, didn't it?  
6 **A. Yes, but of course that was a different delivery method.**  
7 **That was technically approved before the introduction of**  
8 **the codes of practice, so it was a very different level**  
9 **of decision making for anything coming in post-2003.**  
10 **You will be aware I have made some recommendations in**  
11 **relation to RIP itself, so I am talking about a very**  
12 **different time and a different environment.**  
13 **The first thing would be, seeing if there is that**  
14 **operational requirement, why would you want to put this**  
15 **into a vehicle or another situation? And: what**  
16 **operational benefits would that give you?**  
17 **If that was assumed to be appropriate, then you**  
18 **would go into the process of seeking what alternatives**  
19 **are available internationally, is there any other**  
20 **equipment anywhere which delivers this which has had**  
21 **testing which is to the UK standard, the UK level? The**  
22 **UK has pre-existing agreements with North American**  
23 **institutions and Canadian institutions, particularly in**  
24 **relation to those issues because if it is going to be**  
25 **used anywhere it is likely to be across the wider North**

Page 158

1 **American continent.**  
2 **As I said, you have all the issues then of**  
3 **reliability and the health affects of the equipment**  
4 **itself. The operational overlay would look at the**  
5 **potential problems with the use of CS in a vehicle,**  
6 **particularly in this instance the fogging of the**  
7 **vehicle, what it would do to subjects, what it would do**  
8 **to the vision of the subjects, the vision of AFOs. All**  
9 **of the issues which have arisen throughout the Inquiry**  
10 **would be scoped, documented and considered at that**  
11 **stage. That is if it passes the first hurdle.**  
12 **Then if there is nothing available internationally**  
13 **which might fit the criteria that is suitable for**  
14 **testing, there would be consideration about whether to**  
15 **develop a new weapons system.**  
16 **Is that the sort of area you were looking at, sir?**  
17 Q. Yes. I think it is.  
18 If you forgive me a moment. (Pause)  
19 Can you lastly then turn to paragraph 95 of your  
20 second report.  
21 **A. Yes, sir.**  
22 Q. You say in paragraph 95(a):  
23 "I have not seen any evidence that a clear  
24 operational requirement existed supporting the  
25 introduction of the CSDC device by GMP."

Page 159

1 Does that remain your view having heard the  
2 evidence?  
3 **A. Yes, sir. The evidence I have heard has indicated that**  
4 **they wanted a safer alternative to the RIP round, but is**  
5 **not in my mind a clear operational requirement.**  
6 Q. Secondly, no specific legal advice was obtained in  
7 relation to the GMP acquisition and use of CSDC?  
8 **A. Not that I have seen, sir.**  
9 Q. No specific health and safety advice was obtained in  
10 relation to CSDC?  
11 **A. Again, I have not seen that.**  
12 Q. Significant gaps and omissions exist in the audit trail  
13 for the acquisition, evaluation and use of CSDC.  
14 **A. Yes.**  
15 Q. Does that remain the position having heard all of the  
16 evidence?  
17 **A. Yes, sir.**  
18 Q. That there was a failure of practitioners and senior  
19 advisers to share all relevant information and  
20 effectively brief key decision makers regarding CSDC?  
21 **A. Yes, sir.**  
22 Q. Does that remain the position?  
23 **A. It does, sir.**  
24 Q. Incorrect statements and significant omissions were  
25 contained in the CSDC approval documentation submitted

Page 160



<p>1 to the GMP Firearms Policy Group and ACC Thompson?</p> <p>2 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>3 Q. G, the written advice for HOSDB and CAST regarding the</p> <p>4 required procedure from less lethal research was not</p> <p>5 followed nor effectively responded to. Does that remain</p> <p>6 the position?</p> <p>7 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>8 Q. An unknown and unresearched chemical agent,</p> <p>9 dimethyldichloro, was deployed and used against</p> <p>10 subjects.</p> <p>11 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>12 Q. How concerning, if at all, was that?</p> <p>13 <b>A. I think it is extremely concerning, because it doesn't</b></p> <p>14 <b>appear that we know what it was or what its effects on</b></p> <p>15 <b>human beings were. I can say that the Home Office would</b></p> <p>16 <b>never approve any chemical weapons system without a full</b></p> <p>17 <b>understanding of the effects of the agent that it</b></p> <p>18 <b>contained.</b></p> <p>19 Q. GMP did not consult ACPO, the GMP police authority or</p> <p>20 the Home Secretary or inform them of the decision</p> <p>21 operationally to deploy CSDC outside of the specific</p> <p>22 remit of the 2003 code of practice?</p> <p>23 <b>A. Yes, and I think the reference to the police authority</b></p> <p>24 <b>is a specific requirement in the code as I recall it.</b></p> <p>25 Q. J:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 161</p>	<p>1 <b>A. A chief officer group meeting is chaired by the chief</b></p> <p>2 <b>constable, would include all the chief officers. In</b></p> <p>3 <b>some forces that would include the chief legal adviser</b></p> <p>4 <b>for the force, director of finance and perhaps other key</b></p> <p>5 <b>advisers. It is the main forum for strategic decision</b></p> <p>6 <b>making for the force. That is where all the major</b></p> <p>7 <b>multi-million pound decisions are made and ratified. It</b></p> <p>8 <b>must be subject to minuting, you know, recording of all</b></p> <p>9 <b>the minutes and the capturing of the audit trail for all</b></p> <p>10 <b>decisions made. That would cover everything from the</b></p> <p>11 <b>building of a new police station to the introduction of</b></p> <p>12 <b>a device like this and senior personnel decisions.</b></p> <p>13 <b>It is the main meeting that is held within police</b></p> <p>14 <b>forces.</b></p> <p>15 THE CHAIRMAN: To whom are the minutes normally circulated?</p> <p>16 <b>A. Every individual that is at the meeting, key advisers</b></p> <p>17 <b>across the force. At that stage the police authority,</b></p> <p>18 <b>potentially Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary,</b></p> <p>19 <b>it depends on the issues that are being discussed but it</b></p> <p>20 <b>would be formally minuted, formally recorded, formally</b></p> <p>21 <b>archived and accessible.</b></p> <p>22 THE CHAIRMAN: Formally archived?</p> <p>23 <b>A. It has to be, because clearly significant public</b></p> <p>24 <b>expenditure as well as critical decisions are made at</b></p> <p>25 <b>those meetings.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 163</p>
<p>1 "Significant and relevant knowledge existed within</p> <p>2 ACPO PUF at the time that GMP considered an approved</p> <p>3 CSDC that was immediately available had anyone made</p> <p>4 contact to seek their views."</p> <p>5 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>6 Q. Lastly:</p> <p>7 "Consultation action directed by ACC Thompson in</p> <p>8 relation to the CSDC approval process was not carried</p> <p>9 out as he instructed."</p> <p>10 Was that his condition B?</p> <p>11 <b>A. Yes, sir. I think, yes, there were three conditions,</b></p> <p>12 <b>weren't there, sir, and it was the first two component</b></p> <p>13 <b>parts.</b></p> <p>14 Q. Yes, and that was the second of them I think.</p> <p>15 One last point on CSDC, you have noted earlier in</p> <p>16 the report that the item was actually approved for use</p> <p>17 by the chief officer group on 26 July 2007?</p> <p>18 <b>A. Well, there is a reference to that, sir. I have not</b></p> <p>19 <b>seen any documents to indicate that is actually what</b></p> <p>20 <b>happened.</b></p> <p>21 Q. You are right to correct me. There are two references</p> <p>22 in the STRAs, I think for 2007 and 2008, for that having</p> <p>23 occurred but no minutes have been produced in relation</p> <p>24 to the July 2007 chief officer group meeting. Can you</p> <p>25 tell the chairman what a chief officer group is?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 162</p>	<p>1 MR BEER: Yes, I have finished asking questions for the</p> <p>2 moment on --</p> <p>3 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt, Mr Beer.</p> <p>4 MR BEER: No, no, of course.</p> <p>5 On CSDC, can we turn then to Operation Shire and</p> <p>6 begin, please, with some general issues concerning</p> <p>7 information and intelligence.</p> <p>8 First, some context setting to the questions I am</p> <p>9 about to ask.</p> <p>10 Would you agree that the context includes the</p> <p>11 following.</p> <p>12 Firstly, officers facing uncertainties because of</p> <p>13 the suspected activities of these subjects, including</p> <p>14 possibly their awareness of being surveyed, their use of</p> <p>15 a number of vehicles, changing or leaving mobile</p> <p>16 telephones in certain places when they go out in</p> <p>17 a stolen car and use of multiple addresses. That</p> <p>18 presents investigators and planners with a number of</p> <p>19 uncertainties.</p> <p>20 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>21 Q. Is that common?</p> <p>22 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p>23 Q. It is not unique to this case?</p> <p>24 <b>A. No, it is far from unique.</b></p> <p>25 Q. Secondly, the context involves a changing intelligence</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 164</p>

1 picture. Would you agree with that?

2 **A. Yes, sir.**

3 Q. That intelligence picture may include the loyalties and

4 affiliations of the subjects?

5 **A. Yes, sir.**

6 Q. Including what has been described as "interoperability"?

7 **A. Yes, sir.**

8 Q. Again, is that an unusual or a unique feature of this

9 case?

10 **A. No, sir, it is not unique.**

11 Q. Would you agree that challenges that the operation and

12 the planners within it faced were understanding the

13 intentions of the subjects and their purpose of repeated

14 visits to the car park at Culcheth?

15 **A. Yes, sir.**

16 Q. In particular whether they were attending the car park

17 to commit a robbery, to receive premises for the purposes

18 of carrying out a robbery or to engage in some other

19 serious criminality. Yes?

20 **A. Yes, sir.**

21 Q. If we can look at paragraphs 276 and 277 of your first

22 report, please.

23 **A. Yes, sir.**

24 Q. The allegation that had been put by the CPS was that the

25 strategy utilised on 2 and 3 March was to secure arrests

Page 165

1 only when certain evidential tipping points had been

2 reached, it being the view of the SIO that those

3 evidential tipping points would enable prosecution of

4 the subjects for an offence of conspiracy to commit

5 robbery. No evidential tipping points had been agreed

6 with the CPS, despite assertions, and the adoption of

7 a fixed tipping point strategy gave primacy to

8 an approach based on the intervention in the act of

9 robbery so as to ensure prosecution of the subjects at

10 the expense of a required proper consideration of

11 alternative options which would have minimised the risk

12 to health and safety.

13 I think you disagree with those allegations, don't

14 you?

15 **A. Yes, sir.**

16 Q. Just explain why, please.

17 **A. I think the first and clear point is it is not a matter**

18 **for the force to agree with the CPS in relation to**

19 **tipping points.**

20 **The second point is the designation of a tipping**

21 **point in relation to evidential issues shouldn't**

22 **necessarily be the decision to deploy assets to conduct**

23 **an arrest. The tactical firearms commander can go**

24 **before that or delay after that point has been reached**

25 **to make sure that any arrest and the tactics that are**

Page 166

1 **used to effect the arrest are the most proportionate and**

2 **the most appropriate at that point in time.**

3 **I think there is a separation of tasks and roles and**

4 **responsibilities which are particularly important to**

5 **separate.**

6 Q. In this case, just digressing for a moment, we have seen

7 the tipping points set out in both the TFC's log for

8 2 March, Chief Inspector Lawler, and Mr Granby's for

9 3 March and reflected in PowerPoint presentations. Do

10 you understand those to be evidential tipping points or

11 a moment of intervention for the purposes of public

12 protection?

13 **A. I think that is a different question. I am sometimes**

14 **unclear in relation to what they are when it -- in**

15 **relation to the evidence that has been given, but from**

16 **my point of view it is that we should be very clear on**

17 **what are evidential tipping points, because it is very**

18 **hard for a TFC to state in advance when they are**

19 **actually going to call on a strike or implement certain**

20 **tactics. I think, you know, at the point of**

21 **an evidential tipping point it should then be handed**

22 **over for a considered opinion from the TFC as to whether**

23 **it needs to be immediate or whether a delay is**

24 **appropriate.**

25 Q. You I think disagree with the suggestion that the

Page 167

1 strategy gave primacy to intervention in the act of

2 robbery, and I think rather reached the opposite

3 conclusion, that here, if anything, the approach taken

4 by certainly the SIO DI Cousen, if anything, suggested

5 that he had gone early?

6 **A. Well, it does appear from the discussions that have gone**

7 **on, particularly in relation to DI Cousen that the**

8 **intention was to arrest before they got to Culcheth.**

9 **Clearly that didn't happen in this instance, but**

10 **I picked up that that was a key theme throughout. On**

11 **this instance, quite clearly the subjects had reached**

12 **Culcheth --**

13 Q. And --

14 **A. -- and the arrest took place before anybody had clearly**

15 **started the substantive part of a potential offence.**

16 Q. You are not critical of this operation -- this is

17 a criticism that is sometimes levelled against the police

18 service -- of leaving it too late to catch suspects in

19 the act of committing a robbery, thereby endangering the

20 public?

21 **A. No, I am not. What I would say is that given what we**

22 **know at this point of the Inquiry in relation to the**

23 **fairly significant time period where eyes were lost on**

24 **the car, that many tactical firearms commanders,**

25 **a reasonable body of firearms commanders, might have**

Page 168

1 **deployed a tactic at that point in time to disrupt,**  
2 **because an offence could have been in progress at that**  
3 **time and I think many in the public safety context would**  
4 **have made a decision to deploy at that time.**  
5 Q. I see. Perhaps then I can just explore that now because  
6 it has arisen. It was eyes lost for about 13 or 15  
7 minutes or so?  
8 **A. Yes.**  
9 Q. I think you have just described that as a "significant"  
10 or a "reasonable" period. In the context of a MASTS  
11 operation such as this, at that time in the operation  
12 what level of concern does losing eyes at that point  
13 create?  
14 **A. I think in this context, because the belief is that the**  
15 **offence was going to take place at Culcheth, it was**  
16 **known that the vehicle and the subjects were at**  
17 **Culcheth, that a reasonable assumption a commander could**  
18 **make is that they might have left the vehicle and the**  
19 **offence could be about to be committed or was in**  
20 **progress. On that basis I could see many commanders**  
21 **would immediately call in a disruption option.**  
22 Q. This is completely separate from the --  
23 **A. From the arrest, completely separate.**  
24 Q. This is completely separate from the other criticisms  
25 you make about failure to consider disruption as

Page 169

1 a tactic?  
2 **A. Yes.**  
3 Q. This is in that moment --  
4 **A. In that --**  
5 Q. -- a reasonable body of firearms commanders may have  
6 called on disruption tactics, simply because of the lack  
7 of knowledge of where the subjects were?  
8 **A. I make that point because that could have been called**  
9 **before the SIO had said, "It has reached my evidential**  
10 **tipping point", before that happened a reasonable body**  
11 **of TFCs may well have called in a disruption tactic in**  
12 **the interests of public safety, because an offence could**  
13 **be about to be committed or could have been in progress**  
14 **at that point.**  
15 Q. What are the downsides to doing that, what would have  
16 been the downsides to doing that?  
17 **A. The main downside would be the subjects would have seen**  
18 **a police presence or if the disruption was a low key**  
19 **subterfuge or different type of tactic, sending ARV**  
20 **officers in uniform to buy cups of coffee and walk**  
21 **around all the shops, there are different way of**  
22 **delivering a disruption tactic but my opinion would be,**  
23 **given that timescale and the critical concerns that**  
24 **a commander could hold at that point in time, because**  
25 **eyes were lost, that it probably would have been a fast**

Page 170

1 **time, send the ARVs in and make sure the public are safe**  
2 **and deal with anything that is presented by way of**  
3 **an offence being committed.**  
4 Q. You mention there a subterfuge disruption tactic, which  
5 I don't think I have picked up from your reports. Can  
6 you tell the chairman a little bit more about that, you  
7 mentioned there sending ARV officers in to buy cups of  
8 coffee?  
9 **A. The old fashioned thought would be, "Put a panda car**  
10 **outside", of course it is far more sophisticated in this**  
11 **day and age. Police activity is quite often high**  
12 **profile, quite often noisy, could be a missing person**  
13 **enquiry, the use of tannoys for various reasons.**  
14 **Perhaps it is not appropriate to give a range of**  
15 **things which have been used, but you can do policing**  
16 **activity in an area which would mean that if criminals**  
17 **were not wanting to get caught they would see that**  
18 **activity and depart and perhaps plan their criminality**  
19 **for another day.**  
20 **There are things you can do other than just go**  
21 **tearing in with police cars and blue lights and**  
22 **two-tones flashing to make it look like it is too busy**  
23 **with police officers to conduct a criminal enterprise.**  
24 Q. You said there that the subjects go away and plan their  
25 criminality for another day, that is of course the

Page 171

1 downside or a downside to this, but you are saying this  
2 in the context of eyes being lost and therefore  
3 a suspicion that the subjects may be outside the  
4 vehicle?  
5 **A. I think that is before a tipping point for evidential**  
6 **purposes, it is an example of when a TFC may well call**  
7 **on a strike.**  
8 **Of course the other thing is the planning for**  
9 **another day is also an issue when an arrest is called**  
10 **for as well. You can disrupt and plan to arrest at**  
11 **a different location or a different time.**  
12 Q. Can I turn then, with those general matters of context,  
13 to the decision to deploy armed officers and look at  
14 paragraphs 229 to 230 of your first report.  
15 **A. 229 to 230?**  
16 Q. Yes. In 229 you say:  
17 "I agree with Mr Sturman's comment that in this  
18 operation I believe in the absence of specific overt  
19 intelligence suggesting that the subject would be armed,  
20 there was a reasonable planning assumption based on the  
21 historic intelligence that they could be in some way  
22 armed. I believe the TFC was entirely justified in  
23 seeking and obtaining an authorisation for armed  
24 deployment."  
25 Then 230:

Page 172

<p>1 "As I have outlined elsewhere in this report, 2 I consider that the intelligence and information 3 presented to the officers that I have seen more than 4 satisfied the criteria for the TFC requesting and the 5 SFC authorising the deployment of armed officers." 6 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b> 7 Q. Does that remain your view today -- 8 <b>A. It does, sir.</b> 9 Q. -- having heard the evidence? 10 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b> 11 Q. Is it right that that is not the end of the issue, 12 namely that the criteria were more than satisfied for 13 the request and the authority to deploy armed officers, 14 because in reaching that decision, it is appropriate to 15 use a planning assumption that at some stage the 16 subjects might be armed. Would you agree that that does 17 not mean that you necessarily pass on that assumption to 18 the AFOs? 19 <b>A. No, sir. The deployment of armed officers is</b> 20 <b>a contingency effectively and the briefing to armed</b> 21 <b>officers, you know, has a different set of criteria to</b> 22 <b>support it.</b> 23 Q. Is that because if we look at paragraphs 288 and 289 of 24 your first report, where you make reference to 25 paragraphs 420 and 421 of the Manual of Guidance --</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 173</p>	<p>1 Q. Can we turn then, please, to the working strategy and 2 tactical parameters, firstly in general terms and then 3 in this operation. 4 Can we look, please, at the Manual of Guidance on 5 working strategies, that is policy and procedure bundle 6 and it is paragraph 5.39 of the Manual of Guidance, 7 which is at page -- 8 <b>A. 336, sir.</b> 9 Q. Thank you very much: 10 "Commanders must at the earliest opportunity develop 11 an effective strategy to direct police action, a working 12 strategy may start to be developed once information is 13 received. It can be formalised once a threat assessment 14 has taken place. See applying the national decision 15 model. A strategy may contain a number of objectives, 16 information and intelligence may change, as may the 17 threat assessment, therefore the strategy must remain 18 dynamic and capable of being reviewed." 19 Paragraph 540: 20 "Whilst it is important that a strategy is defined 21 and agreed as quickly as possible, it must be based on 22 all the information available at the time. It is rare 23 for a complete or perfect picture to exist, public 24 safety should always be the priority and at times this 25 may require immediate action to protect life, which of</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 175</p>
<p>1 putting it frankly -- the quantum of proof for the grant 2 of an authority to deploy is exceptionally low? 3 <b>A. Yes, sir. Well, it is certainly low compared to the</b> 4 <b>criteria for the other decisions in this incident.</b> 5 Q. Yes. You point out or you observe in paragraph 289 that 6 the Manual of Guidance says: 7 "The words 'reason to suppose' sets the level of 8 knowledge required about the existence of a threat 9 justifying the deployment of AFOs at a far lower level 10 than that would actually justify the use of firearms." 11 That is obvious? 12 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b> 13 Q. The words "Reason to suppose", they come fairly low in 14 the spectrum of the lexicon of police officers and 15 lawyers in terms of what is required? 16 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b> 17 Q. Additionally, is it for the reasons in 291 and 292 of 18 this report, namely the decision to authorise doesn't 19 mean a decision to use the firearm is granted, and it is 20 taken in the knowledge that it is a matter for the AFO 21 to justify their individual decisions and actions? 22 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b> 23 Q. Your conclusion that the decision to deploy was more 24 than satisfied is taken with those two points in mind? 25 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 174</p>	<p>1 necessity may be based on limited information." 2 5.1: 3 "While the strategy and the rationale behind it 4 should be recorded as part of an audit trail, so should 5 any revisions or amendments. Similarly the strategy 6 should be regularly reviewed, particularly where 7 a change of handover of command occurs. An effective 8 strategy should provide clarity of purpose, recognise 9 public safety as a priority, reflect the 10 multidimensional threat of assessment in priority order, 11 be achievable, be dynamic to reflect changes in 12 circumstance and be specific to the operation." 13 Then, lastly, paragraph 6.27, please. 14 THE CHAIRMAN: 348? 15 MR BEER: Yes, 348: 16 "The strategy and rationale behind it, as well as 17 any revisions or amendments, should be recorded and will 18 form an audit trail. The strategy should be regularly 19 reviewed, particularly where a change of handover of 20 command occurs." 21 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b> 22 Q. Does that fully describe the purpose of a working 23 strategy? 24 <b>A. Yes, sir.</b> 25 Q. Could you translate that into more everyday or</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 176</p>

1 non-practitioner's language? Speaking for myself, it is  
 2 sometimes difficult to -- even recognising that they are  
 3 overlapping concepts -- divorce a working strategy, from  
 4 tactical options, from contingencies, from tactical  
 5 parameters.  
 6 **A. I think it is fair to say, sir, there is quite often**  
 7 **some overlap in relation to where.**  
 8 THE CHAIRMAN: Some what, sorry?  
 9 **A. Some overlap in relation to where some of those**  
 10 **component parts are recorded.**  
 11 **In lay terms I would say that the strategy is:**  
 12 **a clear statement of intent, what the operation is**  
 13 **seeking to deliver; the prioritised order of what should**  
 14 **be protected, what is at risk; and an important level of**  
 15 **clarity in relation to who is in charge of the**  
 16 **operation, what they are responsible for and any**  
 17 **constraints or direction that they place on that**  
 18 **operation.**  
 19 Q. The working strategies that we have seen always start  
 20 off with, "To safeguard the safety of the people of  
 21 Culcheth or the north-west region ..."  
 22 Is that fairly common, to say that the purpose of us  
 23 being police officers is to safeguard the public?  
 24 **A. I think it is fairly common and probably spins out of**  
 25 **the article 2 issues, where all the training and all the**

Page 177

1 **guidance says you must put the public at the top of your**  
 2 **priority list of issues in terms of public safety.**  
 3 Q. Yes.  
 4 **A. That develops then generally into a range of statements**  
 5 **and there should be considerations and issues around**  
 6 **public safety, officer safety and subject safety within**  
 7 **an operation.**  
 8 Q. What I am driving at is: to what extent are these  
 9 working strategies the same from operation to operation?  
 10 If it is always going to be the purpose of an operation  
 11 to protect the public, to protect police officers and to  
 12 protect the subject, what is the point?  
 13 **A. I think to an extent that part is generic, part of the**  
 14 **point is to focus the people who are delivering the**  
 15 **policing operation to understand what is important. It**  
 16 **should not be too generic, whilst those issues should be**  
 17 **addressed it should be bespoke to that particular**  
 18 **policing operation.**  
 19 **For example, I used the term it should specify**  
 20 **exactly what the desired outcome is. In this operation,**  
 21 **there is a very strong criminal justice outcome and**  
 22 **a facilitated criminal enterprise, up to a point.**  
 23 **I would expect the strategy to make it very, very clear**  
 24 **that the strategic firearms commander is authorising**  
 25 **this, authorising a team of suspected criminals to be**

Page 178

1 **allowed to run up to a certain point in time, to specify**  
 2 **why that is being done and what control measures are in**  
 3 **place to make sure that public safety, officer safety**  
 4 **and subject safety is maintained to the greatest**  
 5 **possible extent.**  
 6 Q. I see, so not just the generic statement, "We are here  
 7 to protect the public, we are here to protect the  
 8 officers ..."  
 9 **A. That is the basis of it, but then it should be**  
 10 **articulated out. Quite often the best strategies I see**  
 11 **have a narrative attached to them which makes some sort**  
 12 **of statement along those lines, so that the tactical**  
 13 **firearms commander is very, very clear that they have**  
 14 **been authorised to allow this criminal enterprise to run**  
 15 **up to a certain point, but there are a level of**  
 16 **constraints about what can and cannot be done and what**  
 17 **is required to be delivered at the end of it.**  
 18 Q. I see. Translating that to this case, to a working  
 19 strategy, you would expect, is that the right word, it  
 20 to include reference to allowing the subjects to move  
 21 away from Boothtown in the car?  
 22 **A. Yes.**  
 23 Q. Even though it was their suspected intention to commit  
 24 a robbery?  
 25 **A. Yes -- I think the thing that comes through clearly to**

Page 179

1 **me is this is not a matter for the SIO to determine, to**  
 2 **allow a criminal enterprise to proceed to a certain**  
 3 **point in time. This is a matter for the firearms**  
 4 **command side of it. His input is just saying,**  
 5 **"Evidential tipping points been addressed, I am happy,**  
 6 **please arrest when appropriate".**  
 7 **But the operation that must be wrapped around that**  
 8 **must take into account the much wider considerations of**  
 9 **deploying MASTS officers, deploying specialist munitions**  
 10 **and potentially having an intervention on the streets**  
 11 **where the public could be present.**  
 12 Q. Could you give an example of what a working strategy in  
 13 this case might look like?  
 14 **A. Well the bits, I think as I have alluded to, that are**  
 15 **not in there, something very clearly around this**  
 16 **criminal justice outcome that is desired. This is**  
 17 **a specific operation that has been designed to try and**  
 18 **deliver a team into the criminal justice system for**  
 19 **conspiracy to commit armed robberies. That should be**  
 20 **extremely clear. It should be clear what risks that the**  
 21 **strategic firearms commander is accepting in relation to**  
 22 **that operation, ie allowing it to run, you know, could**  
 23 **be high speed use of cars and the various tactics. That**  
 24 **needs to be acknowledged within it.**  
 25 **The parameters that that commander is giving the**

Page 180

<p>1 tactical firearms commander in relation to specialist                  2 munitions, particularly their use in relation to the                  3 benefits and the downside of them.                  4 For me the simple part of this is it is facilitating                  5 criminal enterprise, there are risks associated with it,                  6 the people who are at risk need to be identified,                  7 control measures need to be put into place and the                  8 firearms operation needs to be tactically appropriate.                  9 I think it is that narrative around those issues                  10 that somebody reading it would clearly understand what                  11 has been authorised and what is happening.                  12 Q. Is this right, it is translating what might be rather                  13 abstract statements into measurable or identifiable                  14 steps on the ground?                  15 A. Yes, sir. Not necessarily steps on the ground, because                  16 it is the responsibility of the tactical firearms                  17 commander to convert that. This is the higher level                  18 statement of what is the force authorising and what is                  19 the force seeking to achieve? What constraints have                  20 been put on it and what additional authorisations is the                  21 strategic firearms commander giving?                  22 Q. Can you think of a better phrase then, please, than                  23 "steps on the ground", so rather than the abstract                  24 statements --                  25 THE CHAIRMAN: I think what Mr Beer is asking is:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 181</p>	<p>1 Is 10.30 all right?                  2 MR BEER: Yes, thank you, sir.                  3 THE CHAIRMAN: 10.30 start is fine.                  4 Thank you very much.                  5 (4.30 pm)                  6 (The Inquiry adjourned until 10.30 am the following day)                  7                  8                  9                  10                  11                  12                  13                  14                  15                  16                  17                  18                  19                  20                  21                  22                  23                  24                  25</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 183</p>
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

<p>1 translating abstract statements into what then?                  2 MR BEER: Yes.                  3 A. I think translating the abstract statements into a clear                  4 statement of what this operation is seeking to achieve.                  5 THE CHAIRMAN: Seeking to achieve.                  6 A. That is basically what it is.                  7 MR BEER: Yes.                  8 A. Anybody reading it would understand:                  9 "This is a suspected team of armed robbers, it is                  10 believed they are going to Culcheth to commit a robbery.                  11 We are going to allow them to run, which we would not                  12 ordinarily do in normal criminal investigations. Why we                  13 are letting them run is the sustainable public                  14 protection issue, which is if we don't catch them in the                  15 act or close to then we are not going to send them to                  16 prison for long enough.                  17 "We acknowledge the risks associated with that, to                  18 mitigate the risks we are deploying these officers, with                  19 this equipment, in these circumstances."                  20 Then you say to the tactical firearms commander,                  21 "Develop the tactics accordingly".                  22 MR BEER: Thank you very much.                  23 Sir, might that be an appropriate moment?                  24 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Thank you, Mr Beer.                  25 Thank you, Mr Arundale.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 182</p>	<p>1                  2                  3 I N D E X                  4                  5 MR IAN ARUNDALE (sworn) .....1                  6 Questions from MR BEER .....1                  7                  8                  9                  10                  11                  12                  13                  14                  15                  16                  17                  18                  19                  20                  21                  22                  23                  24                  25</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 184</p>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A				
<b>ability</b> 26:4 36:1 46:6 61:14 108:18	52:24 <b>accountable</b> 31:7 124:23	160:7,13 <b>act</b> 135:1 166:8 168:1,19 182:15	180:5 <b>addresses</b> 164:17	47:15 60:15 75:3 113:10 160:19
<b>able</b> 28:23 37:19 40:3 87:10 89:22 108:22 112:15 114:18,19 117:6	<b>accounts</b> 77:14 78:10,16,21 79:1 79:2	<b>acted</b> 6:17 97:11 <b>action</b> 4:25 28:21 51:14 55:17 66:18 90:4 97:4,12 98:9 121:21 143:8,15 162:7 175:11,25	<b>addressing</b> 100:8 123:6 <b>adds</b> 117:12 <b>adequate</b> 64:5 <b>adjourned</b> 183:6 <b>adjournment</b> 55:4 95:7 140:1	<b>advising</b> 112:7 117:10 <b>advisory</b> 147:6 <b>AEP</b> 17:1,3 19:16 136:12
<b>absence</b> 78:16 109:17 172:18	<b>accreditation</b> 14:4 35:4 99:12	<b>actions</b> 52:11 71:20 75:22 81:4 94:7 174:21	<b>administrative</b> 42:14,20 71:17 73:5 115:8	<b>affect</b> 35:12 36:13 58:11 80:9,17 81:3 82:14 92:14
<b>absolute</b> 90:17 94:23	<b>accredited</b> 8:23 99:6,9	<b>activities</b> 52:11 89:5 149:21 164:13	<b>adopted</b> 56:4 147:11	<b>affiliations</b> 165:4 <b>afield</b> 14:15 33:2
<b>absolutely</b> 31:22 36:3 41:15 44:24 59:14 65:2 66:2 67:12 103:6 122:13 133:22	<b>accuracy</b> 42:23 76:12 143:1	<b>activity</b> 171:11,16 171:18	<b>adoption</b> 22:21 137:14 166:6	<b>AFO</b> 34:24 35:18 36:12 50:22 60:8 64:2 67:18 79:18 92:22 106:15,24 110:25 119:20 121:8,18,22 174:20
<b>abstract</b> 181:13,23 182:1,3	<b>accurate</b> 66:2 79:12 80:3 81:6 84:8 144:18	<b>actual</b> 11:11 13:11 34:11 59:23 73:6 75:24	<b>advance</b> 102:13 167:18	<b>AFOs</b> 9:2 13:11 28:21 35:9 41:2 41:18 42:24 43:2 44:16,19 49:25 51:23 52:21 54:16 55:15 56:21 57:23 61:18 63:3 64:8 65:15 66:4 76:15 77:12 79:9,23 81:4 82:13 83:2 83:22 84:2 90:19 108:3 118:18 159:8 173:18 174:9
<b>abstraction</b> 13:10 13:14	<b>achieve</b> 158:1 181:19 182:4,5	<b>ad</b> 24:6 <b>add</b> 57:22 112:18	<b>advanced</b> 93:12 112:23 118:23 121:19	
<b>academia</b> 25:18	<b>acknowledge</b> 182:17	<b>acute</b> 137:17	<b>adverse</b> 19:8 49:25	
<b>academic</b> 3:7 136:6	<b>acknowledged</b> 9:1 62:20 144:4 180:24	<b>ad</b> 24:6 <b>add</b> 57:22 112:18	<b>adversely</b> 102:5	
<b>ACC</b> 36:25 84:13 85:3 130:8 144:8 148:17 150:20 161:1 162:7	<b>acknowledgement</b> 101:9	<b>addition</b> 10:1 25:25 <b>additional</b> 13:15 48:18 50:8,8 51:11 57:22 61:23 74:21 78:7 98:6 98:10 100:12 101:5 116:10 181:20	<b>advice</b> 36:3 38:24 40:7 72:14 74:5 87:13 111:22 112:24 113:9 115:5,20 116:25 117:16 136:2 143:5,9,11 147:19 150:1 152:20 160:6,9 161:3	
<b>accept</b> 34:4 37:22 79:8 87:17 107:22 123:15 144:15	<b>ACPO</b> 14:16,19 15:15,17,17,18 16:7 20:15 27:18 30:8 37:22 61:22 62:9 124:23 125:3 129:24 132:10 140:18 142:17 143:10 145:21,25 146:2 147:19,23 147:24 148:10 149:18,19 150:3 151:2,16,19 152:2 152:13 154:2,13 157:7,10 161:19 162:2	<b>additionally</b> 25:10 50:18 70:14 154:25 174:17	<b>advise</b> 37:19 112:9 112:10,15 114:11 114:20	
<b>acceptable</b> 44:21 104:4 151:4	<b>accepted</b> 17:14 108:14 110:6 151:14	<b>address</b> 49:9,12 85:13 95:15 101:24 103:19 110:13 119:25 121:5	<b>advised</b> 59:11 <b>adviser</b> 62:13 66:10 67:2 72:19 110:13 111:21 112:4,14 112:18 114:8 116:11 117:9,17 118:4 119:4 163:3	
<b>accepting</b> 180:21	<b>access</b> 23:25 28:23 34:7 50:3	<b>addressed</b> 61:25 86:4,6 119:16 151:4 178:17	<b>advise</b> 37:19 112:9 112:10,15 114:11 114:20	<b>age</b> 171:11
<b>accessed</b> 154:7	<b>accessible</b> 163:21		<b>advised</b> 59:11 <b>adviser</b> 62:13 66:10 67:2 72:19 110:13 111:21 112:4,14 112:18 114:8 116:11 117:9,17 118:4 119:4 163:3	<b>agencies</b> 10:17 145:5,10
<b>accessed</b> 154:7	<b>accompanied</b> 104:21		<b>advised</b> 59:11 <b>adviser</b> 62:13 66:10 67:2 72:19 110:13 111:21 112:4,14 112:18 114:8 116:11 117:9,17 118:4 119:4 163:3	<b>Agency</b> 26:25 92:19 152:16
<b>accessed</b> 154:7	<b>account</b> 53:25 77:15 78:4 82:23 88:8 180:8		<b>advised</b> 59:11 <b>adviser</b> 62:13 66:10 67:2 72:19 110:13 111:21 112:4,14 112:18 114:8 116:11 117:9,17 118:4 119:4 163:3	<b>agent</b> 161:8,17 <b>ago</b> 12:23 90:12 <b>agree</b> 65:13 69:11 72:23 73:3,4,11 74:13 79:23 81:1 111:1 112:20
<b>accessed</b> 154:7	<b>accountability</b>		<b>advised</b> 59:11 <b>adviser</b> 62:13 66:10 67:2 72:19 110:13 111:21 112:4,14 112:18 114:8 116:11 117:9,17 118:4 119:4 163:3	

115:10,13,14 120:2 122:21,22 164:10 165:1,11 166:18 172:17 173:16 <b>agreed</b> 26:23 85:2 96:8 156:15 166:5 175:21 <b>agreement</b> 30:13 30:15 133:17 <b>agreements</b> 158:22 <b>aim</b> 80:20 <b>aimed</b> 66:17 <b>air</b> 7:9 8:18 <b>akin</b> 9:12 <b>albeit</b> 128:16 144:2 <b>Alder</b> 156:3 <b>allegation</b> 165:24 <b>allegations</b> 70:2 77:25 166:13 <b>alleged</b> 49:1 <b>Allen</b> 71:20 <b>Allen's</b> 115:7 <b>allocated</b> 106:21 <b>allocating</b> 106:23 <b>allow</b> 35:14 69:8,21 179:14 180:2 182:11 <b>allowed</b> 62:14 101:2 179:1 <b>allowing</b> 39:12 179:20 180:22 <b>allows</b> 47:16 <b>alluded</b> 180:14 <b>altered</b> 117:20 <b>alternative</b> 13:21 97:12 117:8 160:4 166:11 <b>alternatives</b> 158:18 <b>amend</b> 100:22 101:4 <b>amended</b> 31:13,17 56:4 61:25 76:15 117:20 <b>amendment</b> 29:25	66:15 <b>amendments</b> 22:22 30:7,10,12 44:6 75:14 176:5,17 <b>America</b> 3:16 20:6 24:8,11 35:1 136:14 <b>American</b> 23:25 158:22 159:1 <b>ammunition</b> 155:6 <b>amount</b> 47:14 98:15 135:3 <b>analysis</b> 53:24 59:22 69:22 <b>and/or</b> 5:2 36:23 44:6 49:2 151:16 <b>answer</b> 34:14 37:25 54:17 <b>answering</b> 46:12 <b>answers</b> 51:5 66:19 67:1 118:25 <b>anybody</b> 109:10 123:22 153:22 168:14 182:8 <b>Apart</b> 151:12 <b>apparent</b> 55:15 93:2 110:19 <b>apparently</b> 94:14 <b>appear</b> 73:25 93:5 96:4 109:9 149:24 161:14 168:6 <b>appeared</b> 130:17 <b>appears</b> 70:24 72:16 73:12 127:4 140:12 <b>appendix</b> 1:16,20 <b>applicable</b> 128:15 <b>application</b> 64:25 90:3 128:10 <b>applied</b> 3:18 40:8 56:20,24,25 57:3 57:7 70:20 78:15 92:3 94:24 <b>applies</b> 128:3,11 129:5	<b>apply</b> 23:10 56:23 57:5 88:15 <b>applying</b> 50:15,16 88:1 175:14 <b>appointed</b> 14:19,22 16:20 36:20 <b>apportion</b> 151:5 <b>appreciate</b> 70:13 <b>approach</b> 34:1,3 47:22 49:5,17 50:2,19 54:3 62:8 64:6 65:22 77:22 88:5 96:8 111:1 122:21 129:12 130:15 132:2 133:5 140:14 142:8 166:8 168:3 <b>approached</b> 22:3 <b>appropriate</b> 45:25 47:7,19 52:10,23 53:10 54:23,25 59:6 61:22 90:4 95:3 97:2 110:5 113:1 123:18 139:22 143:24 158:17 167:2,24 171:14 173:14 180:6 181:8 182:23 <b>appropriately</b> 41:3 90:6 <b>appropriateness</b> 35:14,20 36:6 39:12 <b>approval</b> 125:19 139:20 141:4,12 142:1,5,17 143:11 144:14 149:1,4 157:17 160:25 162:8 <b>approve</b> 30:12 47:2 141:6 161:16 <b>approved</b> 20:11 23:8 125:10 126:1 129:1,7 130:6	134:9,10,14,16 141:3 142:23 145:3 150:12 154:10 158:7 162:2,16 <b>approving</b> 17:25 <b>April</b> 1:1,19 99:6,9 <b>archived</b> 163:21,22 <b>area</b> 6:2,7 7:3 8:11 8:15,20 11:6,9,14 31:25 40:9 105:19 112:4 137:2 159:16 171:16 <b>areas</b> 11:2,4,4,16 <b>arena</b> 27:15 36:8 55:20 148:24 149:23 150:20 <b>argue</b> 57:21 72:24 117:7 <b>arisen</b> 141:23 159:9 169:6 <b>arises</b> 92:20 99:18 <b>arising</b> 16:10 141:19 <b>armed</b> 4:8 7:10,14 8:16 10:5 16:5 30:4 39:25 40:4 41:6 42:7 49:22 52:9 54:9,9 70:12 70:14 80:10,18 82:17 99:2 103:8 124:18 128:9 146:12,17 172:13 172:19,22,23 173:5,13,16,19,20 180:19 182:9 <b>armoury</b> 156:25 <b>arranged</b> 22:5 106:16 <b>arrangements</b> 105:23 <b>arranging</b> 103:1,5 <b>arrest</b> 5:2 82:10 166:23,25 167:1 168:8,14 169:23	172:9,10 180:6 <b>arrests</b> 165:25 <b>arrived</b> 64:5 122:18 <b>arsenal</b> 138:5 <b>art</b> 22:8 <b>article</b> 15:23 177:25 <b>articulate</b> 55:16,23 114:18 <b>articulated</b> 56:11 179:10 <b>Arundale</b> 1:4,5,6 1:10 55:8 95:11 126:14 139:21 140:4 182:25 184:5 <b>ARV</b> 170:19 171:7 <b>ARVs</b> 72:11,14 73:21,23 171:1 <b>asked</b> 21:20 22:4 45:23,23 49:7,9 55:16 65:11 84:2 89:6 127:24 129:9 <b>asking</b> 38:24 57:12 72:19 164:1 181:25 <b>aspect</b> 20:10 39:18 58:3 122:8 <b>aspects</b> 28:24 118:5 <b>assertions</b> 166:6 <b>assess</b> 28:12 35:7 35:10 41:4 43:3 61:4 115:20 117:3 117:17 123:3,18 138:19,24 139:2 <b>assessed</b> 18:24 40:9 105:1 121:23 <b>assessing</b> 28:14 35:2 82:22 <b>assessment</b> 29:11 32:3 33:21 43:12 58:11,18 59:21,22 60:2,18 61:7 62:12 64:4 65:10
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



72:2 79:9,15,22 81:20 82:2,14 83:4,10,11,14 85:17 91:4 92:9 93:21 94:2 103:10 107:20 121:17 122:5,5 135:9 175:13,17 176:10 <b>assessments</b> 17:19 17:20 60:7,12,20 60:25 61:18 79:4 83:2,20,23 130:1 <b>assets</b> 61:13 89:21 91:19,20,24 93:14 166:22 <b>assist</b> 41:2 57:1 59:6 64:14 <b>assistant</b> 2:13 7:23 141:18 <b>associated</b> 20:6 21:19 25:25 27:4 28:6 87:22 89:23 111:23 112:1,14 113:11,23 114:3 114:12,21 115:21 116:15 118:13 144:3 181:5 182:17 <b>Association</b> 15:19 <b>associations</b> 25:11 <b>assume</b> 49:9 150:25 <b>assumed</b> 158:17 <b>assumption</b> 169:17 172:20 173:15,17 <b>assumptions</b> 143:24 <b>asthma</b> 139:10 <b>attach</b> 98:22 <b>attached</b> 67:10 179:11 <b>attempt</b> 152:12 155:18 <b>attempted</b> 50:14 <b>attempts</b> 60:24 <b>attend</b> 6:3 96:12,17	97:7 98:13,17 99:10,16 101:19 103:11 105:23 <b>attendance</b> 97:25 101:23 103:1,5,12 107:4 <b>attended</b> 96:5,22 99:2 110:24 120:9 <b>attending</b> 97:3 165:16 <b>attention</b> 37:3 61:22 101:10,13 <b>attenuating</b> 17:4 19:15 136:12 <b>audit</b> 19:4 39:10 68:11 76:21 105:18 142:2,20 143:6 160:12 163:9 176:4,18 <b>auditable</b> 46:3 109:7 150:23 151:9 <b>audited</b> 87:6 <b>author</b> 43:19 44:5 <b>authorisation</b> 12:4 33:18 82:20 124:4 149:16 172:23 <b>authorisations</b> 181:20 <b>authorise</b> 12:12 174:18 <b>authorised</b> 31:17 33:8 72:3,18 116:4 137:4,6 179:14 181:11 <b>authorising</b> 173:5 178:24,25 181:18 <b>authority</b> 15:9 99:20 109:24 116:2 128:5,7 161:19,23 163:17 173:13 174:2 <b>authorship</b> 44:22 <b>automatically</b> 101:15	<b>available</b> 10:4 12:15 19:19,25 20:24 21:14 37:25 60:6 92:7 113:1 120:7 128:4 158:19 159:12 162:3 175:22 <b>average</b> 34:10 130:7 <b>avoid</b> 8:7 50:14 <b>Avon</b> 11:13 <b>awarded</b> 3:14 <b>aware</b> 29:4 37:12 41:21 64:9 72:7 73:23 91:10 97:19 101:22 102:17 106:20 107:2 108:7,11,14 122:16 126:9 132:19,21 140:20 141:2 148:12,22 149:4,6,7,7,8,9,9 149:24 157:4,5,16 158:10 <b>awareness</b> 50:4 107:15 147:17 164:14 <b>always</b> 175:24 <b>awful</b> 75:23 <b>Azelle</b> 53:5	3:22 5:9 35:16 39:8,15 84:19 85:20 <b>bag</b> 78:12 79:2 <b>balance</b> 52:23 69:6 97:16 112:11 119:10 139:18 <b>balanced</b> 116:16 <b>balances</b> 27:4 <b>based</b> 6:9 11:9 26:13,14 55:18 59:25 69:20 79:19 79:24 81:21 84:7 84:24 96:3 166:8 172:20 175:21 176:1 <b>basic</b> 22:14 57:19 63:12 89:17 102:12 110:20 134:3 150:3 151:15,22 152:5 <b>basically</b> 182:6 <b>basis</b> 18:2 36:7 37:3 39:24 55:23 56:5 57:6 60:3,14 79:15 89:6 123:12 138:14 145:18 169:20 179:9 <b>baton</b> 16:12 17:2 <b>beacon</b> 45:18 <b>bear</b> 115:4 <b>bearing</b> 75:8 <b>becoming</b> 15:24 <b>Beer</b> 1:3,4,9,10,10 13:2 28:17 54:23 55:7 95:2,9,10 100:5,6 126:18,24 128:25 139:24 140:3,4,23 144:24 145:1 164:1,3,4 176:15 181:25 182:2,7,22,24 183:2 184:6 <b>beginning</b> 153:5 <b>behalf</b> 1:11 50:12	<b>behaviour</b> 50:25 123:21 <b>beings</b> 161:15 <b>belief</b> 1:24 53:16,18 53:21 143:4 145:9 169:14 <b>beliefs</b> 143:24 <b>believe</b> 2:4 10:16 10:18 115:11 146:12 149:3 154:6 172:18,22 <b>believed</b> 182:10 <b>benefit</b> 40:24 53:9 118:10,20,21 <b>benefits</b> 57:22 111:24,25 112:10 113:8,10,12,15 114:4 115:21 116:11,20,22 158:16 181:3 <b>bespoke</b> 32:4 61:25 116:14 138:12 178:17 <b>best</b> 1:23 63:25 157:6,10 179:10 <b>betray</b> 115:9 <b>better</b> 26:22 123:2 126:13 181:22 <b>beyond</b> 70:20 71:6 81:13 135:23 <b>Bird</b> 29:18 <b>bit</b> 32:18 81:13 171:6 <b>bits</b> 180:14 <b>blame</b> 151:5 <b>blanks</b> 68:2 <b>blue</b> 171:21 <b>bodies</b> 15:8 39:2 132:19 <b>body</b> 18:21 20:8 135:1 152:16 168:25 170:5,10 <b>bolt</b> 10:7 <b>book</b> 69:5 <b>booklet</b> 67:10 76:9
<b>B</b>				
<b>B</b> 31:8,9 162:10 <b>BA</b> 3:8 <b>back</b> 24:12 43:23 44:2,17 46:8 64:20 87:12 88:2 101:24 102:10,16 102:20 103:16 104:5,6,11,22 118:21 122:18 136:3 139:7,8,12 139:13 140:10 154:13 155:11 <b>background</b> 2:6				

<b>books</b> 68:25 69:3,8	<b>buildings</b> 145:12	<b>carefully</b> 36:5	<b>central</b> 39:2 124:9	183:3
<b>Boothtown</b> 179:21	<b>bulk</b> 108:3	38:19 41:23	149:4	<b>chairman's</b> 144:16
<b>borders</b> 8:13	<b>bullets</b> 16:13	109:13 146:24	<b>centrally</b> 127:10	<b>challenge</b> 30:16
<b>bore</b> 89:5	<b>bundle</b> 18:6 58:23	<b>carried</b> 60:18 71:21	<b>centre</b> 8:21,21,22	47:4 52:11,23
<b>boxes</b> 127:3	126:15 175:5	83:20 162:8	8:25 9:1,20,21	53:4
<b>branch</b> 15:18 19:1	<b>burglaries</b> 11:11	<b>carries</b> 116:10,14	152:18,22	<b>challenged</b> 46:22
24:25 132:23	<b>business</b> 40:10	147:6	<b>centres</b> 8:23 15:25	46:22,23
135:18 150:2	<b>busy</b> 171:22	<b>carry</b> 10:14 37:23	<b>Centrex</b> 153:4	<b>challenges</b> 8:15
<b>breach</b> 36:10	<b>buy</b> 170:20 171:7	61:17 89:6 100:25	<b>certain</b> 30:17 55:17	57:5 137:19
119:13,13		102:8 139:6	55:17 66:18,18	165:11
<b>breaches</b> 121:19	<b>C</b>	<b>carrying</b> 50:11	155:8 164:16	<b>challenging</b> 94:10
122:2	<b>C</b> 117:13	165:18	166:1 167:19	107:22,24
<b>breaching</b> 121:4,9	<b>cadre</b> 7:3,6	<b>cars</b> 12:10 171:21	179:1,15 180:2	<b>change</b> 17:12
<b>break</b> 139:22	<b>cake</b> 135:1	180:23	<b>certainly</b> 5:8 6:14	111:16 117:18,19
<b>breaking</b> 82:7	<b>call</b> 167:19 169:21	<b>cartridge</b> 135:4	13:4 40:10,16	132:7 135:7 146:7
<b>breathing</b> 139:16	172:6	<b>case</b> 4:17 30:21	56:16 62:15 63:6	175:16 176:7,19
139:16	<b>called</b> 62:12 170:6	41:12 43:15 47:9	69:17 98:20	<b>changed</b> 76:14 98:1
<b>Brian</b> 53:2	170:8,11 172:9	49:3,10 61:15	102:24 112:2	106:10 111:6
<b>brief</b> 160:20	<b>Cambridge</b> 3:20	66:14 70:9,19	123:11 146:20	141:1 153:8
<b>briefed</b> 15:11	<b>Canadian</b> 158:23	78:16,22 83:9	147:15 154:7	<b>changes</b> 15:12
<b>briefing</b> 42:4 43:1	<b>canister</b> 138:22	102:9 104:8	156:10 168:4	43:11 96:23 97:19
43:20 44:9,12	146:14 155:16	110:10 112:17	174:3	111:8,11,15
57:14,20 63:3,10	<b>canisters</b> 140:10	132:2 136:8,15	<b>cetera</b> 142:2	176:11
65:21 76:2 79:25	<b>capabilities</b> 12:20	151:9 152:4	<b>CFI</b> 36:24 71:21,22	<b>changing</b> 8:5
80:9,17 111:12	116:24	164:23 165:9	72:23 73:8 74:3	164:15,25
144:10 173:20	<b>capability</b> 9:24	167:6 179:18	74:13 99:22,23	<b>channel</b> 77:3,7
<b>briefings</b> 57:12,18	10:3,6,14 12:13	180:13	101:14,16,16,18	<b>chapter</b> 30:17 78:9
60:8 61:19 64:3,7	12:24 13:3,6,12	<b>cases</b> 33:22	101:21,22 103:4	<b>charge</b> 5:2 143:16
80:8,16,19 81:1,7	13:19 33:12 35:12	<b>cashpoint</b> 11:11,12	103:10,24 106:16	177:15
130:12	41:4 43:4,12	11:24	121:1 132:10	<b>Charles</b> 29:17
<b>briefly</b> 3:7	91:19 116:10	<b>cashpoints</b> 11:19	<b>chaired</b> 163:1	81:16
<b>bring</b> 91:20 115:4	<b>capable</b> 68:11	11:20	<b>chairman</b> 1:3,6	<b>check</b> 112:11 121:4
125:15	135:21 137:13	<b>CAST</b> 140:18	12:18 13:1 14:24	<b>checked</b> 143:18
<b>bringing</b> 4:17 27:9	148:1 175:18	155:15 156:1	15:3,15 17:3	<b>checking</b> 143:19
152:1	<b>capturing</b> 69:3	161:3	25:14,21 28:4	<b>checks</b> 27:4
<b>broad</b> 62:3 65:22	114:4 118:22	<b>catch</b> 168:18	54:5,25 55:6 95:4	<b>chemical</b> 20:2
84:24	163:9	182:14	95:9 100:4 119:2	23:11 136:1,1,23
<b>broken</b> 37:15	<b>car</b> 164:17 165:14	<b>catching</b> 25:24	126:17,23 128:24	137:1,2,4 156:24
<b>bronze</b> 5:15,21	165:16 168:24	<b>caught</b> 171:17	139:23 140:3	157:12 161:8,16
<b>brought</b> 16:23	171:9 179:21	<b>causal</b> 98:21	143:1 144:23,25	<b>Cheshire</b> 72:11
23:22 24:19 36:22	<b>Cardiff</b> 4:7 6:8,10	<b>cause</b> 74:4 144:5	152:14 157:19	73:20,23
36:24 37:3,21	<b>career</b> 6:1 7:2,19	<b>caused</b> 18:23	162:25 163:15,22	<b>Chesterman</b> 26:12
61:21 101:10,13	51:12	<b>caution</b> 49:24	164:3 171:6	31:2 92:16 157:15
<b>building</b> 4:17 84:4	<b>careful</b> 50:7 80:2	<b>caveat</b> 108:21	176:14 177:8	<b>chief</b> 2:13,16,19,21
163:11	87:25	<b>cent</b> 89:15	181:25 182:5,24	7:23 13:23 14:1

15:19 24:13,20 36:23 37:1,18 46:20 47:9 86:10 86:13 101:10 102:2,23,25 103:16 105:13 106:11,22 108:21 110:7 111:10,13 121:25 122:4 141:15,18,21,24 142:21 143:12,16 148:17 150:21,24 151:13 162:17,24 162:25 163:1,1,2 163:3 167:8 <b>child</b> 134:25 <b>children</b> 139:11 <b>choice</b> 9:15 <b>chosen</b> 32:20 <b>chronicle</b> 130:20 <b>chronology</b> 140:23 <b>circles</b> 127:18 144:7 <b>circulars</b> 148:13 <b>circulated</b> 132:16 146:3 163:15 <b>circumstance</b> 117:18 176:12 <b>circumstances</b> 35:11 53:17 79:19 82:9 87:19 113:19 123:16 128:5 129:25 138:23 139:2 182:19 <b>city</b> 4:7,10 <b>Civil</b> 26:13 <b>claims</b> 134:4,7,19 134:24 135:5,11 <b>clarity</b> 176:8 177:15 <b>Clark</b> 102:3 <b>Clark's</b> 102:7 <b>class</b> 19:5 136:3 <b>classified</b> 120:25 <b>classify</b> 51:7	<b>clear</b> 19:4 41:15 43:10 51:5 66:5 67:11,13,20 73:3 74:6 76:21 93:22 98:13 105:18 106:8,12 113:9 120:14,21 121:2 127:20 142:23 146:12,17 147:12 158:3 159:23 160:5 166:17 167:16 177:12 178:23 179:13 180:20,20 182:3 <b>clearing</b> 30:9 <b>clearly</b> 17:6 18:20 19:18 30:6,13 33:5 43:19 44:16 45:8 47:6 49:9 52:14 54:16 58:14 64:9 66:4 75:11 79:18 82:23 110:6 116:18 117:21 118:18 123:4 127:19 133:18 134:9 149:20 163:23 168:9,11 168:14 179:25 180:15 181:10 <b>close</b> 182:15 <b>closed</b> 156:14 <b>coaching</b> 88:22 <b>code</b> 21:22 23:5,7 24:18 26:21 36:20 124:7,12,19 125:7 125:9,13,18 126:3 126:10,20,25 128:3,10,15,20 129:4 131:25 133:2 135:13 140:15,21 142:14 143:11 147:1,2,5 149:12,16,20 151:13 161:22,24 <b>codes</b> 158:8	<b>coffee</b> 170:20 171:8 <b>cognitive</b> 35:25 <b>collation</b> 39:19 <b>collect</b> 138:3 <b>collective</b> 79:4 82:4 82:18 83:11 <b>college</b> 18:5 34:17 34:20 152:17 <b>colloquially</b> 16:12 <b>colour</b> 127:3 <b>column</b> 66:10 <b>columns</b> 67:22 <b>combination</b> 42:21 77:20 <b>combined</b> 33:16 59:4,9 <b>come</b> 22:10 26:8 46:8 87:18 95:23 121:10 134:16 139:7,8,12 153:2 174:13 <b>comes</b> 67:18 92:22 133:14 179:25 <b>comfortable</b> 67:5 <b>coming</b> 24:3,12 136:3 158:9 <b>command</b> 11:3 14:1 16:4 26:19 28:8 29:1 30:3 32:20 34:19 35:17 47:24 57:7 71:16 81:20 84:25 89:17 89:24 96:5,18 106:20 108:19 112:12 124:19 176:7,20 180:4 <b>commanded</b> 6:22 10:10 11:14 12:2 70:12 <b>commander</b> 5:11 5:15,21 6:18,23 8:1,2,6,7 14:10 34:10,19,19 36:12 74:24 75:1 84:23 85:18,25 90:20	92:22 94:14 95:13 112:12 166:23 169:17 170:24 178:24 179:13 180:21,25 181:1 181:17,21 182:20 <b>commanders</b> 9:3 14:11,13 27:3 28:9,13,14,17,18 28:20 29:12 35:9 36:15 41:18 42:3 42:24 43:2 47:15 49:25 50:5 51:19 51:23 52:21 55:15 57:10 60:15 61:3 61:7 63:10 66:8 68:13 76:4 77:1 112:16 113:9 114:20 116:19 168:24,25 169:20 170:5 175:10 <b>commanding</b> 11:15 32:7,12,16,19 34:2 <b>commenced</b> 140:24 <b>commensurate</b> 91:6 134:21 <b>comment</b> 172:17 <b>commentator's</b> 85:2 <b>commentators</b> 74:11 <b>comments</b> 30:10 49:17 52:4 100:21 <b>commercially</b> 19:25 20:24 21:14 <b>commission</b> 15:10 16:20 19:2 24:16 <b>commissioner</b> 29:20 <b>commit</b> 165:17 166:4 179:23 180:19 182:10 <b>committed</b> 89:15 169:19 170:13	171:3 <b>committee</b> 15:18 16:19 24:20,23 <b>committing</b> 11:5,10 168:19 <b>common</b> 23:23 38:12 62:11 63:24 65:7,13 66:24 81:2,10,13 92:18 102:19 130:9 132:12 164:21 177:22,24 <b>commonly</b> 30:2 <b>communicate</b> 61:18 <b>communicated</b> 46:11 65:10 <b>communicating</b> 77:4,8 79:12 111:14 <b>communication</b> 60:7 77:3 94:1 105:5,8 106:13 148:23 <b>communications</b> 123:8 136:20,24 146:21 155:19 <b>community</b> 139:8 151:2 <b>comparabilities</b> 93:15 <b>comparatively</b> 12:14 <b>compared</b> 21:10 33:22 174:3 <b>comparison</b> 89:4,7 <b>compactly</b> 101:25 <b>competence</b> 95:12 101:12 112:4 117:5 <b>competency</b> 84:10 89:17,22 116:3 <b>competent</b> 85:4,17 92:8 96:7 100:24
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

107:13 110:23 111:22 114:13 115:19 117:11,22 118:5 119:9,19 120:4,15,22 121:8 <b>competing</b> 77:23 <b>compilation</b> 42:10 44:5 <b>compiled</b> 43:10,15 43:16 76:7 <b>Complaints</b> 15:8 15:10 <b>complete</b> 17:16 44:20 66:25 67:24 175:23 <b>completed</b> 67:4,13 69:18 143:8,15 <b>completely</b> 16:25 90:1,15 106:3 109:4 137:10 169:22,23,24 <b>completion</b> 67:9 <b>complex</b> 28:8 131:15 141:5 <b>complexities</b> 51:8 <b>compliance</b> 40:17 72:9 96:16 <b>comply</b> 111:19 <b>complying</b> 15:25 <b>component</b> 33:20 37:16 56:17 57:19 122:7 162:12 177:10 <b>components</b> 18:25 <b>composed</b> 129:18 <b>comprehensive</b> 26:17 70:11 75:17 76:11 <b>comprehensively</b> 71:1 <b>computerised</b> 75:24 <b>conceal</b> 152:12 155:18 <b>concealing</b> 154:15	<b>concepts</b> 177:3 <b>concern</b> 53:8 74:4 81:21 149:14 169:12 <b>concerned</b> 24:5 38:20 89:11,13 130:14 138:12,18 <b>concerning</b> 42:9 48:22 49:1 130:21 140:6 149:20 161:12,13 164:6 <b>concerns</b> 64:10 170:23 <b>conclude</b> 73:14 119:18 120:13 121:7 155:2 <b>concluded</b> 115:7 <b>concludes</b> 42:9 <b>conclusion</b> 73:8,12 74:14 87:18 100:22 101:4 107:10 121:10 150:1 155:10 168:3 174:23 <b>conclusions</b> 53:4 85:3 95:24 124:9 156:9,10 <b>concurred</b> 121:24 <b>condition</b> 35:11 162:10 <b>conditions</b> 127:21 162:11 <b>conduct</b> 48:23 60:11,20 79:3 166:22 171:23 <b>conducted</b> 85:19 115:6 <b>conducting</b> 80:8,16 81:1 89:2 <b>conference</b> 153:15 <b>conferences</b> 25:14 111:13 130:12 146:22 <b>conferring</b> 30:19 <b>confidence</b> 36:14	86:3 107:14 <b>conflict</b> 55:21 56:7 56:12 57:17 69:15 88:16 89:24 90:7 90:10,13,17,20,25 91:9 92:1 93:17 94:19,20,22 <b>confront</b> 84:2 <b>confronted</b> 41:6 <b>confusion</b> 8:7 <b>conjunction</b> 5:3 <b>conscious</b> 40:6 49:17 50:3 52:4 52:19 114:5 <b>consent</b> 141:8,12 <b>consequences</b> 59:24 86:1,17 119:13,15 <b>consider</b> 36:5 38:7 38:17 49:15 64:5 65:7 86:16 97:17 100:23 102:21 105:15 139:9 140:5 141:15,17 152:7 155:2 169:25 173:2 <b>considerable</b> 53:7 131:7 <b>considerably</b> 77:21 77:22 <b>consideration</b> 53:3 53:23 86:8,21 87:1,17 98:7 103:17 109:7 117:2 122:10 159:14 166:10 <b>considerations</b> 71:1 82:21 97:10 133:23 142:18 178:5 180:8 <b>considered</b> 12:8,11 38:19 39:9,11 70:23 71:9 73:23 86:4,6 88:20 92:3 93:23 97:11 99:18	99:19,25 101:7,11 103:24 109:13 113:1 117:9 122:13 123:23 157:20 159:10 162:2 167:22 <b>considering</b> 53:17 98:10 117:24 123:22 <b>consist</b> 135:16 <b>consistency</b> 42:23 108:17 <b>consistent</b> 135:6 <b>consistently</b> 107:13 <b>consists</b> 43:8 <b>conspiracy</b> 166:4 180:19 <b>constable</b> 2:13,16 2:19,21 7:23 13:24 14:2 37:1 57:5 141:18 150:21,24 163:2 <b>Constabulary</b> 21:21 22:4 25:4 26:13 163:18 <b>constantly</b> 58:10 115:20 117:3,17 <b>constitute</b> 154:1 <b>constituted</b> 86:8 <b>constraints</b> 24:4 177:17 179:16 181:19 <b>consult</b> 154:11 161:19 <b>consultancy</b> 2:25 <b>consultation</b> 135:14 162:7 <b>consulted</b> 29:5 38:20 124:25 <b>contact</b> 15:5 98:15 147:19 150:3 162:4 <b>contacted</b> 155:14 <b>contain</b> 44:17 100:16 175:15	<b>contained</b> 29:6 66:10 97:9,23 122:25 135:3 160:25 161:18 <b>containing</b> 1:12 <b>contains</b> 68:10 <b>contemporaneous</b> 69:12 75:5 141:11 <b>contemporaneou...</b> 75:22 <b>content</b> 21:1 29:11 73:11 80:9,17 92:5 110:24 <b>contentious</b> 55:19 102:22 137:2 <b>contents</b> 1:23 15:7 27:6 28:11 29:4 61:23 85:24 86:2 104:2 105:6,14 122:16 124:13 144:9 <b>context</b> 4:24 42:6 60:21 63:21 70:8 74:19 79:6 81:14 81:20 116:3 121:12 142:12 164:8,10,25 169:3 169:10,14 172:2 172:12 <b>continent</b> 159:1 <b>contingencies</b> 74:12 112:25 118:1 177:4 <b>contingency</b> 72:13 73:22 112:19 173:20 <b>continually</b> 58:4 138:4 <b>continue</b> 9:17 14:1 36:4 37:8 39:13 71:18 <b>continued</b> 92:21 101:12 121:18 138:5 <b>continuing</b> 35:4,14
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

38:4 127:9	12:10,20 27:19,20	168:7	<b>critique</b> 39:7	<b>cycle</b> 58:9
<b>continuity</b> 26:22	27:23 28:16 29:7	<b>cover</b> 63:23 163:10	<b>crop</b> 36:19	<b>cypher</b> 84:18
<b>continuous</b> 58:9,18	<b>country</b> 9:2 11:10	<b>covered</b> 7:3 31:20	<b>cross-border</b> 32:21	
93:20 135:9	28:9,15 69:4	<b>covering</b> 7:4	<b>Crown</b> 4:20 5:4	<b>D</b>
<b>continuously</b> 42:25	130:17 134:20	<b>covers</b> 67:12	<b>CS</b> 20:2,23 21:5	<b>D</b> 184:3
<b>contract</b> 133:16	<b>Countrywide</b> 13:2	<b>CPS</b> 4:17 165:24	135:3 137:5,6	<b>daily</b> 5:7,8 6:14
<b>contribute</b> 107:17	<b>couple</b> 133:7	166:6,18	138:22 141:2	57:5
<b>contributing</b> 126:6	<b>course</b> 21:17 29:1,3	<b>CPS's</b> 49:3	148:1 156:12	<b>danger</b> 51:2 53:11
<b>contributors</b> 110:7	29:4 32:23 34:7	<b>CQC</b> 107:19,25	157:24 159:5	134:25
<b>control</b> 24:19 47:25	35:3,10 36:8	<b>create</b> 149:15	<b>CSDC</b> 23:13 120:8	<b>dangerous</b> 20:4,14
108:19 124:20	37:10 38:3,5	169:13	120:16,23 124:5	51:4 108:5 121:21
179:2 181:7	45:20 48:17 57:11	<b>creation</b> 47:11	124:11 130:22	122:3
<b>controlled</b> 44:4	64:11 86:12 87:21	<b>credibility</b> 35:8	140:7,10,12,25	<b>dangers</b> 20:11
146:24	88:8,12,13,15,17	36:13 47:17 92:21	141:7 142:9	114:3 118:13
<b>controversial</b>	89:4 91:17 92:8,9	<b>crime</b> 4:2,7,12 11:1	144:14 145:3,4,9	138:19 139:17
131:15	92:13 93:2,6,16	11:5,5,8,15,16	146:19 147:13	<b>data</b> 69:22 138:3
<b>conurbation</b> 8:13	94:10 95:21 96:2	13:18 114:6	150:8,22 152:12	<b>database</b> 152:8
<b>conurbations</b> 6:11	96:21 97:4,4 98:3	152:21	154:1,2,15,25	153:10,13,21
<b>conventional</b> 16:17	98:4,14 99:16,17	<b>criminal</b> 3:11 29:8	155:16,18,23	154:6,7,17 155:9
131:16	100:9,11,15,15,17	77:24 94:11	156:7,17,20	<b>date</b> 44:5 58:20
<b>conversation</b> 140:8	100:20 101:6,17	113:17,17 114:2	157:17,22 159:25	148:25
<b>conversations</b>	102:4,11 103:11	118:21 171:23	160:7,10,13,20,25	<b>dated</b> 1:18 47:23
131:19	103:22 104:3,6,14	178:21,22 179:14	161:21 162:3,8,15	48:14 71:22
<b>convert</b> 181:17	104:24 105:4,6,10	180:2,16,18 181:5	164:5	<b>Davies</b> 18:4 141:16
<b>converted</b> 44:15	106:23 107:5,19	182:12	<b>CSDCs</b> 120:10	141:21,24 142:22
<b>conveyed</b> 23:19	109:3,19,20	<b>criminality</b> 165:19	<b>CTSFO</b> 95:21	143:2,7,16 148:17
<b>conveys</b> 65:17	110:24 120:19	171:18,25	<b>Culcheth</b> 93:25	<b>Davies's</b> 18:7
<b>conviction</b> 41:16	121:6 122:16,17	<b>criminals</b> 118:17	165:14 168:8,12	<b>day</b> 7:5 25:22 26:1
<b>coordinate</b> 21:21	123:9 124:12	171:16 178:25	169:15,17 177:21	45:15,15 75:15
<b>coordinated</b> 127:10	141:23 142:12	<b>criminology</b> 3:11	182:10	96:6,12 107:16
<b>coordination</b> 89:19	145:8 147:5 158:6	3:19	<b>culture</b> 147:10	171:11,19,25
<b>copied</b> 67:10	164:4 171:10,25	<b>criteria</b> 46:25 57:2	<b>Cumbria</b> 29:17,22	172:9 183:6
<b>core</b> 6:6 56:17	172:8	65:16 89:23 92:14	<b>cups</b> 170:20 171:7	<b>day's</b> 98:17
90:17 94:23 97:1	<b>courses</b> 9:15 34:20	110:3 154:22	<b>current</b> 41:1 99:21	<b>day-to-day</b> 89:6
122:7	55:17 98:24	159:13 173:4,12	106:8	<b>daybook</b> 67:5,7,9
<b>coroner's</b> 81:16	100:14 101:6,23	173:21 174:4	<b>currently</b> 26:13	76:4
<b>correct</b> 2:9 5:12	103:2,5 106:20	<b>critical</b> 32:7,7	61:8	<b>daybooks</b> 68:6
6:19 8:9 10:9	107:4 108:13	35:17,18 63:15	<b>curriculum</b> 27:13	<b>days</b> 26:3 106:5
16:6 18:13 87:4	<b>court</b> 4:18 19:7	97:18 98:19	61:24 110:21,23	134:23
95:22 103:4	53:15	105:17 106:7	111:6,8,11,15,20	<b>de</b> 29:17 81:16
149:14 162:21	<b>courtesy</b> 151:15,23	163:24 168:16	112:5	<b>deal</b> 6:3 10:24
<b>correspondence</b>	152:5	170:23	<b>cursor</b> 146:3	13:21 38:24 61:14
148:24	<b>courts</b> 3:5	<b>criticism</b> 70:20	150:3	62:1 84:17 142:21
<b>costly</b> 17:24	<b>Cousen</b> 41:12	71:7 168:17	<b>custom</b> 45:12 68:8	171:2
<b>counter</b> 7:11,13	81:19 82:22 168:4	<b>criticisms</b> 169:24	<b>CV</b> 84:24	<b>dealing</b> 25:24 26:3

51:3 59:20 71:24 74:20 105:18 <b>dealings</b> 26:6 <b>dealt</b> 45:8 64:18 78:8 86:23 <b>death</b> 20:6 65:12 141:24 144:3 <b>deaths</b> 16:11 81:14 <b>debates</b> 133:21 <b>debriefs</b> 32:25 50:4 <b>decade</b> 153:6 <b>December</b> 22:25 98:25 <b>decided</b> 24:18 71:14 77:13 <b>deciding</b> 38:3 82:17 112:13 <b>decision</b> 3:1 4:25 19:5 33:21 34:9 36:21 37:20 39:4 47:19 51:14 55:9 55:11,22,23,25 56:5 57:1 58:3,8 58:14,18 61:9 63:15 68:10,22 69:15,19 71:16 74:12 75:6,10,14 78:14 79:16,24 84:6 86:23,24 87:3,6 88:2,8 89:1 90:18 91:6,14 93:20 94:23 103:14 104:8,9 106:4 109:13 110:2 112:18 114:24,25 116:6 116:21 118:7 122:14 123:18,23 131:15 143:23 144:13 150:22 151:9,17 154:4 155:23 156:24 158:9 160:20 161:20 163:5 166:22 169:4	172:13 173:14 174:18,19,23 175:14 <b>decision-making</b> 56:13 112:12 <b>decisions</b> 16:23 37:14 39:2,6 51:17,24 55:17,19 57:8,13,24 58:19 65:12 68:14 69:12 70:4,5,25 71:11 72:15 75:15,22 76:20 79:9,18 81:21 87:14 94:8 110:6 115:1 122:11 147:24 148:3 163:7,10,12 163:24 174:4,21 <b>decisions'</b> 89:3 <b>declare</b> 154:11 <b>dedicated</b> 7:6 9:24 12:24 <b>deemed</b> 37:7 61:22 78:6 <b>defence</b> 119:1 135:24 <b>define</b> 61:10 <b>defined</b> 83:13 175:20 <b>definition</b> 60:25 61:5 64:21 126:11 <b>definitive</b> 19:3 29:25 38:15 <b>degree</b> 53:17 <b>degrees</b> 93:3 <b>delay</b> 166:24 167:23 <b>delegated</b> 6:3 <b>deliberate</b> 61:8 <b>deliver</b> 7:7 9:17 10:13 12:17 13:11 20:22 27:2 45:21 117:6 177:13 180:18 <b>delivered</b> 12:20	27:1 29:8 98:11 112:3 136:6 157:22 179:17 <b>delivering</b> 20:2 50:12 121:18 170:22 178:14 <b>delivers</b> 116:9 158:20 <b>delivery</b> 137:7 158:6 <b>demanding</b> 88:13 89:4 <b>demands</b> 17:22 <b>demonstrate</b> 32:9 154:22 <b>demonstrates</b> 71:13 <b>demonstrating</b> 90:10 <b>depart</b> 171:18 <b>departments</b> 132:18 <b>depending</b> 86:14 <b>depends</b> 65:20 163:19 <b>deploy</b> 9:23 12:11 28:20 33:15 112:16 141:2 161:21 166:22 169:4 172:13 173:13 174:2,23 <b>deployed</b> 28:11 35:1 89:16 116:16 137:13 144:10 161:9 169:1 <b>deploying</b> 138:1 156:12 180:9,9 182:18 <b>deployment</b> 12:4 16:4 30:4 33:9,9 33:12,18 41:2,24 42:6 50:22 54:9 56:21 72:4,21 80:23 82:17 103:8 104:11 112:22,23	113:15 114:23 115:18 116:14 118:2 136:23 137:16 141:7 144:1,5 172:24 173:5,19 174:9 <b>deployments</b> 6:13 6:23 28:5 32:24 33:1 39:25 40:5 70:10,13,14 89:7 90:19 114:19 124:18 <b>depth</b> 146:4 <b>deputy</b> 2:16 37:1 99:22 <b>Derek</b> 29:18 <b>describe</b> 8:10 56:19 120:5 176:22 <b>described</b> 4:16 9:9 9:11,25 110:22 128:6 132:10 165:6 169:9 <b>design</b> 19:21 21:9 21:18 66:14,17 <b>designation</b> 166:20 <b>designed</b> 17:5 66:25 68:25 69:3 75:19 180:17 <b>desire</b> 26:22 78:3 <b>desired</b> 178:20 180:16 <b>despite</b> 96:4 166:6 <b>detail</b> 31:3 40:17 42:3 46:8 61:10 67:7,19 93:24 127:15 <b>detailed</b> 17:23 40:6 44:12,19 126:2 133:4 <b>details</b> 86:12 100:14 <b>detective</b> 4:5 <b>determine</b> 5:1 53:15 78:8 105:14 148:7 180:1	<b>determined</b> 136:21 <b>determining</b> 59:6 109:24 <b>develop</b> 19:17 21:4 21:9,13 28:9 39:3 60:2 110:3 159:15 175:10 182:21 <b>developed</b> 21:6 25:16 55:21 175:12 <b>development</b> 14:14 15:13 16:25 19:1 23:16 24:25 30:23 85:18 92:25 127:9 129:10 130:14 131:14 132:22 135:18 150:2,6 151:25 <b>developments</b> 15:12 150:14 <b>develops</b> 178:4 <b>device</b> 120:16 125:8 139:4 140:13 142:24 151:24 152:1 159:25 163:12 <b>devices</b> 125:25 155:7 <b>devoted</b> 25:23 <b>DI</b> 41:12 81:19 168:4,7 <b>differ</b> 59:11 <b>difference</b> 67:2 137:9,11 <b>different</b> 10:6 12:22 32:2 33:5,6 34:1,2,3,5,10 44:9 45:9 46:13 47:15 57:21 68:7 69:7 78:13 79:5 81:23 82:1 83:1,8 84:9 87:14,18 88:14 104:25 121:10 122:12 124:3 127:23 137:7,7,10
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

158:6,8,12,12 167:13 170:19,21 172:11,11 173:21 <b>differently</b> 97:11 <b>differs</b> 74:10 <b>difficult</b> 12:10 31:10 32:18 49:12 51:18 52:17,22 53:13 114:5 177:2 <b>difficulties</b> 90:2,24 <b>difficulty</b> 18:19 46:12 61:15 89:19 90:9 97:3 <b>dig</b> 11:24 <b>diggers</b> 11:21 <b>digressing</b> 167:6 <b>diligence</b> 151:16 152:6 <b>dimensions</b> 114:18 <b>dimethyldichloro</b> 161:9 <b>DIP</b> 20:19 <b>diploma</b> 3:18 <b>direct</b> 43:2,23 104:10,22 111:9 126:4 142:12 175:11 <b>directed</b> 162:7 <b>directing</b> 59:5 <b>direction</b> 126:4 177:17 <b>directive</b> 148:13 <b>directly</b> 35:22 46:12 49:13 80:9 80:17 81:3 103:16 106:17 142:8 144:13 <b>director</b> 163:4 <b>disagree</b> 30:15 166:13 167:25 <b>disasters</b> 57:4 <b>discharge</b> 57:24 79:10 118:6 <b>discharged</b> 118:19 <b>discharging</b> 15:21	121:4 148:1 <b>discipline</b> 36:10 39:21 40:3 <b>disclose</b> 87:23 <b>disclosed</b> 35:16 36:7 48:11,15,19 86:18 130:20 156:1 <b>disclosure</b> 48:18 86:2 87:20 154:1 155:11 156:23 <b>discourage</b> 53:9 <b>discover</b> 157:12 <b>discovered</b> 157:1 <b>discriminating</b> 20:19 148:2 <b>discussed</b> 29:2 163:19 <b>discussing</b> 150:18 <b>discussion</b> 60:22 67:16 <b>discussions</b> 130:16 132:12 148:3 153:14 168:6 <b>disguise</b> 152:12 <b>dismissive</b> 142:6 <b>dispersal</b> 146:14 <b>display</b> 89:22 <b>disregard</b> 69:14 <b>disrupt</b> 169:1 172:10 <b>disruption</b> 169:21 169:25 170:6,11 170:18,22 171:4 <b>dissection</b> 53:8 <b>disseminated</b> 148:13 <b>dissemination</b> 39:19 <b>distance</b> 20:23 <b>distinction</b> 40:2 41:11 <b>diverse</b> 93:13 <b>divorce</b> 177:3 <b>doctrine</b> 124:17	<b>document</b> 18:4 22:11,19,22 27:12 30:1 43:1,9,14,17 43:22,22 44:4,9 44:12,23 45:2 46:4 47:3,11,13 65:8 67:12,24 74:3 76:2 92:11 102:17 147:6 <b>documentary</b> 62:17 <b>documentation</b> 8:4 70:10 77:1 92:13 138:11,17 139:5 155:5,14 160:25 <b>documented</b> 39:9 71:2,22 86:20 87:1 105:16 143:5 151:3 159:10 <b>documents</b> 1:13 18:7 20:14,18 44:10 46:9 47:17 65:5 67:4,9 73:11 140:6 162:19 <b>doing</b> 2:24,25 135:21 146:1 158:1 170:15,16 <b>domain</b> 27:10 31:6 31:11 <b>domestic</b> 22:13 <b>DOMILL</b> 132:8,16 <b>DOMILL's</b> 132:14 <b>door</b> 154:13 155:11 <b>doors</b> 156:14 <b>doubt</b> 143:9 <b>downside</b> 39:11 116:21 170:17 172:1,1 181:3 <b>downsides</b> 131:22 170:15,16 <b>draft</b> 38:14 <b>drafted</b> 22:18 145:13 <b>drafting</b> 22:9 23:4 125:6 126:7 <b>draw</b> 41:23 133:15	156:9 <b>drawing</b> 41:8,11 42:5 50:21 93:5 138:10 <b>drawn</b> 64:21 94:5 123:8 <b>drew</b> 48:14 156:10 <b>driven</b> 12:9 58:8 <b>driver</b> 125:17 <b>drivers</b> 125:14 <b>driving</b> 51:24 94:22 178:8 <b>DSTL</b> 132:7 135:24 <b>due</b> 50:24 60:19 62:7 63:19 102:4 103:17 107:5 151:15 152:5 <b>duration</b> 56:24 <b>duties</b> 36:4 85:4 86:22 101:2 109:4 118:6 121:22 <b>duty</b> 13:14 54:8,15 147:8 <b>Dyfed-Powys</b> 2:19 2:22 13:24 14:11 14:15 31:21 <b>dynamic</b> 53:23 75:12 113:24 175:18 176:11	<b>edge</b> 11:10 <b>effect</b> 18:21 22:24 66:6 92:7 112:11 152:10 167:1 <b>effective</b> 16:16 21:10 36:15 90:10 175:11 176:7 <b>effectively</b> 17:5 21:4 27:1,5,22 31:10 32:19 36:10 44:4 56:25 70:11 94:21 97:13 152:18 153:7 160:20 161:5 173:20 <b>effectiveness</b> 35:8 92:21 <b>effects</b> 109:18 161:14,17 <b>either</b> 30:13 31:25 111:6 157:16 <b>elderly</b> 139:11 <b>electricity</b> 18:21 <b>electronic</b> 111:9 <b>element</b> 29:8 82:21 106:2 107:25 <b>elements</b> 90:1,6 136:18 <b>Ellison</b> 46:20 47:9 66:22 <b>email</b> 48:10 103:19 105:2 141:10 150:21 <b>emails</b> 104:13 <b>embarked</b> 21:3 <b>embarrassing</b> 87:21 <b>embedded</b> 56:13,15 56:17 <b>emerged</b> 56:8 <b>emergency</b> 28:7 <b>emerging</b> 147:20 <b>emphasis</b> 43:1 <b>emphasised</b> 62:5 <b>enable</b> 83:13 166:3
<b>E</b>				
E 113:3 184:3 E7's 53:3 <b>earlier</b> 88:3 98:4,7 100:13,21 104:15 109:23 115:12 117:13 121:12 140:15 162:15 <b>earliest</b> 175:10 <b>early</b> 5:21 89:16 100:10 102:10 106:5 134:23 168:5 <b>easily</b> 51:5 <b>easy</b> 39:5,6				

<b>encouragement</b> 52:10	107:23 108:5 158:12	<b>event</b> 93:10 105:10 120:8	42:2,5 43:21 45:1 45:20 46:20 54:21	<b>expected</b> 49:21 100:25 104:5
<b>encourages</b> 82:2	<b>environments</b> 29:13	<b>events</b> 34:15,16 68:23 91:10 93:4	61:1,21 67:6 73:17 77:23 78:23	105:7 106:11 119:5 149:22
<b>endangering</b> 168:19	<b>envisage</b> 121:21 152:4	102:13 103:20,21 133:3 150:6	112:13 132:14 133:9 134:22,23	<b>expenditure</b> 163:24
<b>ends</b> 44:25	<b>equipment</b> 11:21 13:9 18:23,24	<b>eventually</b> 17:24 21:7	135:17 136:12,18 138:21 140:14	<b>expense</b> 13:19 166:10
<b>energy</b> 17:4 19:15 136:12	24:7,12 114:12 115:4,22 116:21	<b>everybody</b> 108:2 148:24	172:6 178:19 180:12	<b>expensive</b> 13:8 133:20
<b>enforcement</b> 10:17 19:13 136:7 137:3	116:23 129:18 132:24 133:14	<b>everyday</b> 39:4 176:25	<b>examples</b> 11:7 24:10	<b>experience</b> 3:24 4:16 5:9 34:11
138:6 145:5,10 153:18	134:11,15,17 137:12,21 138:12	<b>evidence</b> 3:3 5:2 16:23 33:23 40:25	<b>exceedingly</b> 53:13 <b>excellence</b> 9:1,21	35:2 39:16 41:9 41:20 42:5,18
<b>engage</b> 165:18	138:18,20 139:9 139:14 144:5	41:16 42:1 46:10 47:5 62:6 63:22	15:25 45:18 152:18,22	43:6 59:4,9,13,16 59:17 61:2 66:24
<b>engaged</b> 114:6 123:21 146:1	147:20 158:20 159:3 182:19	65:19 71:4 73:13 78:2,20 79:2	<b>exceptionally</b> 174:2 <b>excluded</b> 64:25	74:7 75:21 83:6 84:19 91:18,23
<b>England</b> 8:12 33:2 137:14 147:15	<b>equivalent</b> 105:5 <b>error</b> 74:1	81:19 85:7 86:5 96:11 98:20 99:8	<b>executive</b> 28:21 <b>exercise</b> 89:25 90:5	97:17 99:14 134:6 137:17
150:12	<b>errors</b> 1:25 42:9,14 42:20 60:17 63:18	99:25 102:24 104:17 110:9	90:6,9 107:23 <b>exercises</b> 27:19,21	<b>experienced</b> 84:23 89:18 96:4 114:9
<b>enhanced</b> 10:3,14 113:23	71:17 73:1,5,6,9 73:14 74:17,23	111:3 113:16,20 118:22 123:24	27:23,24 28:8,12 29:6,7 152:19	114:17 <b>experiments</b> 19:2
<b>enquiries</b> 152:21	115:9 147:18 <b>especially</b> 109:19	128:13,14 141:11 143:1 144:19	<b>exhibited</b> 147:23 <b>exist</b> 8:19 74:18	<b>expert</b> 3:3 50:15,16 152:20
<b>enquiry</b> 171:13	<b>essential</b> 115:20 <b>essentially</b> 129:16	145:8,14,19 151:8 152:11 156:2	160:12 175:23 <b>existed</b> 159:24	<b>expert's</b> 50:14,15 <b>expertise</b> 135:23
<b>ensure</b> 15:10 16:21 19:3 20:10 22:12	<b>establish</b> 120:6 <b>established</b> 15:11	159:23 160:2,3,16 167:15 173:9	162:1 <b>existence</b> 30:6	<b>experts</b> 54:21 136:7 <b>explain</b> 15:15 16:8
23:6,21 24:5,15 26:22 27:5 31:5	23:9 125:10 142:15	<b>evidenced</b> 121:19 122:2	153:2,4 174:8 <b>existing</b> 19:24	17:3 20:21 23:14 34:14 40:1 43:8
37:13 46:23 58:19 72:9 76:12,20	<b>establishing</b> 90:2 <b>establishment</b> 17:14	<b>evidential</b> 4:24 166:1,3,5,21	21:19 143:9 <b>expand</b> 93:8	50:2 55:11 79:17 126:2 131:17,22
80:2 101:22 104:18 106:13	<b>et</b> 142:2 <b>evaluate</b> 127:20	167:10,17,21 170:9 172:5 180:5	<b>expansion</b> 127:14 <b>expect</b> 4:9 8:15	135:16 142:11 143:25 166:16
112:24 125:8,18 125:25 135:7	<b>evaluated</b> 20:3 23:8 125:9,16 126:1	<b>evolved</b> 55:25 <b>exact</b> 51:4	38:11 42:2 50:11 61:19 67:8,16	<b>explained</b> 9:25 98:7 <b>explains</b> 129:16
136:2 143:20 166:9	<b>evaluating</b> 21:14 <b>evaluation</b> 17:16	114:15 138:20 139:1 178:20	72:18 75:13 76:25 86:20 88:13 90:21	<b>explains</b> 129:16 <b>explanation</b> 145:15
<b>ensured</b> 38:6	23:11 39:19 125:19 127:18	<b>example</b> 11:8,14 12:21 24:2 30:17	94:12 105:11 117:16 134:15,21	<b>explore</b> 63:3 169:5 <b>explored</b> 94:11
<b>enterprise</b> 113:18 114:2 171:23	142:16 160:13 <b>evaluations</b> 149:2	34:17,22 35:21 38:3 40:20 41:8	178:23 179:19 <b>expectations</b> 16:1	<b>expose</b> 50:25 <b>exposure</b> 33:6 50:8
178:22 179:14 180:2 181:5			51:22 151:12	88:1 111:17 130:12
<b>entirely</b> 31:5 172:22				<b>expressed</b> 53:8
<b>entirety</b> 69:5				
<b>entries</b> 78:24				
<b>environment</b> 20:5 29:13 88:19				



142:7 <b>extend</b> 129:23 <b>extensive</b> 20:9 21:7 40:6 97:16 <b>extent</b> 65:7 66:24 69:13 75:8 77:4 77:15 88:15 94:24 111:17 132:11 145:21 147:10 150:19 178:8,13 179:5 <b>extraction</b> 13:13 <b>extremely</b> 17:24 27:23 43:9 59:15 69:19 84:5 87:20 87:25 90:23 91:1 107:22 116:12 146:22 149:20 161:13 180:20 <b>eyes</b> 168:23 169:6 169:12 170:25 172:2	<b>factor</b> 88:17 97:18 98:19 115:19 116:5 <b>factors</b> 78:19 89:2 90:12 <b>facts</b> 74:1 90:23 91:2 100:21 <b>Fahy</b> 70:3 119:1 <b>fail</b> 102:12 <b>failed</b> 100:13 102:11 104:15 <b>failing</b> 74:22 100:11 <b>failings</b> 21:17 49:1 69:14 72:25 73:16 <b>failure</b> 35:3,10 36:8 37:17 38:4,5 39:2 87:22 89:3 90:6 92:8 94:13,16 97:7 98:17 99:10 99:16,16,17 101:6 101:19 107:8,21 108:7,9,11,12 109:2,18 121:6,15 122:23,25 149:11 149:15 160:18 169:25 <b>failures</b> 37:10 38:13 74:17 91:9 107:3 115:8 <b>fair</b> 9:20 78:11 177:6 <b>fairly</b> 7:9 11:2 12:14 27:14 33:11 33:15 35:9 37:3 102:19 154:6 168:23 174:13 177:22,24 <b>fall</b> 124:13 <b>familiar</b> 29:11 40:10 108:24 109:1 114:13 <b>family</b> 52:14 <b>far</b> 13:5 20:4 38:20 51:15 60:17 63:18	67:6 71:1 73:23 75:16 108:22 113:18 164:24 171:10 174:9 <b>Faraday</b> 135:1 <b>fashion</b> 56:4,11 68:8 69:7 78:21 115:2 <b>fashioned</b> 171:9 <b>fast</b> 70:13 103:18 104:7 105:13 170:25 <b>fast-moving</b> 51:9 <b>faster</b> 51:25 <b>fatal</b> 8:17 <b>fatalities</b> 81:8 <b>feature</b> 5:5 85:20 165:8 <b>features</b> 132:12 <b>February</b> 48:14 99:3 103:23 105:11 122:17 <b>fed</b> 30:11 <b>feed</b> 102:15 <b>feedback</b> 56:2 85:24 88:24 91:5 91:16,22,25 92:3 94:25 104:20 105:15 108:4 123:18 <b>felt</b> 20:4 56:1 <b>figures</b> 108:14 <b>file</b> 4:16 88:24 101:8 143:6 <b>filled</b> 67:22 <b>finally</b> 30:12 156:2 <b>finance</b> 163:4 <b>financial</b> 151:1 <b>find</b> 74:22 75:5 153:19 <b>findings</b> 144:16 <b>fine</b> 36:4 183:3 <b>finished</b> 21:8 96:12 164:1 <b>firearm</b> 42:2 43:25	44:1 64:17 174:19 <b>firearms</b> 3:2,24 5:9 5:10,24,24 6:4,5 6:13 7:8,18 8:2,7 8:14,20,21,22,24 9:15,18 10:23 12:22 14:2,3,10 14:11,13,16 15:12 15:17 16:18 21:23 22:6 24:23 26:18 27:13,15 28:17,18 28:20 30:2,14 32:14,24,25 34:12 34:18 35:6 36:15 36:19,20,23 37:18 40:15 41:18,24 42:4 43:18 46:11 46:25 48:23 51:18 55:20 56:14 57:25 63:9 64:25 65:9 65:20 66:8 68:13 70:9 72:7 74:23 75:1 76:3 77:8 78:9 84:20,23,24 85:25 86:11,13 88:2 89:18,20,24 90:18,19 95:12 101:10 102:23,25 103:17 105:13 106:2,3,5,11,22 108:21 109:4 110:7 111:10,13 114:23 118:2,19 121:25 122:4,8,19 123:3 124:8 127:17 128:3,11 130:8 131:16 132:11 144:7 145:21 146:2 148:24 149:23 150:20 152:21,23 152:24 161:1 166:23 168:24,25 170:5 174:10 178:24 179:13	180:3,21 181:1,8 181:16,21 182:20 <b>firearms-related</b> 59:3 <b>firmly</b> 56:13,15,17 <b>first</b> 1:14 14:19 17:11 21:22 23:2 24:18 27:10 29:23 39:16 40:21 47:22 56:8 69:24 73:10 77:14 81:24 85:11 88:11 93:10 95:15 99:24 100:15,18 110:14 119:3,17 120:1 121:5 124:14,22 127:25 130:21 157:23,25 158:3,13 159:11 162:12 164:8 165:21 166:17 172:14 173:24 <b>firstly</b> 60:9 68:18 103:3 109:21 113:6 152:14 164:12 175:2 <b>fit</b> 20:24 37:8 159:13 <b>fitness</b> 54:8 <b>fitted</b> 17:21 46:25 61:5 <b>five</b> 11:4 113:3 139:23 <b>fixed</b> 166:7 <b>flags</b> 98:8 <b>flashing</b> 171:22 <b>FN</b> 20:1 148:1 <b>focus</b> 41:15 49:7 125:12 178:14 <b>focused</b> 41:25 156:22 <b>focuses</b> 102:17 <b>focusing</b> 115:23 <b>fogging</b> 159:6 <b>folder</b> 1:12 <b>follow</b> 22:11
<b>F</b>				
<b>F/686</b> 80:7 <b>face</b> 32:5 129:4 <b>faced</b> 165:12 <b>facilitate</b> 31:6 113:18 <b>facilitated</b> 178:22 <b>facilitates</b> 68:19 <b>facilitating</b> 66:10 181:4 <b>facilities</b> 135:24 138:2 <b>facing</b> 61:8 164:12 <b>fact</b> 14:24 52:13 59:25 81:12 83:19 98:23 115:23 116:3,9 118:15 122:25 123:9,16 128:13,15 131:3 144:16 148:1,6 151:8 153:24 154:15 155:25				

149:16 <b>followed</b> 47:8 130:15 146:13,18 147:4,12 149:25 161:5 <b>following</b> 68:17 113:2 164:11 183:6 <b>follows</b> 82:16 133:5 <b>force</b> 3:2 7:3,4 8:12 8:15 10:18 11:2,4 11:4 13:8 15:23 16:18 22:7,14,15 22:24 26:2,7 31:20,23,25 32:5 32:21 35:5,7,14 35:20 36:5,13,14 38:8 39:11 45:13 50:13 53:7,18 78:3 86:3,4,6,9,15 86:19 87:21 88:5 88:23 92:2,23 94:15 99:20 102:10,16,21 104:22 106:17 110:3 121:21 122:13 125:15,21 140:18 142:19 145:10 149:21 151:13 152:2,25 163:4,6,17 166:18 181:18,19 <b>force's</b> 36:14 <b>forces</b> 9:2,4,14 12:13,15,24 13:2 13:17 15:10,24 18:15 19:3 20:15 22:11 23:20 24:1 24:14 28:6,22 30:9 32:3 33:1 36:21 37:13,23 38:2,11,24 45:17 45:19 75:25 76:8 102:14,15 111:9 128:4 141:25	147:8,15,20 148:7 148:11,22 153:17 154:23 163:3,14 <b>foreign</b> 19:3 25:17 <b>forensic</b> 51:21 <b>foresee</b> 114:10 <b>forgive</b> 159:18 <b>form</b> 60:14 62:4 73:24 84:19 99:17 106:15 152:25 176:18 <b>formal</b> 15:18,19,20 25:16 29:19 48:13 87:1,6,16 102:14 102:17 105:15 120:10 136:20 140:11 <b>formalised</b> 175:13 <b>formally</b> 56:18 163:20,20,20,22 <b>format</b> 49:5 60:25 137:6,7 <b>formatted</b> 68:23 <b>formed</b> 119:8 124:9 <b>forms</b> 60:3 <b>formulated</b> 83:5,15 <b>fortnight</b> 103:24 104:15 <b>forum</b> 163:5 <b>forward</b> 52:22 127:5 142:19 146:9 <b>foster</b> 51:22 <b>found</b> 74:18 <b>four</b> 72:11 73:20 107:12 153:6 <b>Fourthly</b> 117:1 <b>fractions</b> 53:8,24 <b>framework</b> 17:14 57:12,14 <b>frank</b> 154:1 155:11 <b>frankly</b> 67:21 174:1 <b>frequency</b> 32:10 34:4	<b>frequent</b> 33:11,14 33:15 37:3 136:10 136:11 <b>frequently</b> 68:12 <b>front</b> 1:11 21:5 61:14 92:12 <b>Fulbright</b> 3:14 <b>fulfil</b> 57:22 <b>full</b> 9:7,10 17:4 26:3 30:13 86:12 98:17 101:19 116:19 154:1 155:11 161:16 <b>fully</b> 23:23 65:13 72:23 100:8 105:16 111:22 121:23 123:15 141:1 176:22 <b>function</b> 7:25 14:1 14:8 37:24 50:12 50:12 <b>functional</b> 86:15 <b>functionality</b> 134:1 <b>functions</b> 153:7 <b>fundamental</b> 70:22 71:7,13,15 91:25 94:21 97:1,19,23 121:20 122:3 123:1 <b>fundamentally</b> 31:1 124:22 152:3 <b>funded</b> 16:13 21:2 133:19 <b>funding</b> 133:21 <b>further</b> 14:15 22:22 33:2 63:1 135:25 <b>future</b> 37:8 50:1 86:17 87:14 91:15 109:15,18 122:14	<b>gaps</b> 160:12 <b>gather</b> 113:19 <b>gathering</b> 40:25 41:13 42:15 78:20 <b>general</b> 4:8 17:9 22:1 23:20 45:10 54:13 61:11 70:4 78:5 85:22,23 88:7 89:2,3 95:19 104:2 142:8 164:6 172:12 175:2 <b>generally</b> 9:13 68:5 70:8 178:4 <b>generic</b> 178:13,16 179:6 <b>genuinely</b> 53:16,22 <b>geographic</b> 62:22 <b>geographical</b> 31:25 <b>getting</b> 31:11 108:20 <b>give</b> 5:20 6:25 11:7 25:22 26:5 34:17 35:21 39:21,22 40:3,11,14 45:24 54:6,11,15 60:25 70:2 104:14 108:22 111:21 116:25 135:19 146:4 158:16 171:14 180:12 <b>given</b> 59:7 72:14 74:5,15 76:15 79:12 86:21 87:17 91:16 97:16 103:17 104:2,20 109:7 128:14,16 139:20 140:10 149:10,11 157:15 167:15 168:21 170:23 <b>gives</b> 74:4 127:15 129:11 <b>giving</b> 3:3 30:1 87:12 117:15 180:25 181:21	<b>glance</b> 146:3 <b>Gloucestershire</b> 11:9,12 <b>GMP</b> 9:6 10:7 30:21 31:20,23 32:2 33:5 46:14 48:11,19 50:21 60:5 61:19,21,25 62:23 63:18 65:22 66:22 74:18 80:24 92:7,11 96:3 102:11 104:9 105:12 109:16 121:17,25 122:18 124:10 128:14 130:20 132:2 140:6,10 141:6,11 143:16 146:13 147:23 148:12 149:11 152:12 153:24 154:11,15 155:1,7,14,17,22 156:5,13,23 159:25 160:7 161:1,19,19 162:2 <b>GMP's</b> 80:5 103:1 140:13 142:8 144:14 146:19 147:13 150:19 154:2 157:12 <b>go</b> 2:3 10:5 19:22 52:24 70:17,19 71:6 76:19 79:4 84:4 93:23 101:24 102:20 108:3 116:20 127:5 132:24 133:18 139:13,19 152:7 153:19 158:18 164:16 166:23 171:20,24 <b>goes</b> 54:19 87:12 117:18 134:8 <b>going</b> 18:3 24:8,11 55:1 65:11 80:5
<b>G</b>				
<b>G</b> 161:3 <b>G1</b> 140:8 <b>gain</b> 113:16 <b>gaining</b> 82:20				

81:13 84:1 85:10 100:8 108:2,3,6 117:21 127:22 133:18 138:21,22 139:1 142:25 149:2 153:18 158:24 167:19 169:15 178:10 182:10,11,15 <b>gold</b> 8:1,4,6 34:19 <b>good</b> 9:21 15:11,25 16:22 22:11,15 23:9 34:8 46:16 46:19 62:21,24 66:6 69:3,4 96:24 111:19 112:24 125:11 143:22 151:14 <b>governance</b> 151:1 154:18,19 <b>governed</b> 128:10 <b>government</b> 15:20 17:14 19:6 22:19 23:20 125:17 131:7 134:10,12 150:11 <b>Government's</b> 133:4 <b>Government-spo...</b> 132:19 <b>graded</b> 40:19 44:1 44:13 <b>grading</b> 44:18 45:6 46:22 65:4,5 66:2 <b>gradings</b> 66:5 <b>Grainger</b> 52:15 <b>Granby</b> 85:9,14 87:23 89:5 91:17 93:7,19 <b>Granby's</b> 85:17 93:3 94:7,13,17 167:8 <b>grant</b> 174:1 <b>granted</b> 116:2 128:7 174:19	<b>great</b> 90:24 148:22 <b>Greater</b> 33:14 34:5 42:11 61:16 123:17 124:4 <b>greatest</b> 179:4 <b>greatly</b> 41:1 <b>grenade</b> 141:2 <b>ground</b> 79:20 181:14,15,23 <b>group</b> 11:8 14:17 22:5,9 29:20,21 30:7,8,14 82:25 113:17,17 157:11 161:1 162:17,24 162:25 163:1 <b>groups</b> 11:5,16 <b>guarded</b> 50:19 <b>guidance</b> 8:5 15:6 16:4 27:7 30:1,3 30:22 37:9,12,25 38:1 39:3 58:7 60:6,11,20 61:9 61:17 62:3,4,7,17 63:2,8,20 64:1,6,9 64:12 65:8 68:12 76:16,24 78:7 80:25 91:16 92:6 92:12 96:23 97:20 97:22 124:17,19 125:11 126:9,23 127:11 129:6,20 129:24 132:17 136:3 143:21 173:25 174:6 175:4,6 178:1	30:17 65:9 105:20 106:13 144:6 168:9 <b>happened</b> 20:21 72:6 83:19 104:17 115:23 119:14 150:5 162:20 170:10 <b>happening</b> 33:22 47:5 140:19,22 181:11 <b>happens</b> 46:13 72:5 <b>happy</b> 21:1 87:15 88:4,23 92:4 180:5 <b>hard</b> 38:14 77:17 107:24 167:18 <b>harm</b> 59:23 <b>Harte</b> 140:23 <b>Hatton</b> 12:8 <b>head</b> 36:23,25 86:14 130:7 132:10 135:2 <b>headings</b> 49:11 <b>headlines</b> 44:20 <b>health</b> 35:24 38:22 151:1 159:3 160:9 166:12 <b>heard</b> 9:6 10:7 33:23 46:9,13 60:16,21 62:5,12 62:23 63:17,20,22 85:7 96:11 99:6,7 102:24 108:9 111:3 120:19 122:15 128:13 145:15 149:10 160:1,3,15 173:9 <b>hearings</b> 48:17,22 <b>heart</b> 94:23 <b>hectic</b> 70:14 <b>hefty</b> 27:14 <b>held</b> 34:20 53:16,22 138:6 154:9,23 163:13	<b>helm</b> 146:25 <b>help</b> 35:19 43:3 59:18 114:15 157:19 <b>helped</b> 22:11 42:23 55:21,22 <b>helping</b> 28:10 <b>helps</b> 82:13 <b>high</b> 51:15 61:1 62:3,23 79:11 116:6,8,9 118:5,9 118:10,10,12,15 118:17,20,21 146:22 147:16 171:11 180:23 <b>high-powered</b> 12:1 <b>higher</b> 108:13 181:17 <b>highest</b> 81:22 82:24 <b>highlight</b> 89:14 90:16 <b>highlighted</b> 85:16 90:5,13 <b>highly</b> 51:18 94:14 <b>hindsight</b> 51:8 53:9 <b>hinted</b> 106:1 <b>historic</b> 40:24 172:21 <b>historical</b> 41:13 <b>history</b> 84:5 85:20 <b>Hmm</b> 64:23 104:1 107:7 <b>hoc</b> 24:6 <b>hold</b> 4:11 88:2 170:24 <b>holding</b> 156:14 <b>holidays</b> 24:11 <b>Holmes</b> 143:4,17 <b>home</b> 15:5,21,23 17:25 19:1 22:8 23:6,8,15,19 24:5 24:17,24 25:10 35:4 102:16 110:3 125:8,10,24 126:1 126:5 129:2,7	132:22 133:17 134:14,15 135:13 135:17 136:16 137:12 141:7 142:16 143:10 146:24 147:24 149:17 150:2,10 150:15 151:2,16 152:3,13 154:3,12 157:7 161:15,20 <b>hopefully</b> 50:17 115:2 <b>HOSDB</b> 18:9 141:25 142:23 143:9 152:8 153:11,12,22 154:13 156:1 161:3 <b>HOSDB's</b> 143:5 <b>host</b> 139:12 <b>hours</b> 54:15 <b>house</b> 8:20 11:10 30:9 <b>housed</b> 132:7 <b>houses</b> 138:24 <b>hubs</b> 12:21 <b>huge</b> 57:4 <b>hugely</b> 13:8 <b>human</b> 25:17 161:15 <b>hurdle</b> 159:11
<b>I</b>				
				<b>Ian</b> 1:4,5 184:5 <b>idea</b> 45:17 <b>ideal</b> 66:3 86:10 <b>ideas</b> 107:18 <b>identifiable</b> 51:5 181:13 <b>identified</b> 18:9 70:23 71:8 77:13 83:15 93:1 151:3 181:6 <b>identify</b> 4:23 49:19 52:7 117:4

<p><b>identity</b> 135:14  <b>ifs</b> 118:1  <b>illness</b> 35:23  <b>illustrative</b> 133:9  136:18  <b>imitation</b> 44:1  <b>immediate</b> 26:7,9  86:17 102:22  104:11 121:17,22  122:10 123:6,23  167:23 175:25  <b>immediately</b> 45:24  78:15 109:3  122:19 162:3  169:21  <b>immersed</b> 130:4  <b>impact</b> 21:4 35:2,7  37:9 38:3,16  40:15 50:1 92:20  95:23 97:8 104:10  105:14 109:14  138:24  <b>impacted</b> 88:12  <b>impacts</b> 59:24  101:12 139:3  <b>implement</b> 167:19  <b>implementation</b>  47:25  <b>implemented</b> 26:24  132:1  <b>implementing</b> 90:4  <b>implications</b> 37:21  39:12 112:15  134:2 135:9  139:10  <b>implied</b> 123:10  <b>importance</b> 81:6  98:22  <b>important</b> 53:2  58:3,13 82:19  97:10 109:12  111:16 114:23  115:14,16,19  116:4 117:2 123:7  127:9 141:5</p>	<p>143:23 167:4  175:20 177:14  178:15  <b>importantly</b> 35:13  117:25  <b>imposes</b> 68:12  <b>impracticable</b> 52:7  <b>impractical</b> 49:20  62:22  <b>improved</b> 46:18  94:2  <b>Improvement</b>  26:25 92:19  152:16  <b>inadequate</b> 64:6  <b>incident</b> 6:15 19:8  32:13 35:17,18  51:10 52:14 56:20  56:23 57:3 58:12  58:15,16,19 64:17  67:11 71:17 75:24  77:24 78:4 82:5,6  83:9 91:7 93:11  93:18 96:7 105:17  109:10 110:19  115:2 118:18  174:4  <b>incidents</b> 3:2 5:24  5:25 6:2,4,5 7:1,4  7:9,10,11,14 8:6  8:14,17 9:22  16:10 29:16 32:7  32:8,9,14,20,21  32:21 34:5 50:4  51:16,21 56:14,24  57:9 59:15,19  61:11 62:15 77:21  84:25 89:18 90:18  96:25 106:6,7  <b>incisive</b> 108:22  <b>include</b> 4:1 24:20  48:7 68:16 111:25  120:9 135:17  148:3 163:2,3  165:3 179:20</p>	<p><b>included</b> 3:3 6:7  27:9 45:3 59:10  65:6 136:8 154:16  <b>includes</b> 7:13  129:17,19 164:10  <b>including</b> 1:15,20  33:2 80:20 89:7  127:2 134:1  138:11 164:13  165:6  <b>inconsequential</b>  115:15  <b>inconsistent</b> 89:25  90:14  <b>incorrect</b> 142:4,10  142:19 160:24  <b>increased</b> 53:11  <b>increases</b> 118:19  <b>incumbent</b> 143:7  143:12  <b>indecision</b> 88:17  90:8,16,24 91:8  92:2 95:1  <b>independent</b> 15:9  17:17,18 47:23  104:21 135:5,11  <b>indicate</b> 20:15  67:11 69:5 72:25  101:1 140:7  147:24 154:14  162:19  <b>indicated</b> 59:12  73:15 115:12  125:15 145:19  160:3  <b>indicates</b> 120:5  122:9 140:8 141:6  148:10 155:17  <b>indicating</b> 83:7  153:25  <b>indication</b> 45:24  129:11 135:19  146:4 155:3  <b>indictment</b> 49:3  <b>individual</b> 20:12</p>	<p>24:11 32:4 35:13  38:18 43:13 53:16  57:1 59:18 79:3  80:21 82:3,14,24  83:3,4,8,10,14,23  83:24 85:25 87:15  88:14 97:5 101:16  104:19,23 139:19  163:16 174:21  <b>individual's</b> 38:16  88:12 91:15 92:20  <b>individualised</b>  83:20  <b>individuals</b> 14:14  67:6 68:9 82:4,11  83:7 84:3 86:15  102:10 103:11,14  114:1 118:22  135:20 139:3  149:23 154:14  155:17 156:1  <b>inert</b> 120:10  <b>inevitably</b> 53:22  <b>infers</b> 141:5 145:25  <b>influence</b> 50:7  142:8 145:21  <b>influenced</b> 149:21  <b>influential</b> 142:7  <b>inform</b> 84:6 151:16  151:19,20 161:20  <b>informal</b> 140:8  <b>information</b> 39:23  40:9,13,24 41:1  41:14,17 45:22  46:1 58:9,10,16  59:3,16,25 64:21  67:25 68:10,20  69:20 74:8 78:1  78:20 79:8,11,21  79:25 80:3 81:6  86:18 100:12,16  101:5,7,9,15,18  104:10,19,22  114:25 115:5  122:12 148:14</p>	<p>154:8,21 155:24  160:19 164:7  173:2 175:12,16  175:22 176:1  <b>information'</b> 65:3  <b>informed</b> 79:21  110:7 113:9  116:25 148:11  <b>informs</b> 43:22  <b>infrequency</b> 77:19  78:13  <b>infrequent</b> 77:20  144:2  <b>infrequently</b> 154:6  154:18  <b>inherently</b> 121:20  122:3  <b>initial</b> 77:14 78:4  78:16 79:1,2  <b>initially</b> 18:1 115:6  <b>injuries</b> 18:22  <b>injury</b> 17:6 18:22  20:10  <b>input</b> 34:18 180:4  <b>Inquiries</b> 134:13  <b>Inquiry</b> 1:11 9:11  10:1 20:14 33:24  35:22 39:18 40:11  47:6 48:22 49:15  51:10 53:5 97:18  108:9 119:2  120:20 146:3  156:2 159:9  168:22 183:6  <b>insisted</b> 92:18  <b>inspect</b> 37:13  <b>inspector</b> 102:2  105:3 122:15  130:7 141:16,21  141:24 142:21  143:4,13,14,16  148:17 167:8  <b>Inspectorate</b> 21:21  22:3 25:4 163:18  <b>instance</b> 19:20</p>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

135:3 157:25 159:6 168:9,11 <b>instances</b> 46:17 106:5 <b>instantly</b> 137:13 <b>institutions</b> 158:23 158:23 <b>instructed</b> 47:22 48:5 162:9 <b>instruction</b> 1:21 48:14 76:14 106:22 <b>instructions</b> 47:21 129:20 <b>instructor</b> 36:23 37:18 72:8 86:13 101:11 102:23,25 103:17 105:13 108:22 110:8 121:25 122:4 <b>instructor's</b> 123:4 <b>instructional</b> 107:16 <b>instructors</b> 105:1 106:12 111:10 <b>instructors'</b> 111:13 <b>insufficient</b> 93:23 <b>integral</b> 65:2 103:6 114:22 <b>integrity</b> 44:21 97:1 106:1 <b>intelligence</b> 39:19 39:20,23 40:3,4,7 40:8,13,17,18 41:22 42:6,10,15 43:1,23 44:8,12 45:5,8,21 46:4,10 46:21 47:18 49:1 58:9,16 59:4,15 60:1 64:2,7,13,13 64:16,21,22,24 65:11,17,24 66:7 66:11 67:15 79:21 83:6 89:20 91:7 93:13 94:3 117:19 164:7,25 165:3	172:19,21 173:2 175:16 <b>intelligence'</b> 65:4 <b>intent</b> 41:4 43:4,13 177:12 <b>intention</b> 104:14 168:8 179:23 <b>intentions</b> 165:13 <b>intercept</b> 82:10 <b>interception</b> 99:2 113:7,25 118:16 <b>interest</b> 137:15 140:13 146:14,19 147:13 148:22 150:10,11,14,15 <b>interested</b> 25:18 41:13,14 147:21 <b>interests</b> 80:6 170:12 <b>internal</b> 9:17 71:19 115:13 127:6 <b>internally</b> 148:14 <b>international</b> 22:12 135:25 153:15 154:23 <b>internationally</b> 33:3 56:3 153:17 158:19 159:12 <b>interoperability</b> 165:6 <b>interpretation</b> 126:10 127:11 <b>interrogate</b> 63:14 <b>interrogated</b> 46:20 <b>interrupt</b> 164:3 <b>intervention</b> 113:7 113:24 118:9,16 166:8 167:11 168:1 180:10 <b>interviewed</b> 119:1 <b>introduce</b> 16:16 124:11 142:1 150:8 156:24 157:24 <b>introduced</b> 20:16	30:24 56:7 137:22 <b>introduction</b> 16:24 17:9,11 18:1 19:11,12 21:22 124:5 125:13 131:14,23 133:25 142:9 150:22 151:24 157:12 158:7 159:25 163:11 <b>investigate</b> 4:12 <b>investigated</b> 4:7 <b>investigation</b> 4:1 29:22 77:24 141:23 <b>investigations</b> 182:12 <b>investigative</b> 89:21 91:19,24 <b>investigator</b> 41:11 <b>investigators</b> 40:25 164:18 <b>involve</b> 7:17 8:18 12:4 17:10 27:21 30:5 110:7 <b>involved</b> 4:4 5:20 6:15 22:2 26:19 29:15 31:1 32:24 41:2 47:15 49:22 52:8,15 53:12 54:9 70:12 93:11 93:12,13 103:2,8 105:17 106:17 109:11 124:22 152:3 <b>involvement</b> 30:23 142:17 143:10 <b>involves</b> 117:23 164:25 <b>involving</b> 62:12 81:8 112:23 132:13 <b>IPCC</b> 25:6 29:20 59:12 77:22 <b>IPCC's</b> 49:2	<b>Ireland</b> 16:11,14 17:2 21:2 22:21 25:8 29:1 93:6 136:9 137:15 150:13 <b>ironically</b> 148:15 <b>irregularity</b> 105:22 105:25 <b>irrespective</b> 38:10 122:7 129:4 149:13 <b>irritant</b> 20:19 148:2 <b>issue</b> 11:1,2 12:12 13:16 24:19 33:11 35:7,9,12,22,24 36:2,9,17 37:17 37:19 39:3 46:25 69:17 70:8 79:3 88:11 92:20 102:18 109:8,22 123:6 124:3 128:4 134:14 140:17 172:9 173:11 182:14 <b>issued</b> 63:9 <b>issues</b> 3:1,23 6:5 10:11 15:23 26:3 26:6 27:11 36:24 38:7,15,22,22,23 38:25 40:12 41:23 42:1 44:7 47:4 49:12,13,14 54:18 54:20 56:25 62:1 63:23 70:19 71:6 71:11,15 73:25 75:13 76:11,13 78:10 86:16 87:22 88:2,10 92:25 99:15 100:10 101:1,25 103:16 104:7 105:18 108:16 109:1,25 113:25 115:11,13 115:14,16 117:24	123:1,11 130:4 133:15,19 135:10 135:22 136:1 139:12,16 144:13 146:1 150:10 152:20 156:14,15 157:20 158:24 159:2,9 163:19 164:6 166:21 177:25 178:2,5,16 181:9 <b>item</b> 162:16 <b>iteration</b> 30:22 <b>iterations</b> 43:16 153:6 <hr/> <b>J</b> <hr/> <b>J</b> 161:25 <b>January</b> 14:20 15:1 47:10 107:5 <b>Jason</b> 1:10 <b>JCB</b> 11:21,22 12:9 <b>Jean</b> 29:17 81:16 <b>job</b> 4:20,23 5:5,20 7:5 52:22 <b>joined</b> 2:7 <b>joint</b> 18:4 85:18 <b>jointly</b> 124:23 125:1 <b>judge</b> 143:2 <b>judged</b> 38:13 60:4 <b>judgment</b> 51:24 53:7 92:3 <b>judicial</b> 30:10,16 <b>July</b> 124:11 162:17 162:24 <b>June</b> 2:12,22,24 15:2 111:7 124:11 144:10,11 146:11 146:17 <b>junior</b> 63:13 <b>jurisdiction</b> 24:3 <b>jurisdictions</b> 56:3 <b>justice</b> 3:11 118:21 178:21 180:16,18
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

<b>justified</b> 13:18 82:18 172:22	62:8 63:25 74:7 88:1 89:3 95:23	<b>Latto's</b> 156:11	<b>lessons</b> 34:8	<b>light</b> 58:10,15 98:1 109:2 111:3
<b>justify</b> 134:10,12 174:10,21	97:25 98:1 121:6 130:9 141:6,11	<b>law</b> 10:17 19:13 136:6 137:3 138:6 145:5,10 153:17	<b>lethal</b> 15:14 16:8 16:15,18 17:12,15 19:12,14 21:23 22:7,16 23:11,22 54:20 124:8 125:19 128:3,11 129:1,5,6 130:5 131:6,14,23 133:12,25 137:16 142:5,13 144:1 145:22 147:25 148:12 150:7 152:1 155:4 161:4	<b>lights</b> 171:21
<b>justifying</b> 174:9	146:23 147:16 153:11 157:6,10 157:14 162:1 170:7 174:8,20	<b>lawful</b> 143:21	<b>letter</b> 1:20 47:23 48:13 92:16	<b>limitations</b> 112:1 112:10 113:8,11 113:13,22 116:24 139:18
<b>K</b>	157:14 162:1 170:7 174:8,20	<b>Lawler</b> 167:8	<b>letting</b> 182:13	<b>limited</b> 14:3 18:2 59:15 69:20 87:5 112:20 114:9 176:1
<b>keep</b> 68:13 76:13	<b>knowledgeable</b> 22:6 114:17 115:3 132:18	<b>lawyers</b> 174:15	<b>level</b> 7:9 34:13,13 40:14 47:16 49:24 62:3 67:17 82:24 88:1,4,14 99:24 107:13 109:17 146:22 147:16 149:14 158:8,21 169:12 174:7,9 177:14 179:15 181:17	<b>line</b> 23:8 125:10
<b>keeping</b> 74:18,20 74:23 106:4 148:25	<b>known</b> 8:3 16:12 27:24 30:2 35:15 43:25 101:16 102:12 106:15 127:17 130:18 132:8 139:15 140:7,18 144:7 148:8 155:15 169:16	<b>lay</b> 177:11	<b>levelled</b> 168:17	<b>lines</b> 179:12
<b>key</b> 23:18 39:18 43:23 103:14 112:8 118:5 124:17 142:18 144:12 160:20 163:4,16 168:10 170:18	<b>known</b> 8:3 16:12 27:24 30:2 35:15 43:25 101:16 102:12 106:15 127:17 130:18 132:8 139:15 140:7,18 144:7 148:8 155:15 169:16	<b>layer</b> 98:6	<b>levels</b> 89:7 90:2 143:24	<b>link</b> 43:23 93:5 98:21
<b>kidnappings</b> 7:10	<b>known</b> 8:3 16:12 27:24 30:2 35:15 43:25 101:16 102:12 106:15 127:17 130:18 132:8 139:15 140:7,18 144:7 148:8 155:15 169:16	<b>layers</b> 99:23	<b>Leveson</b> 53:2	<b>linked</b> 35:22 44:1 63:7 147:5 156:13
<b>kill</b> 7:11	<b>known</b> 8:3 16:12 27:24 30:2 35:15 43:25 101:16 102:12 106:15 127:17 130:18 132:8 139:15 140:7,18 144:7 148:8 155:15 169:16	<b>lead</b> 14:25 15:4 16:7,21 22:4 26:12 27:18 36:20 47:18 49:23 100:22 130:8 132:11 149:3 151:16,19 155:1	<b>lexicon</b> 174:14	<b>links</b> 15:20 25:16 135:25
<b>kind</b> 12:7	<b>known</b> 8:3 16:12 27:24 30:2 35:15 43:25 101:16 102:12 106:15 127:17 130:18 132:8 139:15 140:7,18 144:7 148:8 155:15 169:16	<b>leader</b> 35:6 108:18	<b>liaise</b> 15:7	<b>list</b> 23:13 38:15 153:16 178:2
<b>Kingdom</b> 24:21 34:25 146:8	<b>known</b> 8:3 16:12 27:24 30:2 35:15 43:25 101:16 102:12 106:15 127:17 130:18 132:8 139:15 140:7,18 144:7 148:8 155:15 169:16	<b>leadership</b> 78:14 143:25	<b>liaison</b> 4:20 19:2	<b>listed</b> 93:1 115:12 118:6 154:25 155:7
<b>kit</b> 134:11,17	<b>L</b>	<b>leading</b> 21:8	<b>licence</b> 9:7,10,16 122:19 123:13	<b>listened</b> 71:3
<b>knew</b> 98:12 102:11	<b>Laboratory</b> 135:25	<b>leads</b> 68:22	<b>licensed</b> 152:23,24	<b>listening</b> 150:1
<b>knots</b> 61:3	<b>lack</b> 60:6,19 61:17 62:7 63:1,20 64:1 71:12 74:7 95:20 107:13,14 108:16 170:6	<b>leaf</b> 68:5	<b>licensing</b> 26:23 37:12 38:1,11 109:24	<b>lists</b> 65:15
<b>know</b> 1:10 30:21 32:17 38:6,20 39:1 43:15 44:7 47:16 62:3 75:19 82:13 83:19,25 88:23 90:21 95:20 97:13 98:24 104:2 105:20 108:14 116:23 118:25 138:20 139:1 145:4 154:8 157:15 161:14 163:8 167:20 168:22 173:21 180:22	<b>lack</b> 60:6,19 61:17 62:7 63:1,20 64:1 71:12 74:7 95:20 107:13,14 108:16 170:6	<b>learn</b> 33:1	<b>life</b> 65:12 122:6 123:5 136:21 137:23 175:25	<b>literally</b> 24:10 106:18 107:1
<b>knowing</b> 105:6 116:21	<b>land</b> 105:10	<b>learnt</b> 34:8	<b>life-threatening</b> 123:21	<b>little</b> 34:10 40:24 171:6
<b>knowledge</b> 1:24 29:3 50:4,8 59:17	<b>landlocked</b> 8:12	<b>leave</b> 105:4 143:13		<b>live</b> 29:14
	<b>landscape</b> 12:21	<b>leaving</b> 100:10 164:15 168:18		<b>loader</b> 11:22
	<b>language</b> 44:16 177:1	<b>led</b> 16:24 17:13,24 22:21 28:25 30:16 32:20 33:21 45:2 67:15 90:1,7,15 97:10 101:4		<b>local</b> 61:25 69:21 140:12
	<b>lapse</b> 88:16	<b>left</b> 96:12 98:12 101:8 169:18		<b>location</b> 72:12 73:21 103:13 172:11
	<b>large</b> 4:10 11:16 27:23 28:7 48:7 57:3 68:2	<b>legal</b> 80:22 150:25 160:6 163:3		<b>locations</b> 11:23 138:25
	<b>larger</b> 31:20,23	<b>legislation</b> 16:1 22:9,13 24:17 30:10 45:9 78:8		<b>log</b> 66:25 67:7,12 72:11 75:19 76:10 167:7
	<b>largest</b> 8:12	<b>legitimate</b> 142:6		<b>logical</b> 68:23 149:25
	<b>lastly</b> 69:21 118:3 159:19 162:6 176:13	<b>length</b> 75:17		
	<b>late</b> 56:8 168:18	<b>lesson</b> 108:25 138:11		
	<b>Latto</b> 156:3			

<b>logs</b> 66:8,14,17,22 67:21 68:1 69:12 69:21 70:21,24 71:24 75:24 76:7 115:7	<b>lower</b> 117:4 174:9 <b>loyalties</b> 165:3 <b>Luncheon</b> 95:7	<b>management</b> 3:15 30:1,3 39:20 55:21 56:7,12 57:17 69:15 88:16 89:19,24 90:7,11 90:14,17,20,25 91:9 92:1 93:17 94:19,20,22 119:10 124:18 136:21 137:23 138:7	67:22 70:24 71:21 71:22 85:5 93:4 94:8 95:13 99:4,7 99:9 100:14,24 101:3 102:13 103:21,21 107:6 110:13 119:3,11 119:20 121:9 122:20 123:25 165:25 167:8,9	84:20 88:7 89:10 89:13 121:16 145:22 151:3 172:12
<b>long</b> 11:17 19:16 44:20 61:4 63:4 65:16 66:1 67:19 68:9 88:16 90:7 90:15,23 91:8 94:25 182:16	<hr/> <b>M</b> <hr/> <b>machines</b> 11:12,25 <b>main</b> 15:4 43:9 75:23 81:21 154:9 163:5,13 170:17	<b>managing</b> 51:9 103:7	<b>markers</b> 63:2,5,7 63:10,19,22	<b>maximum</b> 113:16
<b>long-term</b> 27:8 56:24 122:11	<b>maintain</b> 97:2 <b>maintained</b> 103:13 121:1 152:8 153:22 179:4	<b>Manchester</b> 33:14 34:6 42:11 61:16 123:17 124:4	<b>markets</b> 24:1	<b>mean</b> 8:24 9:9,13 12:18 34:14 35:19 37:7 40:1 52:12 56:22 64:18 71:10 91:1 105:25 114:15 116:8 129:17 131:9 145:23 151:19 154:19 155:22 164:3 171:16 173:17 174:19
<b>longer</b> 19:23 113:18	<b>maintenance</b> 36:15 129:20 153:9,13	<b>mandatory</b> 96:5,17 96:21 101:19	<b>mass</b> 68:2	<b>means</b> 16:8 85:24 96:6 107:1 117:19
<b>look</b> 20:9 40:20 52:2 57:21 60:9 61:10 64:20 76:16 79:6 82:2 84:14 95:24 98:14 124:14 126:13 127:23 128:19 133:5,10 144:21 159:4 165:21 171:22 172:13 173:23 175:4 180:13	<b>Majesty's</b> 21:21 22:3 25:4 163:18	<b>manner</b> 28:15 123:20 157:22	<b>MASTS</b> 9:24 10:7 10:13 12:2,13,16 12:24 13:3,6,19 33:10,13,16,16 89:7 98:24 99:3 110:20,24 111:18 111:18,24 112:23 113:7,11,12,23 114:9 116:1,6,12 117:23 118:7,13 119:4,10,20 120:4 120:8 121:8 156:5 156:13 169:10 180:9	<b>meant</b> 17:16 27:11 27:22 34:9 37:5 86:18 108:23 129:10
<b>looked</b> 107:3 121:11	<b>major</b> 6:11,23 11:15 14:6 17:11 123:1 152:21 163:6	<b>manoeuvre</b> 94:22	<b>material</b> 48:7,11,15 119:18 120:8 130:20	<b>measurable</b> 181:13
<b>looking</b> 25:13 64:3 72:20 89:13 110:18 113:3 118:1 127:25 159:16	<b>majority</b> 31:1 32:7 32:16 48:21	<b>manual</b> 15:7 18:5 27:6,7,9 30:2,3,6 30:7,13,22,24,24 31:3,10,13,14,16 31:17 56:9,16 58:6 59:21 60:11 60:23 61:24 62:2 68:12 76:16,24 78:9 80:12,25 83:3 124:13,19 126:23 127:15 128:19,23,25 129:5 132:17 151:14 173:25 174:6 175:4,6	<b>materials</b> 139:14	<b>measurement</b> 138:7
<b>looks</b> 43:8	<b>maker</b> 103:14	<b>manufacture</b> 135:7	<b>matrix</b> 133:15	<b>measures</b> 9:12 179:2 181:7
<b>loose</b> 68:5	<b>makers</b> 114:24,25 160:20	<b>manufacturer's</b> 135:5	<b>matter</b> 11:17 37:18 38:12 45:9,20 49:18 57:10 65:13 81:10,11 86:22 99:10,12 122:9 134:9 136:7 151:15,22 166:17 174:20 180:1,3	<b>mechanism</b> 92:18 101:17 109:25
<b>lorry</b> 11:22,22	<b>making</b> 3:2 33:21 34:9 37:14 39:4 45:11 47:19 51:14 55:9,11,22,23,25 56:5 57:1 58:4,8 58:18 63:16 68:11 68:23 69:16,19 71:16 74:12 75:6 75:10,14 78:14,23 84:6 87:6 88:2,3 90:18 91:6 93:21 94:23 106:4 110:2 110:5 112:18 116:6 117:14 131:15 142:22 144:13 148:20 158:9 163:6	<b>manufacturers</b> 17:18 18:19 19:20 134:18	<b>matters</b> 36:20 41:15 43:2 47:24 54:7,12 69:13 70:22 71:8,14	<b>media</b> 136:19,24 137:18
<b>losing</b> 169:12	<b>majority</b> 31:1 32:7 32:16 48:21	<b>manufacturer's</b> 135:5		<b>medical</b> 16:23 17:19 20:25 35:11 36:2 38:21 54:7 54:12,18 130:1 134:2 135:9 139:8 142:16 151:1
<b>lost</b> 168:23 169:6 170:25 172:2	<b>maker</b> 103:14	<b>manufacturers'</b> 134:3,7		<b>medication</b> 35:25 38:23
<b>lot</b> 19:24 75:23	<b>makers</b> 114:24,25 160:20	<b>March</b> 60:19 63:4		<b>Medium</b> 61:1
<b>loved</b> 52:14	<b>making</b> 3:2 33:21 34:9 37:14 39:4 45:11 47:19 51:14 55:9,11,22,23,25 56:5 57:1 58:4,8 58:18 63:16 68:11 68:23 69:16,19 71:16 74:12 75:6 75:10,14 78:14,23 84:6 87:6 88:2,3 90:18 91:6 93:21 94:23 106:4 110:2 110:5 112:18 116:6 117:14 131:15 142:22 144:13 148:20 158:9 163:6			<b>medium-</b> 122:11
<b>low</b> 7:9 11:22 61:1 117:5 170:18 174:2,3,13	<b>manage</b> 31:10 138:3			<b>meeting</b> 47:4 62:12 62:18 86:13 98:13 142:23 144:11 148:15,18 162:24

163:1,13,16 <b>meetings</b> 147:23 163:25 <b>member</b> 29:19 <b>members</b> 51:1 81:15 <b>Menezes</b> 29:17 81:16 <b>mental</b> 35:24 38:22 <b>mention</b> 42:1 72:2 72:4,10,11,16 73:17,18,20 132:6 138:9 171:4 <b>mentioned</b> 17:1 19:11,15 20:1,18 47:12 87:7 90:12 109:23 171:7 <b>Mercia</b> 2:14,16 7:21 8:10,20 9:18 10:19 11:10,13 14:8 26:10,15 31:20 32:8 33:11 34:6 37:1 45:13 45:17 <b>mere</b> 73:9,14 <b>message</b> 67:20 108:20 <b>Messrs</b> 96:1 156:3 <b>Met</b> 10:15,20,21 100:9,11 123:10 <b>Met's</b> 123:8 <b>method</b> 104:22 155:10,12 158:6 <b>methodology</b> 129:24 <b>methods</b> 13:21 106:12 111:14 <b>Metropolitan</b> 10:4 98:3 104:8 105:19 <b>micron</b> 135:4 <b>middle</b> 105:21 <b>Midlands</b> 8:13 <b>military</b> 10:17 137:3 <b>militates</b> 53:23	<b>mind</b> 31:16 50:10 75:8 152:5 160:5 174:24 <b>mindful</b> 80:8,16 <b>minimal</b> 66:3 <b>minimise</b> 16:16 <b>minimised</b> 166:11 <b>minimum</b> 62:13 <b>minister</b> 150:16 <b>minor</b> 1:25 8:17 37:19 <b>minute</b> 53:8 <b>minuted</b> 163:20 <b>minutes</b> 55:1 139:23 146:2 147:23 148:2 162:23 163:9,15 169:7 <b>minuting</b> 163:8 <b>mirror</b> 94:21 <b>misled</b> 144:12 <b>misread</b> 125:4 <b>missing</b> 171:12 <b>mistaken</b> 53:19,19 <b>mistakes</b> 42:9 60:17 62:6 63:18 147:18 <b>mitigate</b> 21:18 182:18 <b>mitigated</b> 20:11 <b>mix</b> 78:23 <b>mixed</b> 78:12 79:1 <b>mobile</b> 164:15 <b>model</b> 40:8,18 55:9 55:12,21,25 56:1 56:7,12,17,19 57:17,23 58:4,5,8 64:13,22,25 65:24 66:11 67:17 69:15 69:16 88:16 89:25 90:7,11,14,17,20 90:25 91:9 92:1 93:17 94:19,20,22 107:19 175:15 <b>models</b> 57:16,21	<b>modern</b> 50:23 <b>module</b> 18:4 <b>Molloy</b> 49:8 94:6 120:2,5,12 <b>moment</b> 2:1 54:24 54:25 74:20 90:12 95:3,24 139:22 159:18 164:2 167:6,11 170:3 182:23 <b>monitor</b> 138:4 <b>monitoring</b> 103:7 <b>months</b> 36:3 <b>morning</b> 55:1 <b>morphed</b> 152:17 <b>motorway</b> 11:24 <b>move</b> 59:20 121:3 146:9 179:20 <b>moved</b> 7:20 13:23 44:3 <b>moving</b> 51:23 70:13 140:23 144:8 <b>MPCC</b> 18:5 <b>MPS</b> 95:21 101:23 102:3 105:3,23 121:6 <b>MPS's</b> 104:13 <b>MSc</b> 3:11 <b>multi</b> 32:21 <b>multi-million</b> 163:7 <b>multidimensional</b> 176:10 <b>multidisciplinary</b> 89:20 91:18,24 <b>multiple</b> 164:17 <b>munition</b> 155:4 156:24 157:13 <b>munitions</b> 12:5,7 20:2 23:12 33:19 72:17,21 112:1 115:18 116:2,4,14 117:24 118:8 136:2,24 137:1,3 137:4 180:9 181:2	<hr/> <b>N</b> <hr/> <b>N</b> 136:4,4 184:3 <b>N18</b> 84:18 <b>name</b> 1:10 28:3 132:7 143:21 153:8 <b>narrative</b> 76:3 179:11 181:9 <b>nation</b> 32:25 <b>national</b> 8:20,21,22 8:24 9:3 14:25 15:4 16:3,21 18:11 23:9 25:14 25:24 26:3,12,24 27:3,12,19,20 29:6 32:17 34:8 34:20 37:9,25 39:3 40:7,7,17 50:6 55:9,11,25 58:3,8 63:8 64:13 64:22,24 65:8,24 66:11 69:15,21 72:7 92:10,19 96:5,17,22 103:3 109:17,21 110:21 111:8,12,20 112:5 124:17 125:11,18 127:11 138:14,16 143:21 146:12,17 147:3,14 148:16 151:16,19 152:16 152:21 175:14 <b>nationally</b> 9:19 26:23 27:2 35:3 67:3 77:5,11 92:7 120:16 132:16 154:10 <b>Nations</b> 22:14 <b>natural</b> 57:4 <b>nature</b> 5:25 6:16 8:10,16 17:21 34:1,3 50:24 63:14 65:17 77:21 78:14 86:15 88:8 91:7,25 93:15	102:12 107:20 108:1 111:17,23 113:24 115:9 122:23,24 132:23 139:6 146:7 <b>near</b> 73:21 <b>nearby</b> 72:12 <b>necessarily</b> 9:14 35:21 43:21 44:17 65:15 92:13 129:17 133:13 141:25 166:22 173:17 181:15 <b>necessary</b> 13:20 50:22 63:8 83:22 112:5 136:17 <b>necessity</b> 176:1 <b>need</b> 38:18 39:9 41:22 45:8 52:9 63:14 80:8 88:21 88:22 113:9,21 138:6 139:1 141:3 141:12,25 153:15 181:6,7 <b>needed</b> 24:14 37:4 91:17,23 109:12 147:3 149:24 <b>needs</b> 44:1 52:22 58:18 61:25 83:10 84:7 92:22 101:7 112:23 116:11,16 117:20 167:23 180:24 181:8 <b>negate</b> 123:16 <b>negative</b> 36:9 97:8 <b>negotiate</b> 21:17 <b>neither</b> 64:10 <b>net</b> 103:14 <b>never</b> 64:10 83:25 106:15,19 107:1,1 110:20,24 133:24 134:4 139:15 152:5 154:7,17 161:16 <b>new</b> 16:25 21:18
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



30:24 58:10,15,16 97:4 125:13 133:13 147:20 159:15 163:11 <b>Neyroud</b> 26:9 <b>night</b> 7:4 <b>nights</b> 7:5 <b>noisy</b> 171:12 <b>nominated</b> 37:23 136:8 156:1 <b>non-contentious</b> 102:19 <b>non-firearms</b> 3:23 <b>non-practitioner's</b> 177:1 <b>non-technical</b> 84:12 <b>norm</b> 12:25 46:5 <b>normal</b> 13:14 45:12 70:20 71:7 75:8 77:4,8,16 92:9 108:13 113:19 182:12 <b>normality</b> 77:17 <b>normally</b> 25:23 36:22 47:3 67:25 68:2 75:18 76:10 78:19 99:22 135:17 163:15 <b>North</b> 20:6 125:22 136:14 158:22,25 <b>north-west</b> 177:21 <b>Northern</b> 16:10,14 17:2 21:2 22:21 25:8 29:1 93:6 136:9 137:15 150:13 <b>note</b> 18:6 51:7 67:11 76:3,13 102:7 141:21 143:2 144:9 145:1 <b>notebooks</b> 77:14 <b>noted</b> 52:8 110:17 162:15 <b>notes</b> 57:11	<b>notification</b> 111:7 121:16 155:12 <b>notifying</b> 111:10 <b>November</b> 1:14 48:4 99:4 120:9 <b>NPIA</b> 25:2 38:9 96:5,17 98:17 100:10 152:13,15 153:3,5 156:4,23 157:2,5 <b>NPIA's</b> 150:18 <b>Nuclear</b> 26:13 <b>number</b> 7:13 11:3 12:16 16:11 18:9 24:10 31:23 33:22 55:8 62:23 71:11 80:7 81:7 82:4 104:17 111:14 131:8 132:15 155:6 156:14 164:15,18 175:15 <b>numbered</b> 113:3 <b>numbers</b> 13:4 33:13 100:4 <b>numerous</b> 8:17 51:13 <b>Nutter</b> 105:3 <hr/> <b>O</b> <hr/> <b>object</b> 129:19 <b>objectives</b> 108:25 175:15 <b>objects</b> 148:4 <b>obligation</b> 80:1 <b>observations</b> 72:23 74:13 156:16 <b>observe</b> 72:8 174:5 <b>observer</b> 111:18 <b>observers</b> 25:18 51:6,7 131:13 155:1 <b>obtain</b> 24:2 141:12 149:15 <b>obtained</b> 3:8,11 45:5 160:6,9	<b>obtaining</b> 78:21 172:23 <b>obvious</b> 112:20 114:16 174:11 <b>obviously</b> 11:1 14:12 45:7 57:10 144:17 145:13 155:19 <b>occasion</b> 7:12 12:8 98:16 119:3 <b>occasionally</b> 30:15 63:15 136:16 140:17 147:17 <b>occasions</b> 14:9 26:2 30:18 33:8 37:4,5 37:7,22 38:21 55:9 66:6 104:18 144:2 <b>occupational</b> 84:10 95:12 <b>occupationally</b> 85:4 100:24 110:23 119:19 120:3,15,21 121:7 <b>occur</b> 59:25 62:18 87:9 118:2 <b>occurred</b> 6:2 43:11 140:17 162:23 <b>occurrence</b> 33:15 136:10,11 <b>occurrences</b> 144:6 <b>occurring</b> 59:24 <b>occurs</b> 176:7,20 <b>OCG</b> 13:18 <b>October</b> 148:16 <b>OFC</b> 75:9 76:19,23 77:3 94:2 96:2,4 <b>OFC's</b> 75:6,16 <b>OFCs</b> 72:7 75:21 76:8,11 <b>offence</b> 41:1 166:4 168:15 169:2,15 169:19 170:12 171:3 <b>offences</b> 4:8,9	<b>offenders</b> 51:3 114:5 <b>offer</b> 123:15 <b>offered</b> 123:9 <b>office</b> 15:5,21 16:14 19:1 21:3 22:8 24:24 25:10 132:22 133:17 134:14,16 135:18 136:16 137:12 141:8 142:17 143:10 146:24 147:24 149:17 150:2,10 151:2,17 152:3,13 154:3,12 157:7 161:15 <b>Office's</b> 15:24 <b>officer</b> 35:4 37:4,22 39:5 66:23 86:11 86:21 88:21 90:21 97:3 104:19,23 105:17 108:23 109:10 110:21 117:5 119:16,24 120:3 123:21 128:5 140:7 142:7 143:16 151:13 162:17,24,25 163:1 178:6 179:3 <b>officer's</b> 37:10 86:12,16 99:13,20 102:5 106:16 108:19 109:14,18 110:1 122:14 <b>officers</b> 10:2,12,13 15:19 16:5 24:11 24:13,20 28:5 30:4 31:23 33:10 33:16 36:16,19 41:6,22 42:4,7 43:18 46:11 50:25 51:18 54:9 55:15 57:15 59:13 62:23 63:11,13 65:9,20 66:17,23 67:4	70:15 72:8 77:8 78:2,3,6,22,23,24 80:8,10,16,18,19 80:22 81:1,3 82:17 84:11 88:19 89:2 96:22 102:15 103:1,7,8 104:24 104:24 105:23 130:16 132:9 143:19 163:2 164:12 170:20 171:7,23 172:13 173:3,5,13,19,21 174:14 177:23 178:11 179:8 180:9 182:18 <b>Officially</b> 14:20 <b>OFSTED</b> 9:13 <b>Okay</b> 81:24 <b>old</b> 171:9 <b>Ombudsman</b> 25:8 <b>omission</b> 97:17 <b>omissions</b> 42:10 60:18 63:19 160:12,24 <b>on-the-ground</b> 28:8 <b>once</b> 83:13 175:12 175:13 <b>ones</b> 6:2 52:15 <b>ongoing</b> 77:24 <b>onwards</b> 56:10,16 106:10 110:13 146:20 <b>Op</b> 70:24 <b>open</b> 24:1 76:17 155:19,22 156:23 <b>opening</b> 126:11 127:12 <b>openly</b> 87:23 <b>operability</b> 92:10 <b>operate</b> 29:12 35:15 <b>operating</b> 30:21 72:9 80:6 84:18
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

<p><b>operation</b> 5:25 10:8 11:14 12:2 28:3 42:11,16 47:6,16 47:25 48:23 60:19 66:9 68:19 73:6 74:19 75:11 79:20 80:1,20 83:11,25 84:12,25 91:21 93:8,10,11 94:12 97:8 106:3 115:19 115:24 117:2,8,23 118:5,9 119:4,6 119:11 122:20 164:5 165:11 168:16 169:11,11 172:18 175:3 176:12 177:12,16 177:18 178:7,9,9 178:10,15,18,20 180:7,17,22 181:8 182:4</p> <p><b>operational</b> 3:23 13:16 17:20,21 19:18 20:5,22,24 26:18 28:20 32:8 37:10 69:14 70:16 72:25 73:15 76:3 84:10 90:4 91:20 95:11,12 99:14,17 101:2 116:13,17 127:21 142:15 151:2 154:2 156:11 158:2,14 158:16 159:4,24 160:5</p> <p><b>operationally</b> 35:1 85:3 118:4 119:19 120:4,15,21 121:8 141:3 161:21</p> <p><b>operations</b> 3:15 7:18 11:3 14:2 22:16 28:24 29:14 30:2 34:2 36:23 36:25 40:16 41:20 42:18 44:18 46:5</p>	<p>49:22 50:1 51:9 52:9,16 53:13 54:10 64:16,19 65:1 86:14 93:16 128:9 150:19</p> <p><b>opinion</b> 39:22,22 40:4,11,15 49:18 52:5 54:6,11,15 70:2 74:5,10 87:13,13 88:18 101:11 125:17 142:7 152:20 167:22 170:22</p> <p><b>opinions</b> 50:7 51:7 54:22 91:3</p> <p><b>opportunity</b> 33:1 62:1 82:10 175:10</p> <p><b>opposed</b> 79:4</p> <p><b>opposite</b> 168:2</p> <p><b>ops</b> 130:7 132:10</p> <p><b>option</b> 10:10 82:8 133:25 169:21</p> <p><b>options</b> 12:16 23:11 70:6 93:23 112:25 117:3,4,8,10 121:19 125:20 166:11 177:4</p> <p><b>oral</b> 48:17,21 71:4 142:25</p> <p><b>order</b> 5:1 41:3 118:24 141:2 155:2,7 176:10 177:13</p> <p><b>ordinarily</b> 182:12</p> <p><b>organisation</b> 130:11 153:8,18</p> <p><b>organisations</b> 25:17 132:6,12 135:20 137:20 153:16</p> <p><b>organise</b> 107:17 108:18</p> <p><b>organised</b> 4:12 11:1,5,8,16 114:6</p> <p><b>origin</b> 44:18 140:13</p>	<p><b>original</b> 100:22,23 101:4 153:21 154:3,22</p> <p><b>originally</b> 16:13,19 140:24</p> <p><b>ought</b> 57:7,14 87:5</p> <p><b>outcome</b> 12:17 87:3 87:10 102:16 110:8 118:22 178:20,21 180:16</p> <p><b>outlined</b> 76:23 100:12 173:1</p> <p><b>outset</b> 19:17 90:9 133:17 144:4</p> <p><b>outside</b> 109:19 161:21 171:10 172:3</p> <p><b>overall</b> 5:10 72:15 103:22</p> <p><b>overburden</b> 67:19</p> <p><b>overburdening</b> 65:15</p> <p><b>overestimate</b> 150:10</p> <p><b>overlap</b> 177:7,9</p> <p><b>overlapping</b> 177:3</p> <p><b>overlay</b> 159:4</p> <p><b>overloaded</b> 44:19 107:11</p> <p><b>overlook</b> 2:1</p> <p><b>overlooked</b> 90:1,15 133:24</p> <p><b>oversaw</b> 17:8 19:11 25:15 26:17</p> <p><b>oversee</b> 27:1 143:8</p> <p><b>overseeing</b> 16:3 29:21,24</p> <p><b>oversight</b> 131:6,8 136:21 154:18,20</p> <p><b>overt</b> 172:18</p> <p><b>overview</b> 108:23 133:4</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>P</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>P</b> 133:6</p>	<p><b>package</b> 120:8</p> <p><b>page</b> 18:7 52:3 58:23 64:20 76:17 76:19 79:5 80:15 127:6 128:20 129:11 141:14 175:7</p> <p><b>pages</b> 1:15,19 48:8</p> <p><b>pagination</b> 127:6</p> <p><b>panda</b> 171:9</p> <p><b>paper</b> 61:11 68:2</p> <p><b>papers</b> 49:10</p> <p><b>paperwork</b> 25:25</p> <p><b>paragraph</b> 23:2 25:13 27:17 29:23 39:16 40:20 42:7 49:16 54:3 58:2,6 58:24 59:20 60:9 64:20 69:24 76:18 79:6 83:12 84:18 84:22 89:14 92:24 93:1 94:9 95:25 97:6 100:11,22 102:2 105:21 106:14 110:17 113:4 118:6 119:8 125:5,23 126:12 127:6,13,25 128:19,23 129:11 129:16 130:5,19 130:23,24 131:1,1 131:5,25 132:7 133:1 136:4 140:4 141:14 142:21 143:2,3 144:9,11 144:21,23 145:2 145:19 146:9 147:22 148:10 150:17 151:11 153:25 159:19,22 174:5 175:6,19 176:13</p> <p><b>paragraphs</b> 50:20 52:2 58:23 60:10 64:3 84:14,17</p>	<p>85:11,12 95:15,19 100:2,4 101:24 103:19 110:14 113:3 119:17,25 121:11 124:14 126:2 131:3,22 133:2 141:15,17 152:7 157:18 165:21 172:14 173:23,25</p> <p><b>parallels</b> 94:5,6</p> <p><b>parameters</b> 175:2 177:5 180:25</p> <p><b>park</b> 165:14,16</p> <p><b>part</b> 4:23 6:6 7:2 14:6 18:19 23:4 27:8 31:8,8,9,9 33:20 38:1,6 39:4 46:12 49:24 67:11 79:24 92:17 96:14 96:14 97:3 99:17 107:23 112:8 121:20 122:3 125:6,12 131:19 132:7 138:9 143:5 168:15 176:4 178:13,13 181:4</p> <p><b>participated</b> 122:20 156:4</p> <p><b>particular</b> 12:18 24:19 38:25 48:25 70:5 72:20 85:16 98:15 102:18 107:4,23 121:15 125:15 126:10 134:11,17 135:10 137:6 139:9 144:21 150:16 165:16 178:17</p> <p><b>particularly</b> 15:14 15:22 22:14 23:10 31:6 38:21,22,23 40:10 41:3,21 43:11 49:7,14 54:14 61:3 75:14</p>
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

75:16 76:11,14 93:25 108:17 111:24 112:22,24 117:25 121:17 130:13 132:22 134:20 136:1 146:6 156:13 158:23 159:6 167:4 168:7 176:6 176:19 181:2 <b>particulars</b> 49:2 <b>parties</b> 83:5,15 <b>parts</b> 28:23 29:5 30:16 31:11 37:16 47:6 48:25 57:19 122:7 129:18 162:13 177:10 <b>pass</b> 54:21 89:3 107:19 108:2,7 142:25 173:17 <b>passage</b> 145:1 <b>passed</b> 96:2 103:15 <b>passes</b> 159:11 <b>path</b> 149:25 <b>Patten</b> 16:20 24:16 <b>Pause</b> 159:18 <b>PAVA</b> 20:3 <b>pay</b> 13:20 <b>payload</b> 21:5 <b>PC</b> 141:24 <b>PCA</b> 25:6 <b>peer</b> 136:5,13 <b>Pemberton</b> 49:8 96:1 110:17 <b>pen</b> 5:20 6:25 <b>penetrate</b> 20:8 <b>Penn</b> 136:14 <b>penultimately</b> 39:15 <b>people</b> 7:7 10:10 21:18 22:6,18 26:5 51:16 59:23 61:12 62:19 67:23 77:12 87:7,18 104:5 130:10	132:13 139:10,15 149:3,22,23 177:20 178:14 181:6 <b>perceived</b> 38:18 61:16 62:7 63:20 80:10,18 <b>perfect</b> 175:23 <b>perfection</b> 49:20 52:7 88:6 <b>perforate</b> 20:8 <b>perform</b> 7:25 14:8 85:4 101:2 110:1 <b>performance</b> 86:12 88:12,14 93:4 102:5 105:1 107:12 110:1 <b>performed</b> 14:13 54:16 <b>performing</b> 75:9 <b>period</b> 11:17 19:16 25:20,22 27:16 28:13 104:4 168:23 169:10 <b>periodic</b> 48:10 <b>periods</b> 61:4 70:25 88:16 90:7,15,24 91:8 94:25 <b>periphery</b> 78:25 <b>permissibility</b> 59:12 <b>permission</b> 54:5 <b>person</b> 22:8 30:11 35:15 36:6,11 37:6,7,23 39:13 45:21 50:11 81:22 106:23 171:12 <b>personal</b> 18:5 39:7 89:10,13 125:16 <b>personality</b> 65:21 <b>personally</b> 23:18 29:24 <b>personnel</b> 163:12 <b>persons</b> 139:10 <b>perspective</b> 66:7	149:17 <b>pertinent</b> 49:14 127:24 <b>Peter</b> 26:9 70:3 119:1 150:21 151:6 <b>photocopies</b> 68:5 <b>phrase</b> 127:12 181:22 <b>physical</b> 62:18 <b>physiological</b> 54:7 54:12 <b>physiology</b> 54:18 <b>picked</b> 96:24 168:10 171:5 <b>picture</b> 5:20 6:25 42:10 46:24 66:5 165:1,3 175:23 <b>piece</b> 24:12 27:23 43:23 129:18 133:13 134:11,17 138:17,20 139:9 <b>pieces</b> 45:7 <b>PIM</b> 77:22 <b>pitfalls</b> 114:11 <b>place</b> 24:17 38:2 70:8 93:16 98:25 101:17,21 106:16 107:5 110:5 111:19 130:2 134:20 158:3 168:14 169:15 175:14 177:17 179:3 181:7 <b>placed</b> 151:12 <b>places</b> 164:16 <b>plan</b> 75:15 117:20 171:18,24 172:10 <b>planned</b> 5:24 62:15 <b>planners</b> 63:9 164:18 165:12 <b>planning</b> 22:16 48:22 80:1 118:23 172:8,20 173:15 <b>plans</b> 108:25	138:11 <b>plastic</b> 16:13 <b>platform</b> 33:10 116:1,13 118:8 <b>play</b> 16:23 24:17 <b>played</b> 23:4 125:6 <b>please</b> 1:4 2:7 3:22 11:7 15:15 16:9 23:3 26:20 34:14 40:21 42:7 54:3 55:11 56:22 58:22 60:9 63:3 69:25 76:17 79:17 84:9 84:13,14 93:9 95:17 100:2,3,4,6 101:24 110:12 113:14 119:24 121:3,10 124:15 127:5 145:23 152:14 164:6 165:22 166:16 175:1,4 176:13 180:6 181:22 <b>pm</b> 55:5 95:6,8 139:25 140:2 183:5 <b>PNC</b> 63:7 <b>pocketbook</b> 78:24 <b>point</b> 2:2 6:1 7:2,19 7:25 15:5 17:17 21:16 22:5 33:4 35:19 36:12 44:10 52:16 54:3 59:10 73:3 74:10 80:12 84:7 103:3 117:12 117:14,14 123:4 129:4,14 137:12 138:1 141:5 143:17 147:22 148:5,20,21 157:3 162:15 166:7,17 166:20,21,24 167:2,16,20,21 168:22 169:1,12 170:8,10,14,24	172:5 174:5 178:12,14,22 179:1,15 180:3 <b>pointing</b> 141:10 <b>points</b> 4:24 52:3 72:17 94:18 166:1 166:3,5,19 167:7 167:10,17 174:24 180:5 <b>police</b> 2:7,8,10,14 2:17,19,22 3:1,8 3:15,19 5:18,21 6:7,20,23 7:20,21 8:10 9:1 10:4,18 11:9,14 12:10,15 14:16 15:8,9,17 15:19 16:3 19:3 20:15 21:23 22:11 23:20 24:1,11,14 24:23 25:8,11,17 27:12 28:5 30:14 33:15 34:20 35:7 39:5,20 40:3 41:6 42:11 50:25 51:9 51:13,14,22 52:21 55:14 56:6 59:5 60:4 61:16 63:4 63:24 70:9 73:6 81:9,11 90:21 92:19 98:3 104:8 105:19 124:4,8 128:4,9 129:2,8 130:7 131:16 143:19 146:2,8 147:8 151:13 152:2 153:17 154:23 161:19,23 163:11,13,17 168:17 170:18 171:11,21,23 174:14 175:11 177:23 178:11 <b>Police's</b> 123:17 <b>policing</b> 3:22,24 6:2 12:21 16:21
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

<p>16:24 17:12,22  18:2,5 22:5 26:24  34:17 39:25 40:5  49:22 50:1,23  52:9,16 55:20  56:25 57:4 58:5  63:12 64:16,19  93:11,12,14,15  124:18 146:12,18  150:15 152:16,17  152:22 171:15  178:15,18  <b>policy</b> 15:6,12  27:15 51:6 58:22  72:15 80:5 109:13  109:17,21,23  110:2 126:15  127:19 138:11  146:8 161:1 175:5  <b>political</b> 137:15  150:25  <b>politicians</b> 136:8  <b>poor</b> 70:6  <b>pops</b> 135:2  <b>population</b> 31:19  <b>Porton</b> 132:8  <b>pose</b> 84:6 139:17  <b>posed</b> 20:12 58:21  <b>poses</b> 82:6 139:19  <b>posing</b> 21:11  <b>position</b> 4:11 28:23  32:24 39:7,8 50:6  77:10 81:2,14  83:1 85:13 98:1  98:10 99:21 103:4  103:4 114:19  116:25 117:15  119:5,25 121:5  123:2 141:15,18  144:8 147:11,14  149:4 160:15,22  161:6  <b>positions</b> 137:18  <b>positive</b> 116:22  <b>possession</b> 43:25</p>	<p>153:25  <b>possibilities</b> 51:1  <b>possibility</b> 79:23  <b>possible</b> 19:12  76:21 79:13 84:8  120:6 175:21  179:5  <b>possibly</b> 6:14 86:14  164:14  <b>post-2003</b> 130:13  158:9  <b>post-incident</b> 53:3  69:8 70:9,21  71:19 77:15,17  78:12,15  <b>postdated</b> 103:21  <b>postgraduate</b> 3:18  <b>potential</b> 16:17  17:6 18:9,22 20:7  20:10,11,22 22:20  38:15 39:11 41:5  59:23 110:1 112:9  112:25 114:11  117:4,8,10 118:21  119:15 159:5  168:15  <b>potentially</b> 16:18  32:12 49:14 53:11  78:18 109:11  118:10 122:6  123:5 163:18  180:10  <b>pound</b> 163:7  <b>PowerPoint</b> 43:16  43:20 44:25 167:9  <b>powers</b> 80:22  <b>practical</b> 133:3  <b>practice</b> 9:21 15:11  15:13,25 16:22  21:22 22:12 23:5  23:10 24:18 26:21  31:18 34:8 45:12  46:16,19 51:6  62:21,25 68:9  69:4,4 96:24</p>	<p>102:19 104:16  124:8,12 125:18  126:3 131:25  133:2,5 135:13  140:15 142:14  143:11,22 149:12  151:14,14 158:8  161:22  <b>practitioner</b> 112:6  132:18 149:13  <b>practitioners</b>  146:23 160:18  <b>pragmatic</b> 49:18  52:6  <b>pre-existing</b> 158:22  <b>pre-planned</b> 7:17  89:17  <b>precede</b> 152:6  <b>preceded</b> 103:20  <b>precedes</b> 73:13  <b>precursor</b> 14:21  <b>predecessor</b> 26:7,9  <b>pregnant</b> 134:24  <b>premises</b> 165:17  <b>preparation</b> 49:10  <b>prepare</b> 48:3,6  <b>prepared</b> 60:24  <b>presence</b> 62:18  170:18  <b>present</b> 17:6 65:19  81:23 82:1 101:6  148:18 180:11  <b>presentation</b> 42:15  43:17 45:1,1,2  47:18  <b>presentations</b>  132:21 146:21  167:9  <b>presented</b> 43:18  46:21,24 70:11  79:19 82:8 94:12  123:20 171:2  173:3  <b>presents</b> 81:22 82:3  82:25 164:18</p>	<p><b>pressure</b> 107:11  <b>Preston's</b> 142:6  <b>prevent</b> 132:1  140:16,22  <b>prevents</b> 47:14  <b>previous</b> 17:7  19:19 36:4 39:8  59:17 84:7 96:25  97:21 111:17  <b>previously</b> 81:15  132:8 136:5  <b>primacy</b> 166:7  168:1  <b>primarily</b> 3:1 5:23  6:9 97:21  <b>primary</b> 18:22  119:24 144:4  <b>principal</b> 84:11  119:16  <b>principals</b> 77:13  78:25  <b>principle</b> 88:3  134:3  <b>principles</b> 22:15  57:16,19 62:4  <b>prior</b> 18:11 99:14  100:14 103:12  <b>prioritise</b> 61:7,12  <b>prioritised</b> 60:2  177:13  <b>priority</b> 79:11  175:24 176:9,10  178:2  <b>prison</b> 182:16  <b>privilege</b> 28:14  33:6  <b>privileged</b> 28:22  32:23 34:7  <b>proactively</b> 114:11  <b>probability</b> 59:23  <b>probably</b> 14:4  17:11 25:25 56:8  56:10 66:3 70:17  75:23 81:23 98:8  136:25 170:25</p>	<p>177:24  <b>problem</b> 13:18,18  38:17,18  <b>problems</b> 21:19  106:6 139:16  159:5  <b>procedure</b> 58:22  72:10 80:7 126:15  127:19 130:15  142:15 161:4  175:5  <b>procedures</b> 23:9  77:16,18 78:13  125:11  <b>proceed</b> 143:10  180:2  <b>proceedings</b> 19:7  35:17  <b>process</b> 19:22,23  24:16 26:23 27:14  37:12,14 38:7,12  38:17 47:7,10  56:13 58:17 64:4  68:22 93:20  101:21 102:14  105:11 106:2  110:6 111:7,9  112:12 124:4,10  134:8 136:20  138:7 139:19  141:4 143:20  146:13,18,24  147:3,12 148:6  149:1,12,24  157:18 158:18  162:8  <b>processed</b> 30:8  <b>produced</b> 22:22  162:23  <b>product</b> 138:4  <b>production</b> 16:3  29:25 130:21  <b>professional</b> 31:18  39:8 51:12,24  151:15,23</p>
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

<b>professions</b> 132:9 132:13	61:9,9 76:21 80:3 83:22 176:8	66:25 75:19 153:21 165:13	71:13 141:19 152:10 164:1,8 184:6	<b>rating</b> 64:2,7 <b>rationale</b> 72:5 176:3,16
<b>profile</b> 171:12	<b>provided</b> 9:4 18:4 35:3 48:18 61:24	176:8,22 177:22 178:10	<b>quick</b> 147:18 <b>quickly</b> 51:24 140:18 153:19 175:21	<b>reached</b> 107:18 166:2,24 168:2,11 170:9
<b>programme</b> 16:8 16:13 17:18,20,23 17:24 21:3 27:2,8 28:10 38:6 85:19 89:16 153:1	66:22 79:25 81:7 83:2 101:15 126:14 140:6	<b>purposes</b> 4:17 64:2 64:7 68:16 154:18 154:20,21 165:17 167:11 172:6	<b>quite</b> 6:14 20:9 35:22 41:22,25 45:8 49:8 51:17 57:10 66:4 76:2 76:11 82:23 91:4 104:18 118:15,16 123:4 133:19 134:9 139:7 150:5 168:11 171:11,12 177:6 179:10	<b>reaching</b> 98:22 173:14
<b>programmes</b> 25:15	<b>providers</b> 91:17 93:6	<b>pursued</b> 22:13	<b>quoted</b> 108:9	<b>read</b> 65:2 79:5 93:7 134:4 155:5
<b>progress</b> 169:2,20 170:13	<b>provides</b> 96:22 128:25	<b>pushing</b> 112:13	<b>quoting</b> 60:5	<b>reading</b> 148:25 150:24 181:10 182:8
<b>progresses</b> 58:17	<b>providing</b> 34:21 53:25 79:1 80:19 102:15 115:5 142:1 152:25	<b>put</b> 11:22 19:21 52:21 57:17 66:6 67:6 91:3 108:21 150:3 158:14 165:24 171:9 178:1 181:7,20	<b>quote</b> 141:5	<b>ready</b> 137:18
<b>project</b> 21:8,8 22:1 22:4 140:25	<b>provision</b> 13:19 34:11 52:20 53:15	<b>putting</b> 67:21 82:16 174:1	<b>quoting</b> 60:5	<b>real</b> 29:14 78:11 133:3,22
<b>projectile</b> 17:4 19:15 20:19 21:5 136:12 148:2	<b>provisions</b> 126:2		<b>quiz</b> 42:3	<b>real-time</b> 53:10
<b>projectiles</b> 20:7	<b>PSDB</b> 141:3,7,12	<b>Q</b>	<b>quote</b> 141:5	<b>realise</b> 106:24
<b>promotion</b> 7:23 13:23	<b>PSNI</b> 29:3 85:19 94:10	<b>Q9</b> 119:16	<b>quoted</b> 108:9	<b>reality</b> 49:21 112:17
<b>prompting</b> 66:17	<b>psychological</b> 54:7 54:12	<b>qualifications</b> 3:7	<b>quoting</b> 60:5	<b>really</b> 27:14 66:5 101:5 108:16 145:25,25 155:25
<b>proof</b> 174:1	<b>public</b> 5:1 27:10 31:6,11 36:7,14 51:1 81:15 86:3 118:14 155:2,6 163:23 167:11 168:20 169:3 170:12 171:1 175:23 176:9 177:23 178:1,2,6 178:11 179:3,7 180:11 182:13	<b>qualified</b> 39:21 40:2,11 45:21 54:6,11 103:10 113:10	<b>R</b>	<b>reason</b> 51:11,20 118:20 144:9 174:7,13
<b>propensity</b> 118:17	<b>published</b> 22:23 25:15 31:4,5 127:2	<b>qualifies</b> 84:24	<b>radical</b> 146:7	<b>reasonable</b> 49:19 50:11,16 52:6 53:18,20 69:19 88:4 118:1 122:5 168:25 169:10,17 170:5,10 172:20
<b>proper</b> 86:8 87:1 166:10	<b>PUF</b> 14:19 15:3,16 15:17 24:20 25:14 25:21 27:18 30:8 162:2	<b>quality</b> 27:1 74:4 112:24 138:4	<b>raised</b> 64:10,11 98:8 105:19 115:14	<b>reasonableness</b> 53:20
<b>properly</b> 18:24 23:23 69:18 86:4 86:5 105:16 123:23 154:11	<b>pull</b> 46:6	<b>quantum</b> 174:1	<b>ran</b> 25:14	<b>reasonably</b> 150:25 155:1
<b>proportion</b> 13:2 25:20	<b>pulled</b> 22:7,18	<b>quarter</b> 13:5	<b>range</b> 2:25 4:9 6:5 7:8 8:14 15:8,21 16:16 19:2 25:18 34:22 37:16 57:2 78:19 84:1 88:10 93:14,22 112:9 113:22 137:19 152:19 171:14 178:4	<b>reasoned</b> 86:23 115:1
<b>proportionality</b> 60:4	<b>purchasing</b> 24:8	<b>query</b> 141:22 142:12	<b>ranks</b> 63:13	<b>reasons</b> 13:6 50:18 62:22 70:4 74:15 82:7 83:3 105:4 113:2 128:17 131:8 149:10,14 171:13 174:17
<b>proportionate</b> 58:20 115:1 167:1	<b>purpose</b> 57:22	<b>question</b> 10:23 45:23,23 53:16,19 53:21 67:15 74:21 85:24 127:8,24 129:9 142:6 156:22 157:2 167:13	<b>rare</b> 12:14,14 175:22	<b>reassess</b> 58:4
<b>prosecution</b> 4:20 5:4 70:3 166:3,9		<b>questioned</b> 41:23	<b>rate</b> 89:4 108:11,12	
<b>protect</b> 5:1 76:12 175:25 178:11,11 178:12 179:7,7		<b>questioning</b> 156:11	<b>rates</b> 108:7,9	
<b>protected</b> 177:14		<b>questions</b> 1:9,11 54:4,17 57:12 66:18 70:22 71:8	<b>ratified</b> 163:7	
<b>protection</b> 167:12 182:14				
<b>proved</b> 20:13				
<b>provide</b> 15:6 47:23				

117:17 <b>reassessment</b> 88:22 <b>recall</b> 11:4 13:4 37:15 60:22 62:10 62:20 63:6 64:11 91:8,13 153:3,7 153:14,21 154:21 161:24 <b>rece</b> 165:17 <b>receipt</b> 122:12 <b>receive</b> 48:10,13 86:11 96:14 <b>received</b> 56:2 97:22 130:13 153:14 156:3 175:13 <b>receiving</b> 92:2 <b>recognise</b> 176:8 <b>recognising</b> 177:2 <b>recommendation</b> 120:11 <b>recommendations</b> 92:4 158:10 <b>record</b> 57:7 66:19 72:1 74:18,20,23 75:5,10,12,13,18 75:21 76:13 77:13 78:1 96:13 106:4 106:8 120:10 <b>recorded</b> 51:25 68:1 69:14 72:13 73:22 74:6 75:23 76:20 77:6 163:20 176:4,17 177:10 <b>recorded'</b> 74:8 <b>recording</b> 57:13 66:11 69:12 70:4 71:11,12 72:15,25 73:9,15 74:1 77:2 77:7 79:11 115:8 163:8 <b>records</b> 68:13 71:20 75:16,18 96:3 97:2 103:13 105:24 107:3 120:3,6,14 121:2	<b>recourse</b> 16:17 <b>red</b> 58:23 <b>redacted</b> 10:18 <b>reduce</b> 17:5 <b>refer</b> 55:8 58:6 <b>reference</b> 15:20 22:10 29:21 72:14 94:17 96:1 119:18 161:23 162:18 173:24 179:20 <b>referenced</b> 46:3 132:16 <b>references</b> 44:17 162:21 <b>referral</b> 102:22,23 157:5 <b>referred</b> 101:20 103:16 <b>referring</b> 54:14 102:2 131:20 <b>refers</b> 59:22 148:16 <b>reflect</b> 49:21 51:8 57:19 66:2 73:6 147:11 176:9,11 <b>reflected</b> 167:9 <b>reflections</b> 73:25 <b>reflects</b> 147:14 <b>reforming</b> 27:14 <b>refrained</b> 87:2 <b>refreshed</b> 120:7 <b>refresher</b> 96:6,18 98:18,23,24 99:2 99:3 <b>regard</b> 63:8 96:16 104:3 118:7 147:8 <b>regarded</b> 9:20 91:22 94:14 <b>regarding</b> 52:11 53:3 63:9 72:14 144:14 146:13,18 160:20 161:3 <b>regime</b> 37:13 38:1 137:21 <b>region</b> 24:22 177:21	<b>regular</b> 5:5 11:2 35:9,22 <b>regularity</b> 6:12 32:9 <b>regularly</b> 36:24 148:10 176:6,18 <b>rehearsed</b> 72:4 73:18,19 <b>reinforce</b> 104:20 <b>reinforced</b> 81:14 97:10 <b>reinforcement</b> 97:21 <b>reinforces</b> 53:2 <b>reiterated</b> 56:18 143:9 <b>relate</b> 43:11 <b>related</b> 23:15 38:23 74:12 151:3 <b>relates</b> 39:18 121:17 127:18 <b>relating</b> 3:24 47:24 54:8 70:22 71:8 71:11,13 138:17 146:10 157:21 <b>relation</b> 3:1 12:22 14:14 15:5,11,21 15:22 16:4,11 19:4 20:21 22:6 22:13,20 26:5 28:15 29:5 30:1 30:17 31:2 34:18 38:21 39:15,23 40:7,12,15,25 41:5 42:15 43:10 47:17 49:18 51:13 54:6,11,20 57:24 58:20 60:6,11 61:23 64:12 67:3 68:13 70:21 71:16 71:20 73:10 74:11 77:25 78:2,4,10 78:12 83:4,14,23 87:12,14,19,25 88:25 89:10 90:18	93:24 94:7 96:23 98:3,9 99:13,20 99:24 100:1 104:9 105:2,5,8,22 108:4,15,17,23 109:14,23 111:24 113:16 114:14,20 115:12 116:9,12 117:7 119:9 120:15,23 124:25 127:8,16 132:14 133:11 135:20 136:1,11 137:15 137:20 138:3 142:4,13,18 144:12 145:21 146:1 147:12,17 147:20,25 150:4 150:21 152:24 154:10 155:15,25 156:11 157:21 158:11,24 160:7 160:10 162:8,23 166:18,21 167:14 167:15 168:7,22 177:7,9,15 180:21 181:1,2 <b>relative</b> 77:19 <b>relevance</b> 39:24 40:4 43:2 45:25 54:4 58:15 105:14 123:3 <b>relevant</b> 41:23 42:4 49:15 53:21 57:2 58:20 63:15 68:10 76:13 80:22,24 84:5,8 85:20 96:22 99:8,19 100:16 104:10 109:11,25 110:6 112:25 119:10 121:16 124:18 133:16 134:14 139:5 144:13 146:22 150:25	160:19 162:1 <b>reliability</b> 18:25 65:10 134:2 135:21 159:3 <b>reliable</b> 144:19 <b>reliant</b> 54:21 104:23 <b>relied</b> 79:9 <b>rely</b> 134:7 <b>relying</b> 59:13 151:6 <b>remain</b> 71:3 85:7 88:24 98:18 111:4 119:22 120:17 132:4 160:1,15,22 161:5 173:7 175:17 <b>remark</b> 131:13 <b>remedial</b> 97:4 <b>Remember</b> 141:25 <b>reminder</b> 58:17 <b>reminding</b> 81:1 <b>remit</b> 7:8 140:11 161:22 <b>remote</b> 11:23 <b>Remount</b> 27:24 28:2,4,5 <b>removed</b> 102:4 <b>repeated</b> 123:1 165:13 <b>repetition</b> 47:14 <b>replace</b> 19:18 <b>replacement</b> 17:2 <b>replied</b> 141:24 <b>replying</b> 141:22 <b>report</b> 1:14,18 6:22 7:13 16:2 20:1 21:20 23:2 25:13 29:23 39:16 40:21 47:24 48:3,6,25 49:2,16 50:21 52:2 54:1 58:2 59:11 69:24 71:22 73:11 81:17 84:15 85:12,13 95:16,25 100:3,13,15,17,23
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

102:20 110:14	142:16 152:2	181:16	<b>revised</b> 110:23	32:17 34:18 37:8
119:17 120:1	156:12 157:24	<b>responsible</b> 16:2	<b>revisions</b> 176:5,17	39:5 75:9 87:12
121:5,11 122:16	158:2,14 159:24	29:24 34:21 59:5	<b>revolutionary</b>	97:2 100:25
122:17 124:15	160:5 161:24	59:9 102:10 103:5	45:11 130:3	107:15 108:17
125:5 130:19,21	<b>requirements</b>	117:10 121:3	<b>rifle</b> 7:10	112:8 114:22
140:5 144:22	15:24 23:5,15,18	124:23 125:3	<b>right</b> 2:1,7 3:9 5:11	120:4 152:23
146:9 157:6	68:12 77:23	126:6 177:16	6:8,18 7:15,21 9:4	153:9,12
159:20 162:16	111:20 124:7	<b>restated</b> 81:7	11:12 14:17 18:12	<b>roles</b> 141:1 167:3
165:22 172:14	125:7,24 150:4	<b>restricted</b> 27:12	18:16 21:24 26:16	<b>rolling</b> 153:1
173:1,24 174:18	151:12	<b>result</b> 19:8 26:21	31:19 48:1 50:18	<b>round</b> 17:2,5 21:4
<b>reported</b> 91:9	<b>requires</b> 53:15,22	47:10 81:8,17	60:10,16 68:16	127:23 158:5
<b>reports</b> 1:23 49:7	83:3 129:6	118:25 126:4	69:1 76:24,25	160:4
51:13 55:8 87:2	<b>requiring</b> 56:20	<b>resulting</b> 53:11	80:13 83:1,17	<b>rounds</b> 12:9 16:12
93:24 101:6	65:8	118:8	87:3 89:1 92:10	121:4,9
103:11,23 104:3	<b>research</b> 16:14,22	<b>retain</b> 78:1	96:9 103:4 117:24	<b>route</b> 154:13
104:14 105:7,10	18:10,18 19:4	<b>retired</b> 2:21	124:7 125:12	<b>routes</b> 31:12
171:5	23:10 25:15	<b>retraining</b> 88:21	131:1 133:24	<b>run</b> 27:24 72:8
<b>representatives</b>	140:25 153:18,20	<b>retrospective</b> 99:13	151:9 162:21	74:17 113:18
24:24 25:10	161:4	<b>return</b> 153:25	173:11 179:19	179:1,14 180:22
<b>represented</b> 24:22	<b>researched</b> 23:7,24	155:1	181:12 183:1	182:11,13
<b>reputation</b> 32:19	125:9 126:1	<b>returned</b> 103:23	<b>rights</b> 25:17 51:5	<b>running</b> 152:19
36:13 86:3	<b>resilience</b> 26:5	<b>returning</b> 36:6	<b>ringing</b> 38:24	
<b>request</b> 13:20	<b>resolution</b> 59:18	<b>returns</b> 153:14	<b>RIP</b> 12:8,11 156:17	<b>S</b>
54:15 173:13	<b>resolve</b> 115:1	154:16	158:5,11 160:4	<b>SACMILL</b> 132:8
<b>requested</b> 33:9	<b>resolved</b> 9:16 11:18	<b>reveal</b> 69:13 78:1	<b>risk</b> 32:3 41:4 43:3	<b>safe</b> 21:10 115:2
<b>requesting</b> 173:4	<b>resource</b> 33:12	<b>revealed</b> 156:7	43:12 62:12 81:22	171:1
<b>require</b> 4:23	34:16	<b>revelatory</b> 74:21	117:4 118:5,9,10	<b>safeguard</b> 177:20
175:25	<b>resources</b> 61:13	<b>review</b> 17:16 26:17	118:12,19 166:11	177:23
<b>required</b> 4:11	113:21	29:19,22,25 51:21	177:14 181:6	<b>safer</b> 118:24 160:4
13:10,10 38:2	<b>respect</b> 149:13	70:9 71:19 92:18	<b>risks</b> 111:24 112:14	<b>safety</b> 18:5 25:15
62:17 89:23	<b>respond</b> 7:4	93:20 101:8 104:7	113:11,23 114:11	105:4 118:14
107:18 110:21	<b>responded</b> 161:5	105:13,15 109:25	114:21 115:21	121:19 122:2,8
121:16 123:6	<b>responding</b> 6:1	115:6 136:5 138:7	116:10,15,17	123:1 151:1 160:9
130:1 133:9	<b>response</b> 41:5	139:13 150:19	180:20 181:5	166:12 169:3
135:13 136:5,19	53:10 58:11 59:5	156:4	182:17,18	170:12 175:24
136:25 149:5	59:6 60:4 78:12	<b>reviewed</b> 58:10	<b>road</b> 133:18	176:9 177:20
161:4 166:10	80:10,18 82:15	92:22 109:12	<b>robberies</b> 4:8 7:10	178:2,6,6,6 179:3
174:8,15 179:17	146:16	136:13 175:18	7:14 8:16 180:19	179:3,4
<b>requirement</b> 13:15	<b>responsibilities</b>	176:6,19	<b>robbers</b> 182:9	<b>sat</b> 48:21
13:17 17:21 19:18	15:3,22 35:6	<b>reviewing</b> 48:7	<b>robbery</b> 77:25	<b>satisfaction</b> 46:24
20:22,25 38:10	167:4	93:3 109:10	165:17,18 166:5,9	<b>satisfactory</b> 96:16
58:4 78:1 96:17	<b>responsibility</b> 15:4	<b>reviews</b> 19:24	168:2,19 179:24	<b>satisfied</b> 173:4,12
111:21 116:7	70:16 76:23 80:21	29:15 30:10 41:20	182:10	174:24
117:3,6 136:13,16	86:11 106:12	42:18 53:3 81:8	<b>Rodney</b> 53:5	<b>save</b> 77:12
137:20 138:5	123:17 130:8	115:13	<b>role</b> 5:15 14:13,16	<b>saw</b> 28:19 93:7

94:6 <b>saying</b> 44:22 86:24 87:2 97:13 105:3 119:12 140:15 151:5 172:1 180:4 <b>says</b> 18:8 58:7 59:2 59:21 65:3,4 67:14 73:18,20 74:3 92:13 106:18 108:16 123:5 128:2 140:24 141:1 143:2 174:6 178:1 <b>scalable</b> 56:19 <b>scale</b> 57:3 <b>scenarios</b> 28:11,16 94:11 <b>scheme</b> 150:6 <b>Scholarship</b> 3:14 <b>science</b> 51:4 135:24 <b>scientific</b> 16:22 19:1 24:24 132:22 135:18 136:6 150:2 <b>scientists</b> 20:25 139:7 <b>scope</b> 70:22 71:8 145:20 <b>scoped</b> 159:10 <b>Scotland</b> 22:21 137:14 <b>scratch</b> 21:6 <b>scrutinise</b> 137:18 <b>scrutiny</b> 19:7 31:6 34:9 69:9 131:7 132:24 <b>second</b> 26:5 51:20 53:9,24 85:12 95:24 100:3 107:8 110:12 121:11 123:9 125:1 130:19 137:23 140:5 159:20 162:14 166:20 <b>secondary</b> 18:22	144:5 <b>secondly</b> 1:18 68:22 114:7 160:6 164:25 <b>secretariat</b> 26:4 147:19 157:11 <b>Secretary</b> 17:25 23:6,8,15,19 24:5 24:18 125:8,10,24 126:2,5 129:2,7 130:6 150:15 161:20 <b>Secretary's</b> 135:13 <b>section</b> 42:9 72:13 128:6 <b>secure</b> 165:25 <b>Security</b> 28:6 <b>see</b> 9:14 13:17 17:20 31:15 56:11 67:16 76:25 78:22 82:12 83:12 94:24 98:20,20 117:18 123:22 127:23 139:5 153:19 169:5,20 171:17 175:14 179:6,10 179:18 <b>seeing</b> 24:12 158:13 <b>seek</b> 24:19 47:1 49:19 52:6 54:5 162:4 <b>seeking</b> 113:16 140:15,22 142:15 157:25 158:18 172:23 177:13 181:19 182:4,5 <b>seen</b> 9:18 17:13 22:24 29:12 45:19 46:9 47:5 51:12 57:9 62:7 66:8,21 67:3 68:1 75:23 76:6,7 80:5 86:5 88:18 93:20 99:25 100:14,17 103:20 104:13,17,19	105:2 110:9 115:6 119:19 121:24 123:24 151:8 155:25 159:23 160:8,11 162:19 167:6 170:17 173:3 177:19 <b>selected</b> 119:6 <b>selection</b> 74:11 <b>selections</b> 70:5 <b>self</b> 20:18 <b>self-designed</b> 76:9 76:10 <b>send</b> 9:2 171:1 182:15 <b>sending</b> 104:22 170:19 171:7 <b>senior</b> 37:4 39:5 128:5 142:7 143:19 160:18 163:12 <b>sense</b> 33:25 34:3 38:12 65:8,13 81:2,13 84:12 92:18 <b>sent</b> 102:9 104:5,6 150:20 <b>sentence</b> 59:8 84:22 127:8 130:3 <b>sentences</b> 125:4 <b>separate</b> 17:18 106:3 167:5 169:22,23,24 <b>separately</b> 128:20 <b>separation</b> 167:3 <b>September</b> 47:23 48:5 <b>sequence</b> 68:23 <b>sergeant</b> 4:6 <b>series</b> 111:12 133:3 <b>serious</b> 4:1,7 7:10 34:5 87:16 91:14 94:10 122:10 123:11,11 165:19 <b>served</b> 2:10 8:8	<b>service</b> 2:6,7,8,11 4:21 5:4 11:24 12:15 14:7 21:13 25:11 31:7 52:21 55:14 56:1,6 59:16 63:4,6,24 81:9,11 158:1 168:18 <b>services</b> 2:25 7:7 9:17 25:17 28:6,7 85:18 129:2,8 130:7 <b>sessions</b> 111:12 <b>set</b> 16:19 27:8,23 50:20 51:15 82:9 84:19 90:23 91:1 91:3 125:18 133:6 149:12 157:18 167:7 173:21 <b>sets</b> 62:3 64:4 147:3 174:7 <b>setting</b> 49:23 164:8 <b>seven</b> 18:10,18 28:13 <b>sexual</b> 4:8 <b>SFC</b> 8:3,8 14:7 41:3,9,14 66:10 67:2 70:15 84:25 85:4 114:9 173:5 <b>SFO</b> 29:3 100:13 100:15 105:23 107:4 <b>shading</b> 127:3 <b>shape</b> 73:24 <b>share</b> 160:19 <b>sheets</b> 91:17 <b>shelf</b> 21:15 <b>shifts</b> 7:4 <b>Shire</b> 5:25 42:11,16 47:6,25 60:19 70:24 75:11 84:12 84:25 93:8,10 94:12 97:8 115:19 115:24 117:2,8 119:11 122:20	164:5 <b>shooting</b> 29:16 81:16 <b>shootings</b> 7:14 8:16 8:17 29:17,22 <b>shops</b> 170:21 <b>short</b> 4:5 55:4 122:10 140:1 <b>short-term</b> 91:15 123:22 <b>shorter</b> 75:17 <b>shortest</b> 56:23 <b>show</b> 69:14,18 155:14 <b>showed</b> 107:13 <b>shown</b> 49:3 83:6 134:6 <b>shows</b> 43:14 44:5 <b>side</b> 85:23 86:1 180:4 <b>sign</b> 30:12 37:5 99:13 <b>signal</b> 94:21 <b>significance</b> 106:24 <b>significant</b> 13:10 17:12,23 20:7 23:4 28:5 47:14 56:2 60:22 71:10 77:5 78:7 91:13 94:13,16 98:15 99:19 105:22,25 108:4 113:8,12,15 113:22 114:4 123:6 125:6 139:17 146:21 148:23 150:7,9,9 150:13 151:25 160:12,24 162:1 163:23 168:23 169:9 <b>significantly</b> 14:6 41:13 46:18 59:18 <b>silver</b> 6:17,23 <b>similar</b> 9:25 10:3 11:21 12:17 19:16
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



29:7 56:11 57:22 77:10 91:11 105:7 153:16 156:10 <b>Similarly</b> 41:19 176:5 <b>Simon</b> 26:12 31:2 92:16 <b>simple</b> 181:4 <b>simply</b> 170:6 <b>simulated</b> 155:6 <b>single</b> 15:5 42:24 90:19 103:13 <b>SIO</b> 41:16 46:23 62:13 166:2 168:4 170:9 180:1 <b>SIOs</b> 41:22 <b>sir</b> 1:4,8,17,22,25 2:4,9,12,15,18,20 3:4,6,10,13,17,21 3:25 4:3,13,15,19 4:22 5:3,6,12,17 5:23 6:9,19,24 7:2 7:16,19,22 8:2,9 8:12,22 9:5,8 10:9 12:3,6,14 13:25 14:12,18,25 16:6 16:10 18:6,13,17 20:20 21:25 23:1 23:17 24:10,22 25:1,3,5,7,9,19 26:21 29:19 30:20 31:22,24 32:1,4 32:15 33:4 37:2 38:5,14 39:4 40:22 41:7,10,15 42:8,21 43:7 44:24 45:4,7,14 45:16 48:2,9,12 48:16,20,24 49:4 50:3,17 51:12 52:1 53:2 54:2,14 54:20,23 55:7,10 57:9 58:1,24 59:1 59:14 60:13,14,22 63:12,22 65:2,13	66:13,16,20 68:21 68:24 69:2,2,10 69:17,23 70:1,3 71:5,15 73:3,3,10 74:16,25 75:2,4,7 76:22,25 79:7,14 80:4,11,14 81:5 81:10,18 82:20 83:16,18,21 84:16 84:21 85:1,6,8,15 85:21 86:7 87:4,8 88:10 89:9,12 95:3,10,14,18,22 96:10,19 99:1,5 100:7,19 102:1 103:6 105:9 106:20 109:5,5,9 110:16 111:5,21 115:25 118:10 119:1,7,15,21,23 120:18 121:2,13 122:22 124:1,6,12 124:16,21,25 125:14 126:4,8,16 126:21 127:1,4,14 128:1,8,12,22 129:3,9 130:23,25 131:2,11,18,21 132:3,5 133:11 134:3 138:13,15 139:22,24 140:17 140:21 141:9,13 144:17,20 145:7 145:11,13,16 146:15 147:2,5,9 148:5,19 149:9,17 150:21 151:6,7,10 151:18,21 152:9 155:5,13,21 156:6 156:8 159:16,21 160:3,8,17,21,23 161:2,7,11 162:5 162:11,12,18 164:20,22 165:2,5 165:7,10,15,20,23	166:15 173:6,8,10 173:19 174:3,12 174:16,22,25 175:8 176:21,24 177:6 181:15 182:23 183:2 <b>sit</b> 1:7 16:21 22:9 <b>situation</b> 9:13 46:17 53:23 59:7 66:3 74:1 84:4 86:10 90:5 104:6 117:17 121:23 158:15 <b>situational</b> 43:3 <b>situations</b> 28:8 51:4 51:23 58:5 59:3 84:2 91:11 127:21 138:21 <b>size</b> 135:4 <b>sketch</b> 57:11 <b>skill</b> 89:8,23 <b>skilled</b> 22:8 115:3 116:12 <b>slightly</b> 31:13 44:3 45:9 56:4 57:21 68:7 69:7 104:25 <b>slip</b> 103:14 <b>slow</b> 51:21 102:20 <b>slowly</b> 85:10 <b>small</b> 7:6 33:22 139:11 <b>society</b> 50:23 118:24 <b>solely</b> 39:24 <b>somebody</b> 35:23 41:12 119:5 134:15 181:10 <b>somebody's</b> 35:10 <b>Somerset</b> 11:13 <b>somewhat</b> 49:12 69:6 <b>soon</b> 140:19 <b>SOP</b> 80:24 156:5,7 156:13,19 <b>sophisticated</b>	171:10 <b>sorry</b> 10:21,23 48:4 58:24 91:3 100:5 125:2 126:22 128:25 129:15 130:23 137:23 141:22 164:3 177:8 <b>sort</b> 37:2 41:17 45:17 86:18 88:23 108:19 140:17,21 159:16 179:11 <b>sorts</b> 24:2 38:7 <b>sound</b> 19:6 <b>source</b> 44:2,8 45:25 <b>sourced</b> 44:13 46:3 <b>sources</b> 45:3 46:22 93:13 <b>South</b> 5:18,21 6:7 6:20 7:20 <b>spanned</b> 11:3 <b>spans</b> 1:15,19 <b>speaker</b> 34:15 <b>speaking</b> 41:19 42:17 177:1 <b>speaks</b> 70:17 <b>special</b> 9:12 12:5,7 28:6,22 72:17,21 112:1 116:14 <b>specialist</b> 29:1 33:18 85:18 89:21 89:23 91:18 109:19 113:21 114:12 115:18,20 116:2,4 117:23 118:8 180:9 181:1 <b>specially</b> 17:5 <b>specific</b> 23:5,14 39:21,23 40:2 42:25 43:24 47:24 83:3,14,22 125:7 125:24 160:6,9 161:21,24 172:18 176:12 180:17 <b>specifically</b> 80:21	89:10 132:1 152:24 157:21 <b>specifications</b> 134:7 <b>specify</b> 18:20 60:24 136:17 178:19 179:1 <b>spectrum</b> 61:13 174:14 <b>speculatively</b> 140:9 <b>speed</b> 13:11 118:15 180:23 <b>spell</b> 4:6 <b>spend</b> 61:4 <b>spent</b> 5:10 <b>spilled</b> 27:6 <b>spins</b> 177:24 <b>split</b> 82:9 89:1 <b>split-second</b> 51:17 <b>spontaneous</b> 5:23 7:17 46:6 89:18 <b>staff</b> 25:11 107:16 108:18 <b>stage</b> 77:6 118:23 159:11 163:17 173:15 <b>stages</b> 75:11 89:16 114:1 <b>stand</b> 1:7,8 <b>standard</b> 8:14 19:5 27:4 49:20,23 50:10,14,15,16 51:16 52:7 55:18 55:18 72:9 80:6 88:5 107:18 110:20 125:18 151:4 158:21 <b>standards</b> 9:3 26:23 134:19,21 <b>standby</b> 72:12 73:21 <b>standing</b> 130:10 <b>start</b> 3:22 5:15 58:14 76:3,17 83:25 84:13
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

<p>153:18 175:12 177:19 183:3 <b>started</b> 27:2 56:9 61:2 98:14 168:15 <b>starting</b> 8:5 9:24 18:11 <b>starts</b> 147:1 <b>state</b> 33:13 77:17 130:6 136:14 155:8 157:14 167:18 <b>stated</b> 42:13 43:19 53:6 81:7 <b>statement</b> 17:8 43:24 102:3 114:16 133:3 140:24 142:4,10 142:22 143:3 145:2,20,24 146:11 150:24 151:6 157:16 177:12 179:6,12 181:18 182:4 <b>statements</b> 87:24 109:9,12 132:14 157:19 160:24 178:4 181:13,24 182:1,3 <b>states</b> 3:16 71:22 145:2 <b>station</b> 163:11 <b>stations</b> 11:24 <b>stature</b> 139:11 <b>status</b> 96:2 110:18 121:18 <b>statute</b> 147:5 <b>steal</b> 11:21,22 <b>stealing</b> 11:11,19 11:20 <b>step</b> 150:7,9 <b>steps</b> 80:2 133:8,11 181:14,15,23 <b>Steve</b> 71:20 115:7 <b>Stockwell</b> 29:16,19 <b>stolen</b> 164:17</p>	<p><b>stop</b> 140:19 <b>stopping</b> 43:14 108:6 <b>storing</b> 129:20 <b>STRA</b> 32:2 <b>straight</b> 104:12 150:4 <b>STRAs</b> 162:22 <b>strategic</b> 8:2,6 14:10,11,12 26:18 28:17 32:2 34:13 34:18 36:18 39:6 67:17 74:23 86:17 163:5 178:24 180:21 181:21 <b>strategically</b> 122:9 <b>strategies</b> 175:5 177:19 178:9 179:10 <b>strategy</b> 60:3 90:3 136:20,22,25 137:24 165:25 166:7 168:1 175:1 175:11,12,15,17 175:20 176:3,5,8 176:16,18,23 177:3,11 178:23 179:19 180:12 <b>streets</b> 118:24 180:10 <b>strength</b> 45:24 65:17 91:20 <b>stress</b> 80:20 <b>stressed</b> 22:15 132:23 <b>stretches</b> 131:1 <b>strike</b> 167:19 172:7 <b>strong</b> 178:21 <b>structure</b> 49:2,6 55:24 <b>structures</b> 34:19 <b>students</b> 102:6 <b>studies</b> 3:8,19 <b>study</b> 3:15 18:10,18 <b>stuff</b> 24:9</p>	<p><b>Sturman</b> 49:8 96:1 <b>Sturman's</b> 172:17 <b>subclause</b> 59:8 <b>subject</b> 19:7 20:23 23:7 24:4 31:4 43:25 51:10 66:14 80:19 125:9 128:15 131:7,9,10 135:11 136:7 139:3 144:3,15 163:8 172:19 178:6,12 179:4 <b>subject's</b> 41:5 <b>subjects</b> 21:11 43:4 82:4,9 83:24 159:7,8 161:10 164:13 165:4,13 166:4,9 168:11 169:16 170:7,17 171:24 172:3 173:16 179:20 <b>submission</b> 67:8 105:24 <b>submitted</b> 153:24 157:17 160:25 <b>subparagraph</b> 136:4 <b>subsequent</b> 17:15 19:7 35:16 60:14 72:15 80:18 81:3 86:2 87:20 96:3 105:24 <b>subsequently</b> 6:10 55:16,22 117:7 <b>substance</b> 2:2 71:14 72:16 115:9 <b>substantial</b> 71:15 <b>substantive</b> 42:14 42:20 73:7,15 74:22 111:15 115:13 168:15 <b>substitute</b> 111:19 <b>subterfuge</b> 170:19 171:4 <b>success</b> 95:20</p>	<p><b>successor</b> 26:11 157:11 <b>sufficient</b> 5:2 <b>sufficiently</b> 114:13 <b>suggest</b> 30:9 47:13 86:8,25 103:22 116:23 120:20 143:7,23 <b>suggested</b> 30:7 32:6 44:25 60:5,16 62:6 63:1 64:1 92:6 109:16 112:17 146:6,10 168:4 <b>suggesting</b> 33:14 43:17 71:12 87:5 133:8 172:19 <b>suggestion</b> 43:5 45:11 63:17,21 93:17 99:8 112:21 146:16 167:25 <b>suggests</b> 156:3 <b>suitability</b> 37:11 38:4,16 148:11 <b>suitable</b> 20:16 159:13 <b>summarise</b> 113:13 <b>summary</b> 49:3 84:19 <b>Sunday</b> 25:23 <b>Superintendent</b> 46:20 47:9 66:22 85:9,14,17 87:23 89:5 93:3,7,19 94:7,13,17 <b>supervise</b> 14:10 <b>supervised</b> 14:12 <b>supplemental</b> 1:20 48:13 <b>supplementary</b> 1:18 <b>supplied</b> 22:8 <b>supplier</b> 9:15 140:9 <b>support</b> 28:12 52:10 128:9</p>	<p>173:22 <b>supported</b> 28:10 73:13 <b>supporting</b> 26:4 52:24 159:24 <b>supports</b> 148:5 <b>suppose</b> 46:12 147:1 157:1,1 174:13 <b>suppose'</b> 174:7 <b>supposed</b> 66:9 <b>sure</b> 28:19 61:6 88:3 92:4 114:24 156:17 166:25 171:1 179:3 <b>surrogate</b> 65:24 <b>surveillance</b> 10:2,6 10:8,12,14 33:16 114:5 <b>surveyed</b> 164:14 <b>suspected</b> 113:17 164:13 178:25 179:23 182:9 <b>suspects</b> 51:1 168:18 <b>suspects'</b> 50:24 <b>suspended</b> 37:6 122:18 <b>suspension</b> 121:22 123:23 <b>suspicion</b> 172:3 <b>sustainable</b> 182:13 <b>Swansea</b> 6:10 <b>Sweeney</b> 84:13,17 85:3 <b>sworn</b> 1:5 184:5 <b>synthesised</b> 40:14 40:18 <b>system</b> 19:17,21 20:2 21:16 23:22 24:15 38:11 65:23 65:25 66:4,12 67:5 103:6 110:5 121:1 126:11 127:12,17,20</p>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

129:10,16,19,19 133:16 134:8 137:7,10 138:10 142:5,13 144:6 159:15 161:16 180:18 <b>systems</b> 15:13,14 16:15,25 17:13,15 18:9 19:25 21:13 21:18 38:2 77:6 125:20 127:10 129:12 130:15 133:5 137:16 138:2,8	47:1 74:12 84:6 93:12 112:9,10,23 113:1,23 114:12 115:4 131:23 133:12 166:25 167:20 170:6 180:23 182:21 <b>tailed</b> 14:4,6 <b>take</b> 4:25 11:23,25 25:21 26:1 31:3 39:1 53:25 55:1 57:1 80:1 82:23 85:10 93:16 106:15 107:5 111:18 129:14 130:2 131:3 134:18 135:4 140:10 169:15 180:8 <b>taken</b> 28:21 35:24 38:8 50:20 55:17 55:20 64:6 65:22 76:20 86:22 88:7 97:4 98:9,17 109:3 118:23 123:7 133:11 134:4 142:19 146:5 149:25 168:3 174:20,24 175:14 <b>takes</b> 52:13 <b>talking</b> 44:3,7 126:25 150:17 158:11 <b>tannoys</b> 171:13 <b>TAs</b> 42:24 70:23 <b>Taser</b> 16:25 17:9 17:11 18:14 19:9 19:23 125:16 130:15 132:15 134:23,24 136:8 136:15 148:16,21 <b>task</b> 38:8 128:15 <b>tasks</b> 49:21 167:3 <b>team</b> 10:10 33:17	107:17 108:18 119:1 178:25 180:18 182:9 <b>tearing</b> 171:21 <b>technical</b> 25:15 39:20 117:5 119:12 142:16 151:2 <b>technically</b> 14:4 96:7 100:24 119:9 158:7 <b>technologies</b> 19:13 19:14 20:13 21:19 22:17 24:2 133:12 144:2 <b>technology</b> 17:7,17 17:19 18:20 19:19 23:22 135:10,24 155:3 <b>telephones</b> 164:16 <b>tell</b> 4:4 22:1 26:19 66:5 116:19 117:12 152:14 162:25 171:6 <b>telling</b> 24:13 81:2 92:11 <b>template</b> 55:18 <b>temporarily</b> 35:25 37:6 86:22 <b>temporary</b> 35:23 36:2 123:12 <b>tend</b> 31:16 67:6 75:16 <b>tender</b> 19:22 <b>tends</b> 103:22 <b>term</b> 17:4 122:6,10 127:16 178:19 <b>termed</b> 43:20 <b>terminated</b> 21:8 <b>terms</b> 3:22 5:9 14:3 15:20,24 17:9,12 18:24 22:1,10 32:10 41:16 44:21 61:1 65:22 67:8 67:13,15 82:20	85:22,23 94:25 95:19 104:2 106:4 109:25 116:6 117:15 118:13 150:1 153:12 174:15 175:2 177:11 178:2 <b>terrorism</b> 7:14 27:19,21 <b>terrorist</b> 7:11 12:21 27:23 28:15,16 29:7 94:11 <b>Terry</b> 84:13 141:24 <b>test</b> 28:9 <b>tested</b> 20:3 24:3 28:11 89:8 142:24 <b>testers</b> 135:14 <b>testing</b> 20:9 21:7 134:1,19 135:6,12 137:21 139:6,7 158:21 159:14 <b>tests</b> 135:21 <b>text</b> 127:3 <b>TFC</b> 4:25 33:9 41:3 41:9,14 62:13 65:21 66:9 67:2 70:23 72:2,19 94:1 114:10 167:18,22 172:6 172:22 173:4 <b>TFC's</b> 92:9,14 167:7 <b>TFCs</b> 170:11 <b>TFU</b> 130:7 <b>Thames</b> 11:12 <b>thank</b> 1:4,6 2:5 13:1 19:10 21:12 39:14 47:20 55:2 55:7 95:2,10 124:2 126:18 139:21,24 144:25 175:9 182:22,24 182:25 183:2,4 <b>thefts</b> 11:11 <b>theme</b> 45:19 168:10	<b>thing</b> 23:21 36:18 43:9 123:8 140:21 156:17 157:23 158:13 172:8 179:25 <b>things</b> 23:13 27:9 37:2 39:9 52:24 65:3 88:20 91:3 107:10 111:25 130:14 138:9 156:4 171:15,20 <b>think</b> 1:15 2:21 3:8 5:10 6:17 7:20 8:8 9:6,11 10:15 13:3,8,23 31:8,16 31:19,25 32:17 33:4,8 39:1,4,15 40:14 43:15,21 44:19,20,22,25 46:2,4,17 47:22 48:21 51:14,20 56:10 59:10 60:16 62:20 63:6,12,17 63:23 65:19 66:3 66:21 67:23 68:8 71:15 73:5 77:20 78:11,18 79:8 80:12 83:19 85:16 87:19 90:12 92:2 92:16 93:22 94:5 95:19 96:8,11 98:6,7,12,24 99:7 99:12 100:17 101:25 107:3 108:13,21 109:6,9 111:6 112:22 113:2 114:16 115:15 117:14,25 122:4,12,24 123:10 127:14,16 128:13,20 129:24 134:23 136:23 138:1 141:10,14 143:15,19 145:25 147:14,15 149:10
<b>T</b>				
<b>TA</b> 112:6 <b>tab</b> 18:6 <b>TAC</b> 62:13 66:10 67:2 71:24 72:19 75:3 112:18 116:11 119:3 <b>tactic</b> 50:22,25 72:3 72:4 73:17,18 111:23 112:6,13 112:16,19 113:7 169:1 170:1,11,19 170:22 171:4 <b>tactical</b> 13:21 26:18 28:18 34:13 36:17 41:17 42:2 60:15 70:5 75:1,15 82:8 85:25 93:22 107:14 110:12 111:21 112:4,8,14 112:24 113:10 114:8,22 116:10 117:3,5,8,9,10,16 117:19 118:4 121:19 166:23 168:24 175:2 177:4,4 179:12 181:1,16 182:20 <b>tactically</b> 181:8 <b>tactics</b> 16:16 19:12				

151:22 153:5,14 153:20 154:14,21 155:15 156:2,10 156:18,19 157:23 159:17 161:13,23 162:11,14,22 166:13,17 167:3 167:13,20,25 168:2 169:3,9,14 171:5 172:5 177:6 177:24 178:13 179:25 180:14 181:9,22,25 182:3 <b>thinking</b> 44:8 81:15 134:22 136:19 <b>third</b> 124:24,25 129:14 <b>thirdly</b> 61:15 65:7 69:8 115:17 <b>Thompson</b> 141:18 144:8,12 145:2 146:10 148:17 150:20 161:1 162:7 <b>Thompson's</b> 145:20 <b>thorough</b> 47:7 80:2 <b>thought</b> 49:13 132:17 171:9 <b>thoughts</b> 135:19 <b>thousands</b> 48:8,8 <b>threat</b> 7:11 12:10 13:22 20:12 21:10 32:3 41:4 43:3,12 58:21 59:21,22 60:1,7,12,18,20 60:25 61:17 64:4 72:1 79:4,8,14,22 80:10,19 81:20 82:2,3,6,14,18,24 83:2,4,10,13,14 83:20,23 84:5 90:3 139:17,18 174:8 175:13,17	176:10 <b>threatening</b> 122:6 123:5 <b>threats</b> 8:18 10:23 32:5 53:10 61:7 61:12 <b>three</b> 6:14 26:2 32:12 36:3 62:19 77:12 78:17,22 83:7 84:3 128:14 132:6 144:18 162:11 <b>thresholds</b> 72:19 <b>thrown</b> 138:22 <b>tie</b> 61:2 <b>time</b> 4:14 6:9,12 8:3,4,23 9:15 10:4 10:11,16,18 11:17 12:18,23 13:3 19:20 21:11 23:25 25:20 26:4 27:10 27:17,22 36:12 44:10 46:6 51:21 52:17 60:1 62:10 62:13 66:15 70:25 73:10 79:20 80:6 80:24 92:7,17 96:7 97:20,24 98:13,15 99:18 102:20 103:18 104:4,7 105:13 106:11 108:8 110:19 111:8 112:3 128:18 130:4,13 135:8 139:19,23 142:14 143:17 146:5 147:10 154:3 156:18 157:14 158:12 162:2 167:2 168:23 169:1,3,4,11 170:24 171:1 172:11 175:22 179:1 180:3	<b>times</b> 6:15 32:12 36:19 81:8 90:1 90:14 175:24 <b>timescale</b> 170:23 <b>timings</b> 102:7 <b>tipping</b> 4:24 72:17 166:1,3,5,7,19,20 167:7,10,17,21 170:10 172:5 180:5 <b>today</b> 173:7 <b>told</b> 20:15 32:19 46:23 73:2 151:23 <b>tolerant</b> 44:15 65:14 66:1 67:17 68:6 69:6 <b>tool</b> 63:12 <b>top</b> 9:24 76:19 116:13 178:1 <b>topic</b> 84:9 <b>totally</b> 122:22 <b>touched</b> 94:4 <b>towns</b> 11:23 <b>traffic</b> 103:20 <b>tragic</b> 16:10 52:14 <b>trail</b> 19:4 39:10 76:21 105:18 142:20 160:12 163:9 176:4,18 <b>trail/rationale</b> 142:2 <b>train</b> 57:23 <b>trained</b> 7:7 9:3 10:2,12,13 34:25 51:18 103:10 110:20 114:8,17 <b>training</b> 8:21,21,24 9:4,7,10,16,18 13:9,15 15:6 25:16 26:19 27:1 27:3,5,11,13,15 28:25 29:1,13 34:12,15,16,21 50:4 55:19,24 60:15 61:23 62:2	91:10 92:12 93:2 96:3,6,14,18,21 96:24 97:1,7,9,20 97:22,24 98:11,18 98:23 99:3,3,10 99:14 100:10 101:20 102:15,16 103:7,15 105:24 106:2,7,9,15,25 108:2,24,25 111:18 120:8 122:8 127:19 129:23 138:10,17 139:5,13 150:19 152:19,23,25 177:25 <b>transfer</b> 68:19 <b>transformed</b> 153:4 <b>transition</b> 8:5 <b>translate</b> 133:2 176:25 <b>translating</b> 179:18 181:12 182:1,3 <b>transparent</b> 44:23 155:20,23 156:23 <b>trap</b> 50:14 <b>traumatic</b> 52:17 <b>treat</b> 63:10 <b>treated</b> 78:25 <b>Trevor</b> 102:3 <b>trial</b> 18:11,14 148:16,21 <b>trials</b> 17:25 18:1 149:1 <b>tribunals</b> 3:5 <b>tried</b> 50:6 <b>tries</b> 21:13 <b>true</b> 1:23 <b>truth</b> 134:19 <b>try</b> 21:18 104:19 133:16 180:17 <b>trying</b> 21:3 61:4,10 87:25 107:17 <b>turn</b> 3:7 23:2 42:7 47:21 48:19 49:25	58:22 69:24 79:3 80:5 83:7 84:1,9 85:9 95:16 100:2 110:12 119:16,24 124:3 126:13 130:19 140:4 159:19 164:5 172:12 175:1 <b>turned</b> 18:3 106:6 <b>turning</b> 95:11 101:23 <b>turns</b> 84:3 <b>two</b> 1:12,23 6:10 26:2 42:21 44:7,9 52:3 61:11 62:18 98:21 100:9,13 101:6 102:4 124:22 132:6 147:25 162:12,21 174:24 <b>two-person</b> 29:21 <b>two-tones</b> 171:22 <b>type</b> 9:13,22 10:23 47:11 74:7 112:19 118:2,18 132:1 170:19 <b>types</b> 6:25 155:6 <b>typographical</b> 1:25 <hr/> <b>U</b> <b>U-G-L-O-W</b> 28:2 <b>Uglow</b> 27:24 28:2 <b>UK</b> 16:24 17:21,22 18:2,14 19:6,13 20:4,17 23:23 24:4,22 26:18 106:6 129:2,8 130:6 134:9,12 152:1 154:24 158:21,21,22 <b>UK's</b> 16:7 <b>ultimately</b> 58:11 60:3 <b>umbrella</b> 16:20 <b>umpire</b> 27:18,20
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

<b>unable</b> 114:10	165:10	90:13,21 92:1	157:22,25 158:15	63:3 74:17 114:23
<b>unacceptable</b> 49:24	<b>United</b> 3:16 22:14	93:12,13 94:18	159:5,7 169:16,18	131:3 137:17
<b>unapproved</b> 24:6	24:21 34:25 146:8	114:9 115:18,21	172:4	141:19 152:10
120:16 140:11	<b>University</b> 3:19	116:2 120:4,7,9	<b>vehicles</b> 12:1,9 13:9	158:2,14
<b>unborn</b> 134:25	136:15	121:8 124:8	113:25 118:16	<b>wanted</b> 23:21 61:6
<b>uncertainties</b> 51:9	<b>unknown</b> 61:2	129:21,24 137:2	138:23 164:15	61:12 158:4 160:4
164:12,19	161:8	138:3 141:2,7	<b>verification</b> 135:6	<b>wanting</b> 171:17
<b>unclear</b> 120:25	<b>unobtainable</b> 49:23	144:1 146:2	<b>version</b> 31:13 44:4	<b>warning</b> 63:2,5,7
167:14	<b>unplanned</b> 140:11	150:12 151:25	60:23,23 127:2	63:10,19,22 80:25
<b>understand</b> 29:9	<b>unpredictability</b>	152:2,12 153:17	156:18	<b>warrant</b> 123:12
63:14 73:8 82:13	50:24	154:2 155:23	<b>version-controlled</b>	<b>wasn't</b> 19:19 20:23
91:19 106:18	<b>unrealistic</b> 51:16	156:7 159:5 160:7	42:25	38:8 47:7 55:18
111:23 143:17	51:22	160:13 162:16	<b>versions</b> 46:13 76:6	64:25 73:22 98:19
150:5 152:11	<b>unresearched</b>	164:14,17 171:13	<b>vested</b> 110:2	105:5 152:4
157:23 167:10	161:8	173:15 174:10,19	<b>view</b> 17:17 22:5	<b>watching</b> 111:18
178:15 181:10	<b>unresolved</b> 101:1	180:23 181:2	52:16 71:3 85:7	<b>way</b> 2:6 14:11
182:8	<b>unsuccessful</b> 53:4	<b>user</b> 42:6	98:19,22 103:3	46:10 56:15 64:18
<b>understandable</b>	<b>untested</b> 24:6	<b>uses</b> 122:6	104:25 111:4	67:4 68:25 73:24
44:16 106:23	<b>untoward</b> 144:6	<b>usual</b> 46:11 67:23	112:2,3 115:10	74:6 79:13 81:23
<b>understanding</b>	<b>unusual</b> 42:13,19	77:4,9 104:16	116:18 119:8,22	82:1,16 91:10
62:24 63:24 64:24	46:2,11 67:23,25	<b>usually</b> 72:5	120:17 121:24	97:14 101:14
81:10 102:18	78:17 90:23 91:1	<b>utilise</b> 90:21 118:7	123:4,7 130:3	112:2 114:16
107:14 116:7,19	91:3 94:24 123:15	<b>utilised</b> 116:1	132:4 137:12	116:18 120:20
128:18 130:9	165:8	165:25	147:10 154:12	127:23 133:1
146:20 158:3	<b>unwise</b> 134:6	<b>utility</b> 47:13 56:2	160:1 166:2	138:19 149:16
161:17 165:12	<b>update</b> 15:7	137:20 138:19	167:16 173:7	154:11,25 170:21
<b>understates</b> 145:20	<b>updated</b> 42:25 46:3		<b>views</b> 162:4	171:2 172:21
<b>understood</b> 130:18	<b>updates</b> 25:16	<b>V</b>	<b>violence</b> 118:18	<b>ways</b> 33:6 69:20
<b>undertake</b> 124:11	48:10 96:23	<b>validate</b> 28:10	<b>violent</b> 51:3	<b>weakness</b> 74:6
149:12	147:24	<b>Valle</b> 11:13	<b>virtue</b> 110:22	<b>weapon</b> 8:19 15:14
<b>undertaken</b> 18:11	<b>upsides</b> 131:22	<b>values</b> 69:11	<b>vision</b> 159:8,8	16:15,25 17:15
88:9 97:5 105:12	<b>USA</b> 136:7	<b>variation</b> 63:23	<b>visits</b> 165:14	19:17,21 21:13,16
112:7 143:20	<b>use</b> 3:2 8:19 12:8,9	67:3 77:5	<b>vital</b> 41:17 122:13	23:22 42:1 79:10
<b>undertaking</b>	12:11 13:21 14:16	<b>variations</b> 45:19	<b>volume</b> 48:7 146:4	121:1 125:8 129:5
128:16	15:17,23 16:12,17	77:10	<b>volunteers</b> 52:9,20	129:13,25 134:1
<b>undertook</b> 47:10	19:9 20:4,6,16	<b>varied</b> 37:17		<b>weapon/device</b>
124:10	21:23 22:6,14,15	<b>variety</b> 128:17	<b>W</b>	23:7
<b>unfair</b> 51:15	22:16 23:23 24:6	149:10	<b>Wales</b> 5:18,21 6:7	<b>weaponry</b> 16:15
<b>unfortunate</b> 42:13	24:23 30:14 48:25	<b>various</b> 31:12	6:20 7:20 8:13	152:8 153:9,13,16
<b>unfortunately</b>	49:6,11 56:12	43:16 75:24 76:6	33:2 125:22	154:23
72:10	57:10,11,16 59:17	171:13 180:23	137:14 147:15	<b>weaponry/equip...</b>
<b>uniform</b> 4:6 170:20	63:2,19 64:12	<b>vary</b> 60:1 67:1	150:12	142:1
<b>unilateral</b> 157:12	65:23,25 66:4,9	77:21,22	<b>walk</b> 170:20	<b>weapons</b> 8:18
<b>unique</b> 116:15	67:5,18 69:5	<b>varying</b> 93:3	<b>wall</b> 20:8	15:13 17:13 19:24
164:23,24 165:8	72:17 89:24 90:10	<b>vehicle</b> 156:12	<b>want</b> 23:20 40:16	21:23 22:7 23:16

54:20 120:5 124:9 125:13,20,25 126:11 127:9,12 127:16,20 128:4 128:11 129:1,6 130:5 131:7,14,24 137:10,16 138:2 138:10 140:9 142:5,13 144:1,6 147:25 148:12 150:7 152:1 154:9 159:15 161:16 <b>Wednesday</b> 1:1 <b>week</b> 6:15 25:23 26:1 32:12 <b>Weekly</b> 5:8 <b>weeks</b> 102:4 107:12 <b>weight</b> 147:7 <b>welfare</b> 35:11 88:11 <b>well-known</b> 148:6 <b>went</b> 18:18 21:6 22:19 154:8 <b>weren't</b> 162:12 <b>West</b> 2:13,16 7:21 8:10,13,20 9:18 10:19 11:10,13 14:7 26:10,15 31:20 32:8 33:11 34:6 37:1 45:13 45:17 <b>whatsoever</b> 157:15 <b>whilst</b> 29:10 121:23 141:4 175:20 178:16 <b>wholly</b> 142:4,10,19 <b>wide</b> 11:6 63:23 <b>wider</b> 36:17 37:20 54:19 60:21 63:21 129:12 150:11 158:25 180:8 <b>Williams</b> 121:25 122:4,15 123:2 <b>Wiltshire</b> 11:13 <b>wished</b> 112:16	125:15 <b>withdrawal</b> 123:12 <b>witness</b> 87:24 107:16 140:24 142:22 143:3 145:1,24 146:11 157:15,19 <b>witnesses</b> 60:17 63:18 78:7 123:7 128:14 133:7 144:18 <b>woman</b> 134:25 <b>wonder</b> 54:23 95:16 126:14 <b>word</b> 84:11 179:19 <b>wording</b> 65:16 <b>words</b> 38:5 59:8 61:4,10 65:23 66:1 67:18 73:4 126:11 127:12 174:7,13 <b>work</b> 7:3 14:20,23 24:16 25:24 28:25 31:2,5 36:6 48:3,6 88:19 132:20 137:22 146:1,5 <b>worked</b> 18:20 <b>working</b> 7:5 14:17 30:8,14 60:2 90:3 157:11 175:1,5,11 176:22 177:3,19 178:9 179:18 180:12 <b>workplace</b> 90:22 <b>works</b> 69:20 <b>world</b> 19:5 136:3 <b>worldwide</b> 16:15 <b>wouldn't</b> 6:4 40:16 52:20 57:18 65:4 75:12 76:25 134:25 <b>wrapped</b> 180:7 <b>written</b> 70:21 73:4 75:12 95:19 96:13 109:17 144:10	145:18 161:3 <b>wrong</b> 52:25 83:8 116:20 <b>wrongs</b> 51:6 <hr/> <b>X</b> <hr/> <b>X</b> 184:3 <b>X7</b> 95:12 96:2,11 97:22 98:16,23 100:9,13,24 101:1 101:19,25 102:4,9 102:11 104:15 105:5 110:10 121:12 <b>X7's</b> 95:20 97:7 98:10 101:12 105:6,10 107:3 <b>X9</b> 119:24 120:7,9 120:10,14,21 <hr/> <b>Y</b> <hr/> <b>Y19</b> 71:21 110:12 110:18 115:7 119:9 <b>Y19's</b> 111:17 116:3 <b>year</b> 4:6 14:21 36:19 96:25 99:14 99:15 111:13 123:10 141:22 150:18 153:3 <b>years</b> 2:10 5:10 12:23 18:10,18 28:13 55:14 64:10 68:9 88:19 153:7 <hr/> <b>Z</b> <hr/> <b>Z15</b> 101:25 102:9 102:11 104:14 105:2,4 121:3,15 121:18,20 122:3 122:19 123:9 <b>Z15's</b> 122:16 123:12 <hr/> <b>0</b> <hr/>	<hr/> <b>1</b> <hr/> <b>1</b> 1:15,19 13:8 48:14 99:6,9 184:5,6 <b>1.06</b> 95:6 <b>1.3.3</b> 127:25 128:10 <b>1.4</b> 128:6,7 <b>10</b> 18:14 55:1 131:23 <b>10.30</b> 1:2 183:1,3,6 <b>100</b> 6:22 89:15 <b>107</b> 58:2 <b>11</b> 131:23 144:10 <b>11.46</b> 55:3 <b>12</b> 144:11 146:11 148:16 <b>12-month</b> 18:14 <b>12.00</b> 98:13 <b>12.08</b> 55:5 <b>13</b> 131:25 169:6 <b>14</b> 71:22 132:7 <b>15</b> 169:6 <b>151</b> 84:14,18,22 <b>152</b> 84:15 <b>154</b> 85:11 <b>159</b> 89:14 <b>16</b> 107:5,6 133:1 157:18 <b>160</b> 93:1 <b>161</b> 92:24 <b>162</b> 94:9 <b>165</b> 85:11 <b>167</b> 95:15 <b>168</b> 95:25 <b>17</b> 157:18 <b>171</b> 95:15 97:6 100:22 <b>176</b> 1:15 <b>178</b> 110:14,17 <b>180</b> 113:4 <b>184</b> 110:15 119:8 <b>185</b> 119:17 <b>186</b> 119:17 <b>187</b> 119:25 120:2 <b>189</b> 119:25 120:13	<b>1980</b> 2:8 <b>1983</b> 4:5 <b>1990</b> 4:5 5:13,16 <b>1990s</b> 5:22 56:9 <b>1991</b> 3:9 <b>1994</b> 3:12 <b>1995</b> 3:14 5:16 6:17 106:10 <b>1999</b> 56:10 <hr/> <b>2</b> <hr/> <b>2</b> 15:23 60:19 67:21 93:4 165:25 167:8 177:25 <b>2.1.3</b> 128:19,23 <b>2.1.4</b> 129:16 <b>2.10</b> 95:5 <b>2.13</b> 128:24,25 130:5 <b>2.14</b> 129:11 <b>2.17</b> 95:8 <b>20</b> 143:3 <b>20:20</b> 51:8 <b>2000</b> 2:13 6:17 7:20 8:3,8 9:22 12:13 27:18 56:10 146:6 153:5 <b>2002</b> 14:20 15:1 21:20 25:20 <b>2003</b> 22:23,25 23:5 27:16 125:7,12 143:11 145:22 146:20 147:2 161:22 <b>2004</b> 140:9 <b>2005</b> 2:16 56:16 132:11 141:1 <b>2006</b> 132:11 <b>2007</b> 124:5,11 130:8 131:9 132:11 144:10,11 145:22 146:17 148:16 162:17,22 162:24 <b>2008</b> 2:19 8:8 9:6
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9:22 12:13 13:23	<b>3</b>	<b>4.35</b> 133:3	<b>73</b> 30:17 47:23 78:9
15:2 25:21 26:14	<b>3</b> 22:25 60:19 67:22	<b>42</b> 144:21,24	130:19,24 131:1
27:16,18 31:3	70:24 71:21 80:7	<b>420</b> 173:25	<b>70</b> 52:2 103:19
156:18 162:22	85:5 93:4 94:8	<b>421</b> 173:25	<b>71</b> 52:2 105:21
<b>2009</b> 30:24 31:4,14	95:13 100:14,24	<b>49</b> 1:19	106:14
31:16 56:17 60:23	101:3 102:13		<b>73</b> 124:14
96:2 141:22 156:5	103:21,21 110:13	<b>5</b>	<b>74</b> 121:11 124:14
<b>2010</b> 29:18 98:25	119:3,11,20 121:9	<b>5</b> 1:19 18:4,6	124:22
146:7	122:20 123:25	<b>5.1</b> 176:2	<b>75</b> 121:15
<b>2011</b> 30:22 31:13	165:25 167:9	<b>5.23</b> 76:18	<b>77</b> 101:24 121:11
85:19 96:6 99:3,4	<b>3.15</b> 110:13	<b>5.24</b> 118:6	<b>78</b> 100:2,6
99:4,6,9 111:7	<b>3.20</b> 139:25	<b>5.39</b> 175:6	<b>79</b> 100:11
120:9	<b>3.30</b> 140:2	<b>50</b> 145:2 150:17	
<b>2011/beginning</b>	<b>30</b> 27:17 141:14,15	<b>51</b> 49:16	<b>8</b>
14:5	<b>303</b> 20:1 148:1	<b>529</b> 126:24	<b>8</b> 131:5
<b>2012</b> 2:10,12,22,24	<b>31</b> 99:7,9 142:21	<b>53</b> 146:9	<b>80</b> 100:2,6
5:13 9:6 14:5	<b>32</b> 2:10 143:2	<b>530</b> 126:21	<b>81</b> 85:12
37:9 47:23 48:5	<b>33</b> 141:15	<b>54</b> 54:3 148:9	<b>82</b> 23:2 125:5,23
56:12 57:23 62:11	<b>333</b> 76:17	<b>540</b> 127:6 175:19	<b>84</b> 85:12
63:4 81:6 94:8	<b>334</b> 76:20	<b>55</b> 39:16	
99:7,9 102:13	<b>336</b> 175:8	<b>59</b> 151:11	<b>9</b>
105:11 107:6	<b>34</b> 29:23 141:17	<b>5x5</b> 65:23,24 66:11	<b>9</b> 131:22
155:14	144:9	<b>5x5x5</b> 65:15 66:4	<b>95</b> 159:19
<b>2013</b> 31:18	<b>340</b> 69:24 70:7	67:16	<b>95(a)</b> 159:22
<b>2016</b> 1:14 48:4,5	<b>341</b> 70:18		
<b>2017</b> 1:1,19 48:14	<b>342</b> 71:18	<b>6</b>	
<b>202</b> 40:20	<b>344</b> 69:25	<b>6.10</b> 58:23,24,25	
<b>22</b> 5:10	<b>345</b> 64:20	<b>6.17</b> 59:20 64:3	
<b>229</b> 172:14,15,16	<b>346</b> 58:23	79:6	
<b>230</b> 172:14,15,25	<b>347</b> 79:5	<b>6.18</b> 60:9,10	
<b>25/26</b> 47:10	<b>348</b> 176:14,15	<b>6.22</b> 83:12	
<b>250</b> 42:7	<b>355</b> 80:15	<b>6.25</b> 60:10,11 64:3	
<b>26</b> 1:1 162:17	<b>36</b> 18:7	<b>6.27</b> 176:13	
<b>266</b> 126:20	<b>37</b> 144:11	<b>6.3</b> 58:6	
<b>27</b> 140:4	<b>39</b> 145:19	<b>6.71</b> 80:15	
<b>276</b> 165:21	<b>3rd</b> 75:16	<b>6.9</b> 64:20	
<b>277</b> 165:21		<b>60</b> 141:17	
<b>28</b> 103:23 105:11	<b>4</b>	<b>61</b> 152:7 153:25	
122:17	<b>4</b> 1:14	<b>64</b> 131:1 152:7	
<b>288</b> 173:23	<b>4.3</b> 127:6	<b>65</b> 101:24	
<b>289</b> 173:23 174:5	<b>4.3.1</b> 126:3,12	<b>66</b> 50:20 102:2	
<b>29</b> 25:13	127:13	<b>67</b> 50:20	
<b>291</b> 174:17	<b>4.3.5</b> 126:3	<b>68</b> 51:20 103:19	
<b>292</b> 128:20 174:17	<b>4.30</b> 183:5		
	<b>4.31</b> 133:2	<b>7</b>	